Suchergebnisse

Die Verfasserin legt eine Fallstudie zur Arbeitsmarktsituation junger Menschen in Frankreich vor. Der Schwerpunkt liegt auf der kritischen Situation von Jugendlichen mit Migrationshintergrund, die im Zuge der Berichterstattung über die Jugendunruhen in vielen französischen Vorstädten ("banlieus") von den Medien breit thematisiert worden ist. Die Verfasserin zeichnet ein differenziertes Bild dieser Jugendlichen. Im Durchschnitt scheinen junge Migranten im Vergleich zu gebürtigen Franzosen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt benachteiligt zu sein, was Berufseinmündung, Qualität des Arbeitsplatzes und das Risiko der Arbeitslosigkeit angeht. Ein beträchtlicher Teil dieser Benachteiligung lässt sich jedoch durch regionale Segregation und der unterschiedlichen Repräsentation ethnischer Gruppen im französischen Bildungssystem erklären. Maßnahmen zu einer besseren Integration von Migrantenjugendlichen in das französische Schulsystem können ein möglicher Weg sein, die hartnäckigen ethischen Ungleichheiten am französischen Arbeitsmarkt auszurotten. (ICE).

This paper investigates how the labor market institutions that characterize most of the Euro- pean countries a®ect the integration process of younger workers on the labor market. We argue that young workers have private information about their abilities when entering the labor mar- ket. However, this information asymmetry does not prevail as the production process reveals the worker's type. Adverse selection distorts hiring practices at the labor market entry. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model and ¯rst derive the optimal menu of labor contracts employers can use as a self-selection mechanism. Firms o®er an increasing wage to high-productive workers while a °atter wage pro¯le to low-productive workers. Our theory suggests that a high level of ¯ring costs as well as the presence of a minimum wage prevent employers from o®ering separating contracts to new entrants and thus contribute to the time-consuming integration process of youth. Finally, we provide numerical exercises to illustrate our theoretical ¯ndings on the optimal wage pro¯le and to assess the consequences for employment opportunities.

This paper investigates how the labor market institutions that characterize most of the Euro- pean countries a®ect the integration process of younger workers on the labor market. We argue that young workers have private information about their abilities when entering the labor mar- ket. However, this information asymmetry does not prevail as the production process reveals the worker's type. Adverse selection distorts hiring practices at the labor market entry. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model and ¯rst derive the optimal menu of labor contracts employers can use as a self-selection mechanism. Firms o®er an increasing wage to high-productive workers while a °atter wage pro¯le to low-productive workers. Our theory suggests that a high level of ¯ring costs as well as the presence of a minimum wage prevent employers from o®ering separating contracts to new entrants and thus contribute to the time-consuming integration process of youth. Finally, we provide numerical exercises to illustrate our theoretical ¯ndings on the optimal wage pro¯le and to assess the consequences for employment opportunities.

This paper investigates how the labor market institutions that characterize most of the Euro- pean countries a®ect the integration process of younger workers on the labor market. We argue that young workers have private information about their abilities when entering the labor mar- ket. However, this information asymmetry does not prevail as the production process reveals the worker's type. Adverse selection distorts hiring practices at the labor market entry. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model and ¯rst derive the optimal menu of labor contracts employers can use as a self-selection mechanism. Firms o®er an increasing wage to high-productive workers while a °atter wage pro¯le to low-productive workers. Our theory suggests that a high level of ¯ring costs as well as the presence of a minimum wage prevent employers from o®ering separating contracts to new entrants and thus contribute to the time-consuming integration process of youth. Finally, we provide numerical exercises to illustrate our theoretical ¯ndings on the optimal wage pro¯le and to assess the consequences for employment opportunities.