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We develop a dynamic model with knowledge spillovers in production. The model contains two opposing forces. Imitation of other firms helps followers catch up with leaders, but the prospect of doing so makes followers want to free ride. The second force dominates and creates permanent inequality. We show that the greater are the average spillovers and the easier they are to obtain, the greater is the free-riding and inequality. More directed copying raises inequality by raising the free-riding advantages of hanging back. Using Compustat and patent-citation data we find that copying is highly undirected.

We attempt to identify and measure potential knowledge spillovers in the French urban transport sector, which is strongly regulated and where a few large corporations are in charge of operating several urban networks simultaneously. We build and estimate a structural cost model where the service is regulated by a local government and is provided by a single operator. Knowledge spillovers are directly linked to the know-how of a specific corporation, but they also depend on the incentive power of the regulatory contract which shapes the effort of the local managers. Exerting an effort in a specific network allows a cost reduction in this network, but it also benefit other networks that are members of the same corporation. Our model provides us with estimates of the operators' absorptive capacity, which is their in-house knowledge power in order to optimally benefit from spillovers. We find that diversity of knowledge across operators of a same corporation improves absorptive capacity and increases the flow of spillovers. Simulation exercises provide evidence of significant reductions in total operating cost following the enlargement of industrial groups.

We attempt to identify and measure potential knowledge spillovers in the French urban transport sector, which is strongly regulated and where a few large corporations are in charge of operating several urban networks simultaneously. We build and estimate a structural cost model where the service is regulated by a local government and is provided by a single operator. Knowledge spillovers are directly linked to the know-how of a specific corporation, but they also depend on the incentive power of the regulatory contract which shapes the effort of the local managers. Exerting an effort in a specific network allows a cost reduction in this network, but it also benefit other networks that are members of the same corporation. Our model provides us with estimates of the operators' absorptive capacity, which is their in-house knowledge power in order to optimally benefit from spillovers. We find that diversity of knowledge across operators of a same corporation improves absorptive capacity and increases the flow of spillovers. Simulation exercises provide evidence of significant reductions in total operating cost following the enlargement of industrial groups.