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International audience ; This article marks a break from the literature dedicated to assess the social cost of legal drugs (alcohol and tobacco) and illegal drugs because it also takes into account, in an Cost-Benefit analysis, the profits generated by drugs in order to measure their impact on the welfare in France in the 2000s. It turns out that all drugs have a negative impact on the welfare. Smoking decreases the welfare of €14 billion, alcohol (€7 billions) and illegal drugs (€1 billion). The difference between the effects on the welfare of the alcohol and tobacco are due to several factors: revenue and consumer surplus are higher for alcohol than for tobacco. Public finances are very favourably affected by alcohol. The external cost is almost identical. Most of the negative consequences of illegal drug use are caused by so-called "problematic drug users" most of which relates to cocaine and heroin. These drugs are little used; the negative effect on welfare is low. This research should be extended by attempting to assign precisely the negative impact of drugs for each specific patterns of consumption in order to calibrate public policies tailored to each consumer group (casual, regular, abusive). ; Cet article marque une rupture avec la littérature consacrée à évaluer le coût social des drogues légales (alcool et tabac) et illicites car il prend également en compte, dans une analyse " coût-bénéfice ", les bénéfices engendrés par les drogues afin de mesurer leur impact sur le bien-être, en France, dans les années 2000. Il s'avère que toutes les drogues ont un impact négatif sur le bien-être. Le tabac diminue le bien-être de 14 milliards d'euros, l'alcool de 7 milliards et les drogues illégales de 1 milliard. La différence entre les effets sur le bien-être de l'alcool et du tabac tient à plusieurs facteurs : le chiffre d'affaires et le surplus du consommateur sont plus élevés pour l'alcool que pour le tabac. Les finances publiques sont très favorablement affectées par l'alcool. Le coût externe est à peu près identique. Les conséquences négatives des drogues illégales sont engendrées par l'usage dit " problématique " dont l'essentiel concerne la cocaïne et l'héroïne. Ces drogues étant peu consommées, l'effet négatif sur le bien-être est faible. Il conviendrait de prolonger cette recherche en tentant d'affecter précisément l'impact négatif des drogues à des modalités spécifiques de consommation afin de calibrer des politiques publiques plus finement adaptées à chacun des groupes de consommateurs (occasionnels, réguliers, abusifs).

International audience ; This article marks a break from the literature dedicated to assess the social cost of legal drugs (alcohol and tobacco) and illegal drugs because it also takes into account, in an Cost-Benefit analysis, the profits generated by drugs in order to measure their impact on the welfare in France in the 2000s. It turns out that all drugs have a negative impact on the welfare. Smoking decreases the welfare of €14 billion, alcohol (€7 billions) and illegal drugs (€1 billion). The difference between the effects on the welfare of the alcohol and tobacco are due to several factors: revenue and consumer surplus are higher for alcohol than for tobacco. Public finances are very favourably affected by alcohol. The external cost is almost identical. Most of the negative consequences of illegal drug use are caused by so-called "problematic drug users" most of which relates to cocaine and heroin. These drugs are little used; the negative effect on welfare is low. This research should be extended by attempting to assign precisely the negative impact of drugs for each specific patterns of consumption in order to calibrate public policies tailored to each consumer group (casual, regular, abusive). ; Cet article marque une rupture avec la littérature consacrée à évaluer le coût social des drogues légales (alcool et tabac) et illicites car il prend également en compte, dans une analyse " coût-bénéfice ", les bénéfices engendrés par les drogues afin de mesurer leur impact sur le bien-être, en France, dans les années 2000. Il s'avère que toutes les drogues ont un impact négatif sur le bien-être. Le tabac diminue le bien-être de 14 milliards d'euros, l'alcool de 7 milliards et les drogues illégales de 1 milliard. La différence entre les effets sur le bien-être de l'alcool et du tabac tient à plusieurs facteurs : le chiffre d'affaires et le surplus du consommateur sont plus élevés pour l'alcool que pour le tabac. Les finances publiques sont très favorablement affectées par l'alcool. Le coût externe est à peu près ...

International audience ; This article marks a break from the literature dedicated to assess the social cost of legal drugs (alcohol and tobacco) and illegal drugs because it also takes into account, in an Cost-Benefit analysis, the profits generated by drugs in order to measure their impact on the welfare in France in the 2000s. It turns out that all drugs have a negative impact on the welfare. Smoking decreases the welfare of €14 billion, alcohol (€7 billions) and illegal drugs (€1 billion). The difference between the effects on the welfare of the alcohol and tobacco are due to several factors: revenue and consumer surplus are higher for alcohol than for tobacco. Public finances are very favourably affected by alcohol. The external cost is almost identical. Most of the negative consequences of illegal drug use are caused by so-called "problematic drug users" most of which relates to cocaine and heroin. These drugs are little used; the negative effect on welfare is low. This research should be extended by attempting to assign precisely the negative impact of drugs for each specific patterns of consumption in order to calibrate public policies tailored to each consumer group (casual, regular, abusive). ; Cet article marque une rupture avec la littérature consacrée à évaluer le coût social des drogues légales (alcool et tabac) et illicites car il prend également en compte, dans une analyse " coût-bénéfice ", les bénéfices engendrés par les drogues afin de mesurer leur impact sur le bien-être, en France, dans les années 2000. Il s'avère que toutes les drogues ont un impact négatif sur le bien-être. Le tabac diminue le bien-être de 14 milliards d'euros, l'alcool de 7 milliards et les drogues illégales de 1 milliard. La différence entre les effets sur le bien-être de l'alcool et du tabac tient à plusieurs facteurs : le chiffre d'affaires et le surplus du consommateur sont plus élevés pour l'alcool que pour le tabac. Les finances publiques sont très favorablement affectées par l'alcool. Le coût externe est à peu près ...

Kenneth Arrow is a founder of the social choice theory as well as a main developer of modern theories of market economies. Moral obligations and social norms are at the core of Arrow's ethical considerations to understand and overcome his well-known impossibility theorem of preference aggregation. Interestingly, he thinks that moral obligations and social norms are very important to overcome failures of market economies. Also, he proposed some interaction between public policies and evolution of social norms. Here, we can find a consistent and systematic thinking of Arrow's ethical considerations, which might be overlooked in spite of its importance. We believe that Arrow has political philosophy (or a theory of justice), which is quite useful to understand recent developments of behavioral economics and theories of non-market economies. Arrow's thought is totally different from Amartya Sen and John Rawls, which are dominant in modern theories of justice. Arrow's approach can shed some new lights on the subject of social justice.

Kenneth Arrow is a founder of the social choice theory as well as a main developer of modern theories of market economies. Moral obligations and social norms are at the core of Arrow's ethical considerations to understand and overcome his well-known impossibility theorem of preference aggregation. Interestingly, he thinks that moral obligations and social norms are very important to overcome failures of market economies. Also, he proposed some interaction between public policies and evolution of social norms. Here, we can find a consistent and systematic thinking of Arrow's ethical considerations, which might be overlooked in spite of its importance. We believe that Arrow has political philosophy (or a theory of justice), which is quite useful to understand recent developments of behavioral economics and theories of non-market economies. Arrow's thought is totally different from Amartya Sen and John Rawls, which are dominant in modern theories of justice. Arrow's approach can shed some new lights on the subject of social justice.

Kenneth Arrow is a founder of the social choice theory as well as a main developer of modern theories of market economies. Moral obligations and social norms are at the core of Arrow's ethical considerations to understand and overcome his well-known impossibility theorem of preference aggregation. Interestingly, he thinks that moral obligations and social norms are very important to overcome failures of market economies. Also, he proposed some interaction between public policies and evolution of social norms. Here, we can find a consistent and systematic thinking of Arrow's ethical considerations, which might be overlooked in spite of its importance. We believe that Arrow has political philosophy (or a theory of justice), which is quite useful to understand recent developments of behavioral economics and theories of non-market economies. Arrow's thought is totally different from Amartya Sen and John Rawls, which are dominant in modern theories of justice. Arrow's approach can shed some new lights on the subject of social justice.

Kenneth Arrow is a founder of the social choice theory as well as a main developer of modern theories of market economies. Moral obligations and social norms are at the core of Arrow's ethical considerations to understand and overcome his well-known impossibility theorem of preference aggregation. Interestingly, he thinks that moral obligations and social norms are very important to overcome failures of market economies. Also, he proposed some interaction between public policies and evolution of social norms. Here, we can find a consistent and systematic thinking of Arrow's ethical considerations, which might be overlooked in spite of its importance. We believe that Arrow has political philosophy (or a theory of justice), which is quite useful to understand recent developments of behavioral economics and theories of non-market economies. Arrow's thought is totally different from Amartya Sen and John Rawls, which are dominant in modern theories of justice. Arrow's approach can shed some new lights on the subject of social justice.

International audience ; We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a normative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individual behaviours and network structure. First, we characterise individual and socially efficient behaviour using the notions of communicability and exponential centrality. Second, we show, by computing the Price of Anarchy, that the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearly with the number of agents. Third, we prove that policies of uniform reduction of interactions satisfy some optimality conditions in a vast range of networks. In setting where no central authority can enforce such stringent policies, we consider as a type of second-best policy the implementation of cooperation frameworks that allow agents to subsidise prophylactic investments in the global rather than in the local network. We then characterise the scope for Pareto improvement opened by such policies through a notion of Price of Autarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global and a local equilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can be extremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy can take advantage of the network structure to design welfare improving containment policies.

International audience ; We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a normative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individual behaviours and network structure. First, we characterise individual and socially efficient behaviour using the notions of communicability and exponential centrality. Second, we show, by computing the Price of Anarchy, that the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearly with the number of agents. Third, we prove that policies of uniform reduction of interactions satisfy some optimality conditions in a vast range of networks. In setting where no central authority can enforce such stringent policies, we consider as a type of second-best policy the implementation of cooperation frameworks that allow agents to subsidise prophylactic investments in the global rather than in the local network. We then characterise the scope for Pareto improvement opened by such policies through a notion of Price of Autarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global and a local equilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can be extremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy can take advantage of the network structure to design welfare improving containment policies.

International audience ; We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a normative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individual behaviours and network structure. First, we characterise individual and socially efficient behaviour using the notions of communicability and exponential centrality. Second, we show, by computing the Price of Anarchy, that the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearly with the number of agents. Third, we prove that policies of uniform reduction of interactions satisfy some optimality conditions in a vast range of networks. In setting where no central authority can enforce such stringent policies, we consider as a type of second-best policy the implementation of cooperation frameworks that allow agents to subsidise prophylactic investments in the global rather than in the local network. We then characterise the scope for Pareto improvement opened by such policies through a notion of Price of Autarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global and a local equilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can be extremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy can take advantage of the network structure to design welfare improving containment policies.

International audience ; We investigate the containment of epidemic spreading in networks from a normative point of view. We consider a susceptible/infected model in which agents can invest in order to reduce the contagiousness of network links. In this setting, we study the relationships between social efficiency, individual behaviours and network structure. First, we characterise individual and socially efficient behaviour using the notions of communicability and exponential centrality. Second, we show, by computing the Price of Anarchy, that the level of inefficiency can scale up to linearly with the number of agents. Third, we prove that policies of uniform reduction of interactions satisfy some optimality conditions in a vast range of networks. In setting where no central authority can enforce such stringent policies, we consider as a type of second-best policy the implementation of cooperation frameworks that allow agents to subsidise prophylactic investments in the global rather than in the local network. We then characterise the scope for Pareto improvement opened by such policies through a notion of Price of Autarky, measuring the ratio between social welfare at a global and a local equilibrium. Overall, our results show that individual behaviours can be extremely inefficient in the face of epidemic propagation but that policy can take advantage of the network structure to design welfare improving containment policies.

International audience ; This paper develops a regulatory competition model to study whether and how refugee law should be centralized, and what are the consequences for refugees and for host countries. Varying refugee flows across countries lead some destinations to adopt strict measures. The resulting externality leads to a generalized "race to the bottom" of asylum law. Neither fixed nor minimum standard harmonization are found to be in the interest of both host countries. Especially the most popular destinations like EU border countries would suffer from losing discretion. However, minimum standards would benefit refugees and less popular destinations.

International audience ; This paper develops a regulatory competition model to study whether and how refugee law should be centralized, and what are the consequences for refugees and for host countries. Varying refugee flows across countries lead some destinations to adopt strict measures. The resulting externality leads to a generalized "race to the bottom" of asylum law. Neither fixed nor minimum standard harmonization are found to be in the interest of both host countries. Especially the most popular destinations like EU border countries would suffer from losing discretion. However, minimum standards would benefit refugees and less popular destinations.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.

This chapter focuses on the inner rationale and consequences of four different archetypal positions regarding how ethical and political values are tackled in welfare economics. Welfare economics is standardly associated with the welfarist framework, for which social welfare is based on individual utility only. Beyond this, we distinguish the value-neutrality claimfor which ethical values should be and are out of the scope of welfare economics-, the value confinement idealfor which ethical values are acceptable if they are minimal and consensual-, the transparency requirementfor which any ethical values may be acceptable in the welfare economics framework if explicit and formalized-, and the entanglement claimwhich challenges the very possibility of demarcation between facts and values.