Suchergebnisse

Cela fait longtemps que la nature est entrée dans le processus capitaliste dans ses dimensions matérielles, terre, ressources agricoles et minières, sous la forme de biens tangibles donc. Depuis quelques décennies, un phénomène nouveau apparaît. Des dimensions de la nature sont requalifiées en information, en services et en actifs financiers pour pouvoir à leur tour faire l'objet d'échanges marchands. Autrement dit une nouvelle classe de marchandises fictives apparaît (Karl Polanyi (1944)). Plutôt que de les nommer « immatérielles », je préfère parler de dématérialisation, car il s'agit d'un processus institutionnel, juridique et politique construit et voulu, et non d'une immanence. Analysant le cas des services écosystémiques, cet article propose une catégorisation permettant de comprendre comment l'institution marchande remo-dèle ainsi de grands pans de la nature, en trois grands moments. Le premier est celui de la qualification de la marchandise, qui vise à en définir les contours précis, la doter d'une mesure et de droits de propriété. Le deuxième processus est celui de l'évaluation, où l'objet considéré acquiert une valeur monétaire de référence. On parle quelquefois de monétisation. Le troisième et dernier moment de la création d'une marchandise fictive est celui de la valorisation. Il s'agit de dispositifs contractuels et/ou marchands qui transforment les valeurs en prix. Ce n'est qu'à cette ultime étape que de la valeur est effectivement créée, c'est-à-dire du capital. Malgré le caractère apparemment immatériel de ces nouvelles marchandises, les conséquences de leur création sur la nature et les relations que nous entretenons avec elle sont tout à fait matérielles.

Cela fait longtemps que la nature est entrée dans le processus capitaliste dans ses dimensions matérielles, terre, ressources agricoles et minières, sous la forme de biens tangibles donc. Depuis quelques décennies, un phénomène nouveau apparaît. Des dimensions de la nature sont requalifiées en information, en services et en actifs financiers pour pouvoir à leur tour faire l'objet d'échanges marchands. Autrement dit une nouvelle classe de marchandises fictives apparaît (Karl Polanyi (1944)). Plutôt que de les nommer « immatérielles », je préfère parler de dématérialisation, car il s'agit d'un processus institutionnel, juridique et politique construit et voulu, et non d'une immanence. Analysant le cas des services écosystémiques, cet article propose une catégorisation permettant de comprendre comment l'institution marchande remo-dèle ainsi de grands pans de la nature, en trois grands moments. Le premier est celui de la qualification de la marchandise, qui vise à en définir les contours précis, la doter d'une mesure et de droits de propriété. Le deuxième processus est celui de l'évaluation, où l'objet considéré acquiert une valeur monétaire de référence. On parle quelquefois de monétisation. Le troisième et dernier moment de la création d'une marchandise fictive est celui de la valorisation. Il s'agit de dispositifs contractuels et/ou marchands qui transforment les valeurs en prix. Ce n'est qu'à cette ultime étape que de la valeur est effectivement créée, c'est-à-dire du capital. Malgré le caractère apparemment immatériel de ces nouvelles marchandises, les conséquences de leur création sur la nature et les relations que nous entretenons avec elle sont tout à fait matérielles.

L'Union Européenne et plus particulièrement la zone euro se sont construites au cours du dernier quart de siècle en appliquant une doctrine économique articulée autour de deux principes : la flexibilité des marchés de biens et du travail, la neutralité monétaire et budgétaire de l'action publique. C'est à un recul de la souveraineté des Etats auquel l'on a ainsi assisté au nom d'une certaine vision du libéralisme. Cette évolution institutionnelle est emblématique du paradoxe de la mondialisation (Rodrik 2011) qui veut que, faute d'un gouvernement mondial, la mondialisation des échanges requière une action des Etats réduite à l'application de règles intangibles édictées par la doctrine au détriment de la démocratie et des arbitrages que celle‐ci implique. Il n'y aurait pas d'alternative autre que le repli à l'abri des frontières nationales permettant éventuellement de sauvegarder le principe démocratique mais au détriment de l'expansion des échanges et, possiblement, de la croissance. Pourtant, la question de la souveraineté comme celle du libéralisme ne sauraient être tranchées aussi facilement. Un débat existe qui conduit à considérer qu'une alternative au modèle du moment est possible qui rétablit les Etats dans leurs prérogatives sans qu'il faille renoncer aux bénéfices de la mondialisation.

L'Union Européenne et plus particulièrement la zone euro se sont construites au cours du dernier quart de siècle en appliquant une doctrine économique articulée autour de deux principes : la flexibilité des marchés de biens et du travail, la neutralité monétaire et budgétaire de l'action publique. C'est à un recul de la souveraineté des Etats auquel l'on a ainsi assisté au nom d'une certaine vision du libéralisme. Cette évolution institutionnelle est emblématique du paradoxe de la mondialisation (Rodrik 2011) qui veut que, faute d'un gouvernement mondial, la mondialisation des échanges requière une action des Etats réduite à l'application de règles intangibles édictées par la doctrine au détriment de la démocratie et des arbitrages que celle‐ci implique. Il n'y aurait pas d'alternative autre que le repli à l'abri des frontières nationales permettant éventuellement de sauvegarder le principe démocratique mais au détriment de l'expansion des échanges et, possiblement, de la croissance. Pourtant, la question de la souveraineté comme celle du libéralisme ne sauraient être tranchées aussi facilement. Un débat existe qui conduit à considérer qu'une alternative au modèle du moment est possible qui rétablit les Etats dans leurs prérogatives sans qu'il faille renoncer aux bénéfices de la mondialisation.

Economic Theory, Applications and Issues (Working Papers N°69) ; The main purpose of this paper is to propose the hypothesis that inequality was essential for the sustainability and 'development' of early agriculturally based societies that developed in Prehistory and Ancient History. This was so for varied reasons: there was a need for some members of societies - the dominant class also called the elite - to escape from the Malthusian trap. In most cases, agriculture produced a bigger economic surplus eventually. Managerial problems – such as the ones associated with storage, the division of labor, irrigation, trade –being part of the consequences of the Neolithic revolution, created pressures to develop more centralized political organizations, a process which led later to the formation of the early states. This process allowed the appearance of powerful local chiefs who changed the nature of their original communities with new forms of social organization, in which one individual and his enlarged family - transformed into a ruling elite - received the benefits of the labor of a large number of serfs belonging to less-favored communities in neighboring areas. Although the surplus appropriated by the elite was used in specific ways – consumption, investments and expenditures on armed forces - it increased the power and wealth of these societies, albeit a solution involving unequally distributed wealth. While this is not the only factor in the growing dominance of agriculturally based societies, it is one of main ones as is evidenced by considering six early civilizations resulting from the Neolithic revolution. This result involves an important modification of Malthus' theory. However, inequality - though necessary - was not a sufficient condition for the sustainability and economic development of these early societies.

Economic Theory, Applications and Issues (Working Papers N°69) ; The main purpose of this paper is to propose the hypothesis that inequality was essential for the sustainability and 'development' of early agriculturally based societies that developed in Prehistory and Ancient History. This was so for varied reasons: there was a need for some members of societies - the dominant class also called the elite - to escape from the Malthusian trap. In most cases, agriculture produced a bigger economic surplus eventually. Managerial problems – such as the ones associated with storage, the division of labor, irrigation, trade –being part of the consequences of the Neolithic revolution, created pressures to develop more centralized political organizations, a process which led later to the formation of the early states. This process allowed the appearance of powerful local chiefs who changed the nature of their original communities with new forms of social organization, in which one individual and his enlarged family - transformed into a ruling elite - received the benefits of the labor of a large number of serfs belonging to less-favored communities in neighboring areas. Although the surplus appropriated by the elite was used in specific ways – consumption, investments and expenditures on armed forces - it increased the power and wealth of these societies, albeit a solution involving unequally distributed wealth. While this is not the only factor in the growing dominance of agriculturally based societies, it is one of main ones as is evidenced by considering six early civilizations resulting from the Neolithic revolution. This result involves an important modification of Malthus' theory. However, inequality - though necessary - was not a sufficient condition for the sustainability and economic development of these early societies.

International audience ; The main purpose of this paper is to propose the hypothesis that inequality was essential for the sustainability and 'development' of early agriculturally based societies that developed in Prehistory and Ancient History. This was so for varied reasons: there was a need for some members of societies – the dominant class also called the elite – to escape from the Malthusian trap. In most cases, agriculture produced a bigger economic surplus eventually. Managerial problems – such as the ones associated with storage, the division of labor, irrigation, trade – being part of the consequences of the Neolithic revolution, created pressures to develop more centralized political organizations, a process which led later to the formation of the early states. This process allowed the appearance of powerful local chiefs who changed the nature of their original communities with new forms of social organization, in which one individual and his enlarged family – transformed into a ruling elite – received the benefits of the labor of a large number of serfs belonging to less-favored communities in neighboring areas. Although the surplus appropriated by the elite was used in specific ways – consumption, investments and expenditures on armed forces – it increased the power and wealth of these societies, albeit a solution involving unequally distributed wealth. While this is not the only factor in the growing dominance of agriculturally based societies, it is one of main ones as is evidenced by considering six early civilizations resulting from the Neolithic revolution. This result involves an important modification of Malthus' theory. However, inequality – though necessary – was not a sufficient condition for the sustainability and economic development of these early societies.

International audience ; The main purpose of this paper is to propose the hypothesis that inequality was essential for the sustainability and 'development' of early agriculturally based societies that developed in Prehistory and Ancient History. This was so for varied reasons: there was a need for some members of societies – the dominant class also called the elite – to escape from the Malthusian trap. In most cases, agriculture produced a bigger economic surplus eventually. Managerial problems – such as the ones associated with storage, the division of labor, irrigation, trade – being part of the consequences of the Neolithic revolution, created pressures to develop more centralized political organizations, a process which led later to the formation of the early states. This process allowed the appearance of powerful local chiefs who changed the nature of their original communities with new forms of social organization, in which one individual and his enlarged family – transformed into a ruling elite – received the benefits of the labor of a large number of serfs belonging to less-favored communities in neighboring areas. Although the surplus appropriated by the elite was used in specific ways – consumption, investments and expenditures on armed forces – it increased the power and wealth of these societies, albeit a solution involving unequally distributed wealth. While this is not the only factor in the growing dominance of agriculturally based societies, it is one of main ones as is evidenced by considering six early civilizations resulting from the Neolithic revolution. This result involves an important modification of Malthus' theory. However, inequality – though necessary – was not a sufficient condition for the sustainability and economic development of these early societies.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.