Suchergebnisse

This research analyses refugee flow through a law and economics lens. This study offers a short historical overview of the creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees by examining some of these events utilizing law and economics methods. In addition, a law and economics model is applied, based on the idea that refugees, as well as national states, might aim to maximize their net benefits. Some of the most important variables that impact the refugee decisionmaking process are then explored as well as the most important "push" factors that impact lawmakers in enacting and modifying refugee laws (e.g. protection of national security and the safeguarding of the national job market). Afterwards, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is discussed, delving into the main factors for its ratification and compliance by national parliaments. Then brought forth is a study of the economic advantages and disadvantages of a centralized supernational asylum law (acquis communautaire) that may result in the elimination of competition between legal orders in refugee law and the removal of negative externalities caused by "asylum shopping". To reach the goal established in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union, the need for harmonization of asylum standards is examined through the application of an economic approach. Specifically, the economic methodology is used to investigate the application of the subsidiarity principle by considering some of the most important economic criteria for both centralisation and decentralisation and by applying the findings to the asylum law. To sum up, international refugee law will be critically analysed through an interdisciplinary approach. The principal goal is to explore the "demand" and "supply" of the "refugee law market" through the lens of the law and economics approach but with the context of human rights.

The Prevention of Catastrophes : Liability Law and Safety Regulation -- On the Edge of Prevention and Compensation : Insurance -- Solutions to the Catastrophe Insurance Capacity Problem -- The Potential Role of the Government in Compensating Catastrophic Damages -- Summary Findings and Policy Recommendations -- Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in Belgium -- Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in France -- Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in The Netherlands -- Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in The United States of America -- Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective -- General Conclusions on Financial Compensation to Victims of Catastrophes

States that developing coercion in order to protect freedom, and containing coercion in order to further protect freedom is an arduous task, and one that faces any democratic Leviathan. This book aims to explore this paradox, and to analyse the intricate balance of freedom and coercion in developing states

Rethinking the New York Convention: from a jurisprudence-oriented perspective -- The New York Convention and Darwinian legal theory -- Enforcement of annulled awards, delocalisation and game theory -- Lex Mercatoria and the New York Convention -- Public policy and the New York Convention -- Neo-New York Convention: a preliminary conclusion

Rethinking the New York Convention: from a jurisprudence-oriented perspective -- The New York Convention and Darwinian legal theory -- Enforcement of annulled awards, delocalisation and game theory -- Lex Mercatoria and the New York Convention -- Public policy and the New York Convention -- Neo-New York Convention: a preliminary conclusion

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Economic analysis of law -- Chapter 3.The context of regulation: The market and private law -- Chapter 4. An introduction to autonomous artificial intelligent systems -- Chapter 5. Unique features of autonomous AI -- Chapter 6. A comparative law and economics of torts and master-servant relationships -- Chapter 7. Fundamental legal concepts and regulatory key questions -- Chapter 8. Optimal regulatory intervention -- Chapter 9. Towards an optimal regulator -- Chapter 10. Conclusions.