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After 9/11, Congress, federal agencies, and scholars exposed the devastating results of the national security agencies' failure to coordinate. The financial crisis has been linked to similar coordination failures in the context of interagency banking regulation, with jurisdictional gaps and blind spots resulting in failure to prevent a global recession. But despite Gilded Age-levels of inequality, little attention has focused on the failures of interagency coordination to secure Americans' access to economic opportunity through work—whether through securing higher wages and higher union density, coordinating government enforcement to achieve redistributive goals and combat consolidation of employer buyer power, or overcoming systemic abuses in employers' wage theft, discrimination, and worker mistreatment. The crippling spread of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic demands that now, more than ever, agencies coordinate in their regulation of labor markets to accomplish micro– and macroeconomic policy goals. This Essay is a component of a larger project that seeks to document federal agencies' selective coordination along six core policy vectors that impact work- or income-based avenues towards equality—macroeconomic, microeconomic, institution-building, industry-specific, anti-subordination, and democratic/expressive policy. It presents the results of a novel data set collecting and systematizing existing Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) authorized by the core agencies involved in labor market regulation: the Department of Labor (DOL), its sub agencies, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the Department of Justice-Antitrust Division, and the Federal Trade Commission. By hand-coding and analyzing the 112 discoverable MOUs from the 1950s to the present, the Essay presents a novel history of interagency coordination on labor regulation, highlighting which labor agencies coordinate most and least, what such coordination facilitates as a substantive and administrative matter, and the broad scope and areas of labor market regulation on which coordination has not yet occurred. It concludes by arguing that the federal government lacks a coherent, aligned vision on labor market regulation and economic mobility through work, and proposes next steps for improving agency coordination.

This work categorizes and comprehensively analyzes all of the practical aspects of international labour regulation for researchers and students of human resource management (HRM). It offers realistic policy guidelines for non-academic HRM practitioners, non governmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions and governments. The book focuses primarily upon the issues, organizations and individuals in the US that influence labour regulation - NAFTA, the US GSP programme, trade unions, activists and ""grass roots"" movements. Major attention is also given to corresponding European Union and Internat

Transnational domestic labor regulation (TDLR) is unilateral regulation introduced by a government to influence labor practices in foreign jurisdictions. TDLR has the potential to empower foreign workers and influence the balance of power in foreign industrial relations systems in ways that might lead to improved labor conditions. Particularly interesting is the potential for TDLR to harness or steer private labor regulation--the many non-state sources of labor practice governance already active in shaping labor conditions within global supply chains. However, whether governments should try to influence foreign labor practices at all is a controversial question. This Article explores the arguments both for and against a unilateral legislative strategy that aims to improve working conditions in foreign countries. While the Article ultimately supports this strategy, it concludes that the design of the model must have as its principal objective the empowerment of the foreign workers themselves. TDLR that is poorly designed or loses sight of this objective can produce harmful results that leave the workers even worse off.

Using data from a national survey of Chinese manufacturing firms conducted in 2009, the authors analyze the impact of implementation of China's 2008 labor contract law on the employment of production workers. The authors found that cities with lax prior enforcement of labor regulations experienced a greater increase in enforcement after 2008 and slower employment growth, and that this finding is robust to inclusion of a rich set of city-level controls and the use of alternative measures of enforcement effort. Although firms affected by the global economic crisis did not report less strict enforcement of the new law, there is evidence that their employment adjustment was less sensitive to enforcement of labor regulations than firms not affected by the crisis.

Between 2007 and 2017, 99 countries initiated reforms in labor regulations that affected World Bank Doing Business labor indicators. The most common topics for reforms are (i) procedural requirements in case of contract termination, and changes in notification arrangements; (ii) fixed-term contracts; (iii) severance payments; (iv) annual leave arrangements, and (v) working time arrangements. Approximately 48 percent of the reforms made labor legislation more flexible, and 52 percent enforced more worker protection. The objective of this study is to document these reforms, and identify key benchmarks in labor legislation by country groups.

We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous policy choice to analyze the adoption of child labor laws. The key mechanism in our model is that parents' decisions on family size interact with their preferences for child labor regulation. If policies are endogenous, multiple steady states with different child labor policies can exist. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive correlation between child labor, fertility, and inequality. In addition, the theory implies that the political support for regulation should increase if a rising skill premium induces parents to choose smaller families. The model replicates features of the history of the U.K. in the nineteenth century, when regulations were introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapidly declining fertility rates and an expansion of education.

More than half of private sector employees in the developing world do not receive legally mandated labor benefits. These regulations have typically been enacted by democratically elected governments, and are valued by both formal and informal workers. Increasing public enforcement (e.g. inspections, fines, and workers' access to the judiciary) can be a powerful tool to reduce violations (e.g. increase the number of employees earning above the minimum wage). Which factors determine enforcement, and whether enforcement produces more social benefits than costs, are, however, unanswered questions.