Suchergebnisse

Over the last several years, judicial appointment procedures in the United States have become increasingly intractable. Members of both parties are seen to engage in political gamesmanship, calling the legitimacy of the appointment process into question and decreasing public confidence in both the legislature and the judiciary. Questions are even beginning to arise about whether and to what extent the United States is complying with the rule of law. Although numerous solutions have been proposed, one alternative has not yet been considered: international law. As paradoxical as it may seem, the best and perhaps only feasible solution to quintessentially domestic concerns about the appointment of judges may require parties to go outside the national legal system itself. This Article takes its inspiration from the recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Case of Gudmundur Andri Astradsson v. Iceland and applies certain principles and practices reflected in that case to the United States via the American Convention on Human Rights. In so doing, the analysis offers a useful and tangible means of addressing improprieties associated with the appointment of judges in the United States, thereby providing a new perspective on a very important problem.

I examine presidential use of public appeals on behalf of nominees to the U.S. courts of appeals from 1977 to 2005. Presidents Clinton and W. Bush have utilized this strategy far more regularly than did their predecessors. I find that presidents go public more often and more quickly on behalf of nominees facing a difficult confirmation climate, as well as on behalf of those who would diversify the bench. However, nominees who received more presidential support were not more likely to be confirmed by the Senate and appeared to be less likely to be confirmed. These findings indicate an important shift in presidential strategy concerning appointments to the courts of appeals in the newly politicized confirmation climate. These findings also provide evidence that presidents may be motivated by factors beyond confirmation success when determining how to expend public support on behalf of individuals nominated to these important courts.