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Full-text available at SSRN. See link in this record. ; This Article offers a new approach to understanding judicial behavior which recognizes judicial heterogeneity, behavior along different dimensions, and interconnectedness among judges at different levels within the judiciary. As a result, it calls into question those fundamental premises of the predominant theories of judicial decisionmaking utilized by legal and political science scholars. This study utilizes a unique dataset of over 30,000 judicial votes from eleven federal courts of appeals in 2008. Utilizing independent measures of judicial activism, ideology, independence, and partisanship, statistical cluster analysis identifies nine distinct judging styles: Trailblazing, Consensus Building, Stalwart, Regulating, Steadfast, Collegial, Incrementalist, Minimalist, and Error Correcting. These judicial style types offer a fuller and more accurate account of judicial behavior than any of the prior models utilized by scholars.

THIS PAPER REPORTS ON A MEETING OF THE AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE WHICH MET TO DETERMINE WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES. THE NEW SOUTH WALES GOVERNMENT'S JUDICIAL OFFICERS' BILL WAS ALSO DISCUSSED. THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ELEMENT OF THE BILL WAS THE PROVISION TO MAKE JUDGES ACCOUNTABLE FOR MISCONDUCT AND INCOMPETENCE.

Explores the need for Senate oversight of presidential judicial nominations in terms of checking presidential attempts to shape constitutional interpretation, making use of historical examples. The large role that courts now play in political life, ie, in contouring constitutional meaning, was not foreseen by the Founders, nor was the president's practice of partisan nominations to press his party's ideological agenda. The contempt for other branches of government shown by the current Supreme Court is noted, along with the extraordinary manner in which George W. Bush secured his office. In this light, problems with Bush v. Gore are addressed, then briefly considered in light of the events of September 11 (2001). The issue of balancing the court is examined, stressing the presidential authority required to load the bench. Bush is seen to lack this authority, & the question arises regarding whether the Senate should allow the current constitutional revolution to continue. Balance can be achieved via (1) the ordinary political process of power shifts in political parties & (2) Senatorial attention to the life experience of nominations as well as ideology; a need for political experience on the bench is advocated. The relevance of circuit judges to the constitutional revolution is noted. J. Zendejas

The World's second oldest system of judicial review of national legislation emerged through court practice from the very first years after the adoption of the Constitution of Norway in 1814. The review is exercised by the ordinary courts at all levels with the single Supreme Court as the last instance. No specialized constitutional court has been established. The independence of the judiciary is generally recognized as high. But what degree of legitimacy should judges appointed in order to ensure ordinary judicial business enjoy when exercising a basically political function like reviewing and possibly setting aside acts of Parliament?

It is indicated that "Her majesty's judges are by nature conservative" but also human & opinionated. Here the admin'ive powers & discretion exercised by British judges & control over them are examined. These powers operate within "fashions & trends of judicial decision" in the field of law, & some of these fashions & trends are delineated under reference to various statutes & laws, as well as individual court cases. Diff's in the interpretation of law arising out of judges' pol'al att's are noted. It is up to the courts to decide how rigorous or flexible is to be their interpretation of what the statute provides & the factors influencing this interpretation are complex. Each individual regards the state sometimes as a force for greater soc justice & sometimes as a force for oppression. In the center of this ambivalence, also looking both ways, stand Her Majesty's judges, often appearing to embody in their decisions the sorts of contradictions which each individual lives in, in terms of his pol'al & personal situations. Within the pol'al & econ system, the judiciary offers as many diff faces to the dilemma of the individual in the state as anyone in society. M. Maxfield.

"What defines a president? Is it policymaking? A good relationship with the American people? Or is it legacy? Most would argue that legacy imprints a president in the American consciousness. A president's federal judicial appointees may be his or her most lasting political legacy. Because federal judges serve for life, their legal policymaking endures long after a president's term in office is over. Presidents who care about serving their mandate, who desire to maximize their policy agenda, and who wish to influence the nation's constitutional fabric appoint as many federal judges as possible. This new volume in the Presidential Briefings series shows how the president's appointment power has expanded beyond its bare constitutional outlines. In exercising their constitutional powers while paying heed to political opportunities, presidents and the Senate have together created our modern judicial appointment politics. Presidents consider a host of demographic and ideological factors, candidate qualities, and electoral politics. Nancy Maveety examines the dynamics of screening and choosing judicial nominees and analyses the institutional calculus in securing their confirmation in the face of senatorial obstruction. Maveety shows how a president can adapt to particular circumstances and provides an outline for synergistically staffing the federal judiciary, thus securing a legacy for all time."--Provided by publisher