Suchergebnisse

Seit den Wahlen vom April 1994, durch die Mandela an die Macht kam, ist KwaZulu Natal die letzte Provinz Südafrikas, in der politische Gewalt herrscht. Die Provinz ist die Hochburg der Inkatha-Partei von Buthelezi, der einen sezessionistischen Zulu-Diskurs führt, obwohl er der Regierung der nationalen Einheit angehört. Anhand der Entwicklung der Slums Inanda und Bambayi am Stadtrand von Durban wird die Komplexität der Gewaltfaktoren aufgezeigt (ethnische Auseinandersetzungen, Überbevölkerung, hohe Arbeitslosigkeit, fehlende städtische Infrastruktur, politische Rivalitäten zwischen ANC und Inkatha). Weitere Aspekte sind die Spaltung der Shembe-Kirche, deren Ursprung interner Natur war, die aber gut die Widersprüche der Zulu-Gesellschaft widerspiegelt und die Kommunalwahlen vom Juni 1996. (DÜI-Ott)

"Als nach den südafrikanischen Parlamentswahlen des Jahres 1994 die von Buthelezi geführte IFP auch in der für sie so wichtigen Provinz KwaZulu-Natal deutlich an Boden verlor und der ANC seine Position zunehmend ausbauen konnte, wurden die Stimmen leiser, die für die Zeit nach den Wahlen des Jahres 1999 eine Wiederauflage der Regierungskoalition beider Parteien prognostizierten. Dennoch kam diese zu Stande, wobei Buthelezi das ihm angebotene Amt des Vizepräsidenten ablehnte und den Posten des Premiers seiner Provinz behielt, um so dem Abrutschen seiner Partei vor allem in KwaZulu-Natal gegenzusteuern. Inzwischen sind aber auch die Chancen der IFP auf die Errichtung einer Zulu-Monarchie in der genannten Provinz gesunken - ist doch auch ihr Wunsch nach einer eigenen Provinzverfassung verblasst, nachdem die geplante kommunale Neuordnung das bisherige Gefüge traditioneller Clangrenzen ohnehin zu schwächen droht." (Autorenreferat)

Diskussion der Ursprünge, Verfahrensweisen und Ergebnisse der Verhandlungen über eine neue regionale Verfassung im Rahmen der Kwazulu-Natal Indaba-Konferenz. Angesichts des ideologischen Spektrums der Gesprächsteilnehmer war es unvermeidlich, daß als Ergebnis eine Mischung zwischen liberalen Ansichten und Gruppenrechtsgesichtspunkten herauskommen mußte. Der Verfassungsvorschlag reflektiert dementsprechend in starkem Maße sowohl konkordanzdemokratische als auch föderale Elemente, wobei sich in dem Kompromiß Individual- und Gruppenrechte in sinnvoller Weise ergänzen und nicht gegeneinander stehen. (DÜI-Hlb)

POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN KWAZULU-NATAL HAS BEEN THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO THE INTEGRITY AND STABILITY OF THE POST-APARTHEID SETTLEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. ALTHOUGH POLITICAL VIOLENCE DECLINED TO NEGLIGIBLE LEVELS IN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY AFTER THE APRIL 1994 ELECTIONS, VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS AND POLITICAL KILLINGS HAVE REMAINED A FEATURE OF POLITICAL CONFLICT IN KWAZULU-NATAL. RIVALRY BETWEEN THE ANC AND THE IFP HAS THREE MAIN DIMENSIONS: A STRUGGLE TO CONTROL TERRITORY; A STRUGGLE FOR THE POSSESSION OF "ZULU TRADITION"; AND PROFOUND CONSTITUTIONAL DISAGREEMENT. VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH THIS RIVALRY IS EXACERBATED BY ACTS OF OMISSION AND COMMISSION BY SECURITY FORCES, THE PREVALENCE OF LOCALIZED "MICRO-CONFLICTS," AND THE PATHOLOGICAL SOCIAL CONDITIONS WHICH ARE APARTHEID'S LEGACY.

This is a conference paper. ; South Africa is a water scarce country which is periodically afflicted by severe and prolonged meteorological droughts. No area is immune, and includes the province of KwaZulu-Natal which receives about twice as much rainfall as the other provinces in South Africa, and has about 40 per cent of the country's rainfall runoff. A prolonged period of below average rainfall in the late 1980's had a cumulative effect on the country's water resources and when the seasonal rainfall for 1992-93 was the second consecutive year of rainfall below 75 per cent (Calow et al, 1996), the impact was devastating. Most of the areas worst affected had large rural populations. This drought exacerbated an already existing problem of inadequate water supplies. The response to this crisis was for a group of government and non-government organisations to jointly launch a drought relief programme in all affected areas. This programme was terminated in December 1993 with the onset of good rains at the start of the 1993-94 wet season. In retrospect, it was terminated prematurely as the rains ended early and many areas remained in a water-stressed situation. A second drought relief programme, organised and executed primarily by the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), was initiated in the northern part of the country in September 1994 and with continuing poor rainfall at the start of the 1994-95 wet season, in KwaZulu-Natal in January 1995. The procedures used in conducting the drought relief exercise differed slightly throughout the country according to circumstance. This paper discusses the methodology applied to the province of KwaZulu-Natal, particularly to the Zululand region in the north.

A substantial amount of effort and resources have been put into regional and sub-regional planning in KwaZulu-Natal over the last five years. At a time of demarcation changes and the advent of new rounds of planning for the incoming District and Local Councils, it is appropriate to take stock of what has been achieved, and to consider what changes will be required to meet future local government needs. The objectives of this research project were to investigate the recent regional and sub-regional planning that has been undertaken in KwaZulu-Natal; to identify the strengths and weaknesses of these integrated development plans; to assess how useful and effective they have been in guiding development and investment; to identify examples of good practice in methodology and content; and to make recommendations as to how these plans can be modified to meet the requirements of the new Councils.

This publication is an outcome of the KwaZulu/Natal Indaba (= conference) held in April 1986 in Durban/South Africa. Its aim was to establish a single legislature for KwaZulu and Natal. (DÜI-Hff)

There is a growing recognition of the dangers of electoral violence. Yet, the theoretical foundation for systematic research and for adequate policy is still underdeveloped. This article aims to develop the theoretical understandings of strategies to manage and prevent electoral violence. This is accomplished by integrating research conducted within the two academic discourses on democratization and conflict management and also by drawing on the experiences from the conflict-ridden province KwaZulu-Natal in South Africa. The five strategies identified are monitoring, mediation, legal measures, law enforcement and self-regulating practices. In the article, the functions and mechanisms of the strategies are discussed. In addition, we analyse the limitations and usefulness of each of the strategies in turn and also provide suggestions on how to improve electoral security. Adapted from the source document.