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THE ESSAY PROVIDES AN EXPLANATION FOR THE EXISTENCE OF STABLE LOGROLLING ARRANGEMENTS. THE MODEL PRESENTED ASSUMES THAT ISSUES ARE VOTED ON ONE AT A TIME, THAT PEOPLE ARE RISK AVERSE, AND THAT EACH PERSON FORECASTS FUTURE ISSUE DECISIONS WITH A RANDOM VARIABLE WHOSE MEAN IS LINEAR IN THE ALTERNATIVES OF THE PRESENT ISSUE. THE AUTHORS SHOW THAT UNDER THIS MODEL THE EXPECTATION THAT LOGROLLING WILL TAKE PLACE STABILIZES THE LOGROLLING PROCESS. FOR THIS EXPECTATION TO BE STABLE, IT MUST BE SYMMETRIC, WHICH MEANS THAT REVOTING OF ISSUES MUST BE POSSIBLE.

This paper presents spatial models of logrolling in the EU. It analyzes the Commission appointment, logrolling, & policy-making processes under the EU's principal legislative procedures: the consultation, cooperation, & codecision procedures. The theory characterizes equilibrium EU policies & sets of successful policies, ie, sets of policies that can become EU policy during the logrolling & policy-making processes. It also determines countries' optimal nomination strategies & countries' & legislators' optimal voting strategies during the Commission appointment process. It concludes that the EU institutions provide opportunities for efficient & stable exchanges of votes. 8 Figures, 34 References. Adapted from the source document.