Suchergebnisse

Despite vast natural resources and geographic advantages in the Asia-Pacific region, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Philippines was ranked among the lowest in the region for the past 30 years. Some challenges, including high-level public corruption, low economic development and the government's inability to establish a good business environment, are seen to have reduced FDI. Moreover, the Philippines still remains lagging in the South East Asian region in terms of FDI despite recent developments, such as good GDP figures and the reforms put in place by President Benigno Simeon Aquino III. This may imply an interval between the reforms made and their impact on FDI. Thus, this study investigates the lagged effects of the government's anti-corruption stance, reforms undertaken to facilitate business and economic growth on FDI in the Philippines. In the process, it draws on both qualitative and quantitative data: The latter utilises an auto-regressive distributed lagged model to find possible time intervals on the impact of variables with each other, while the former provides support through a narration of historical developments, trends and explanations rooted on theoretical foundations.

This paper revisits four recent cross-country empirical studies on the effects of inequality on growth. All four studies report strongly significant negative effects, using the popular system generalized method of moments estimator that is frequently used in cross-country growth empirics. This paper shows that the internal instruments relied on by this estimator in these inequality-and-growth regressions are weak, and that weak instrument-consistent confidence sets for the effect of inequality on growth include a wide range of positive and negative values. This suggests that strong conclusions about the effect of inequality on growth— in either direction—cannot be drawn from these studies. This paper also systematically explores a wide range of alternative sets of internal instruments, and finds that problems of weak instruments are pervasive across these alternatives. More generally, the paper illustrates the importance of documenting instrument strength, basing inferences on procedures that are robust to weak instruments, and considering alternative instrument sets when using the system generalized method of moments estimator for cross-country growth empirics.

PurposeMentor secure-base support, characterized as mentor availability, noninterference and encouragement of growth, has important implications for newcomer socialization. Drawing on attachment theory, this paper aims to examine the relationship between mentor secure-base support and newcomers' workplace courage.Design/methodology/approachData were collected at three time points with a new police officer sample (n = 124). A cross-lagged panel design was used to test the hypotheses.FindingsMentor secure-base support is causally precedent to newcomers' workplace courage, whereas the reverse relationship from workplace courage to mentor secure-base support was not held.Practical implicationsTo help newcomers integrate into their organization and enhance their workplace courage, organizations should actively promote and foster mentoring relationships in which mentors can provide a secure base for mentees.Originality/valueThe authors' findings support that newcomers' workplace courage can be cultivated by mentor secure-base support. It provides insight for organizations to explore workplace courage development for newcomers.

Recent years have seen a sustained research effort exploring the African development experience. The extant literature has offered a large set of explanations as to why the African development record has lagged behind that of other regions of the developing world. This new volume brings international contributors together to focus on the role of growth and institutions. First, it provides brief evidence on the growth and institutional records, as well as on development outcomes, during the post-independence period. Second, it targets certain growth determinants, including industrial embeddedne

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the pre-crisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. so-called de-financialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new 'secular stagnation' in the current age of financialisation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the pre-crisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. so-called de-financialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new 'secular stagnation' in the current age of financialisation. ; FCT

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the pre-crisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. so-called de-financialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new 'secular stagnation' in the current age of financialisation. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

ABSTRACTThis paper revisits the issue of conditional volatility in real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates for Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Previous studies find high persistence in the volatility. This paper shows that this finding largely reflects a nonstationary variance. Output growth in the six countries became noticeably less volatile over the past few decades. In this paper, we employ the modified iterated cumulative sum of squares (ICSS) algorithm to detect structural change in the variance of output growth. One structural break exists in each of the six countries after identifying outliers and mean shifts in the growth rates. We then use generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) specifications, modeling output growth and its volatility with and without the break in volatility. The evidence shows that the time‐varying variance falls sharply in Canada and Japan, and disappears entirely in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, once we incorporate the break in the variance equation of output for the six countries. That is, the integrated GARCH (IGARCH) effect proves spurious and the GARCH model demonstrates misspecification, if researchers neglect a nonstationary variance. Moreover, we also consider the possible effects of our more correct measure of output volatility on output growth as well as the reverse effect of output growth on its volatility. The conditional standard deviation possesses no statistical significance in all countries, except a significant negative effect in Japan. The lagged growth rate of output produces significant negative and positive effects on the conditional variances in Germany and Japan, respectively. No significant effects exist in Canada, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

This paper draws an empirical reassessment of the finance-growth nexus by performing a panel data econometric analysis for all 28 European Union countries over 27 years from 1990 to 2016. Since the mid-1980s, the financial system has experienced a strong liberalisation and deregulation by preventing its beneficial effects on the real economy. This phenomenon, typically called financialisation, points to a negative view of finance and contradicts the well-entrenched hypothesis on the finance-growth nexus. We estimate both linear and non-linear growth models by incorporating seven proxies of finance (money supply, domestic credit, financial value added, short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate, stock market volume traded and stock market capitalisation) and five control variables (the lagged growth rate of the real per capita gross domestic product, the inflation rate, the general government consumption, the degree of trade openness and the education level of the population). Our results show that finance has impaired economic growth in the EU countries, both in the precrisis period and in the crisis and post-crisis periods. The enormous growth of domestic credit and of the financial value added have been restraining the economic growth of the EU countries since 1990 and particularly up until the Great Recession. This implies the need to reduce the prominence of finance, i.e. socalled definancialisation, in the coming years in order to avoid the potential new ?secular stagnation? in the current age of financialisation.

In terms of output, the USSR and Japan account for one-fifth of the world's economy, occupying second and third places behind the United States. Japan has the world's fastest growth of per capita income and the USSR has not lagged far behind. But a century ago they were static feudal societies. This study analyzes the policies which enabled them to transform their economies adn to catch up with the developed world.The strategies of the two nations adopted have been very different: Japan has maintained small farms and factories, developed a labor-intensive technology, and has successfully penet

While the service sector has become the dominant contributor to the Indian economy, in China it has lagged well behind the manufacturing sector. The reasons relate to the countries' differing histories and development strategies. It is expected that China's services sector will grow rapidly in the coming years. (CIJ/GIGA)