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Before the 2016 US presidential elections, more than 2,000 participants participated to a survey in which they were asked their opinions about the candidates, and were also asked to vote according to different alternative voting rules, in addition to plurality: approval voting, range voting, and instant runoff voting. The participants were split into two groups, a first one facing a short set of four candidates (Clinton, Trump, Johnson and Stein), and a second one facing a long set of nine candidates (the previous four plus Sanders, Cruz, McMullin, Bloomberg, and Castle). The paper studies three issues: (1) How do U.S. voters effectively use these alternative rules? (2) What kind of candidates, in terms of individual preferences, is favored by which rule? (3) Which rules empirically satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives? Our results evidence that Bernie Sanders stands out as the "best" candidate in terms of individual preferences (using any standard criterion), and that evaluative voting rules such as approval voting and range voting might lead to this outcome, contrary to direct plurality and instant runoff voting (that elects Clinton) and to the official voting rule (that elected Trump).

National audience ; This article assesses the potential contribution of economic experiments to evidence-based policy making in the field of agriculture, with a special focus on the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP evaluation mostly relies on standard evaluation tools such as farm and market simulation models, calibrated with EU-wide statistical data, statistical and econometric analysis of survey data, and a range of qualitative methods such as interviews with stakeholders, focus group or internet-based public consultation. Yet, the CAP has changed considerably over the past decades, requiring adaptations of its evaluation toolbox. A detailed review of existing studies using economic experiments for designing and evaluating agricultural policies provides the backbone for a comprehensive assessment of the complementarity of experimental approaches with standard evaluation tools. The article also provides recommendations aiming at facilitating inclusion of economic experiments into the CAP evaluation toolbox based on conclusions drawn from a workshop organized with experts, academics and policy makers of Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission.

National audience ; This article assesses the potential contribution of economic experiments to evidence-based policy making in the field of agriculture, with a special focus on the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP evaluation mostly relies on standard evaluation tools such as farm and market simulation models, calibrated with EU-wide statistical data, statistical and econometric analysis of survey data, and a range of qualitative methods such as interviews with stakeholders, focus group or internet-based public consultation. Yet, the CAP has changed considerably over the past decades, requiring adaptations of its evaluation toolbox. A detailed review of existing studies using economic experiments for designing and evaluating agricultural policies provides the backbone for a comprehensive assessment of the complementarity of experimental approaches with standard evaluation tools. The article also provides recommendations aiming at facilitating inclusion of economic experiments into the CAP evaluation toolbox based on conclusions drawn from a workshop organized with experts, academics and policy makers of Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission.

National audience ; This article assesses the potential contribution of economic experiments to evidence-based policy making in the field of agriculture, with a special focus on the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP evaluation mostly relies on standard evaluation tools such as farm and market simulation models, calibrated with EU-wide statistical data, statistical and econometric analysis of survey data, and a range of qualitative methods such as interviews with stakeholders, focus group or internet-based public consultation. Yet, the CAP has changed considerably over the past decades, requiring adaptations of its evaluation toolbox. A detailed review of existing studies using economic experiments for designing and evaluating agricultural policies provides the backbone for a comprehensive assessment of the complementarity of experimental approaches with standard evaluation tools. The article also provides recommendations aiming at facilitating inclusion of economic experiments into the CAP evaluation toolbox based on conclusions drawn from a workshop organized with experts, academics and policy makers of Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission.

National audience ; This article assesses the potential contribution of economic experiments to evidence-based policy making in the field of agriculture, with a special focus on the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP evaluation mostly relies on standard evaluation tools such as farm and market simulation models, calibrated with EU-wide statistical data, statistical and econometric analysis of survey data, and a range of qualitative methods such as interviews with stakeholders, focus group or internet-based public consultation. Yet, the CAP has changed considerably over the past decades, requiring adaptations of its evaluation toolbox. A detailed review of existing studies using economic experiments for designing and evaluating agricultural policies provides the backbone for a comprehensive assessment of the complementarity of experimental approaches with standard evaluation tools. The article also provides recommendations aiming at facilitating inclusion of economic experiments into the CAP evaluation toolbox based on conclusions drawn from a workshop organized with experts, academics and policy makers of Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.

In this paper we experimentally investigate the consequences of electoral fraud on voter turnout. The experiment is based on a strategic binary voting model where voters decide whether to cast a costly vote in favour of their preferred candidate or to abstain. The minority candidate can illicitly influence the electoral process by applying ballot-box stuffing. In the experiment we implement two different framings: we compare voter turnout in a neutral environment and with framed instructions to explicitly replicate elections. This approach enables to both test the model's predictions and to estimate the framing effects of voting and fraud. Comparison of experimental results with theoretical predictions reveals over-voting, which is exacerbated when fraud occurs. Turnout increases as predicted with moderate level of fraud while, with higher electoral fraud, voters fail to recognize that the existence of a relatively larger number of "agents" voting with certainty considerably decreases the benefits of voting. Importantly, framing matters, as revealed by the higher turnout of those in the majority group, against which the fraud is applied.

International audience ; We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.

International audience ; We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.

International audience ; We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.

International audience ; We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions.

Cette étude présente les résultats de trois vagues de tests espacées de six mois permettant de mesurer l'évolution des discriminations dans l'accès à l'emploi selon l'origine et le lieu de résidence dans les trois départements d'Ile-de-France qui ont expérimenté le dispositif des emplois francs, mis en œuvre à partir d'avril 2018 dans près de 200 quartiers de la politique de la ville à titre expérimental. La première vague de test a été effectuée entre février et avril 2018, avant le déploiement des emplois francs, qui consistent en une aide financière aux entreprises en cas d'embauche d'un demandeur d'emploi résidant dans un quartier politique de la ville. La deuxième vague de test a eu lieu six mois après le démarrage du dispositif, entre octobre et décembre 2018. La dernière vague a eu lieu un an après la première, entre février et mai 2019. Les tests portent à chaque fois sur quatre candidats dans trois professions différentes, serveur, chargé de clientèle et comptable. Au total, nous avons répondu à 2436 offres d'emploi, correspondants à 9744 candidatures envoyées entre février 2018 et mai 2019. L'étude met en évidence une discrimination significative et robuste selon le critère de l'origine, à l'encontre du candidat français présumé maghrébin, dans tous les territoires de test et pour les trois professions testées. Nous trouvons également une discrimination plus faiblement significative selon le lieu de résidence, pour une partie des tests. Globalement, nous montrons que le déploiement des emplois francs depuis avril 2018 n'a pas coïncidé avec un changement des discriminations dans l'accès à l'emploi, selon l'origine et selon le lieu de résidence, ni dans leur nature, ni même dans leur ampleur. L'étude indique en outre que l'origine de la faible efficacité du dispositif ne réside pas dans un manque d'information des recruteurs sur les emplois francs.

Cette étude présente les résultats de trois vagues de tests espacées de six mois permettant de mesurer l'évolution des discriminations dans l'accès à l'emploi selon l'origine et le lieu de résidence dans les trois départements d'Ile-de-France qui ont expérimenté le dispositif des emplois francs, mis en œuvre à partir d'avril 2018 dans près de 200 quartiers de la politique de la ville à titre expérimental. La première vague de test a été effectuée entre février et avril 2018, avant le déploiement des emplois francs, qui consistent en une aide financière aux entreprises en cas d'embauche d'un demandeur d'emploi résidant dans un quartier politique de la ville. La deuxième vague de test a eu lieu six mois après le démarrage du dispositif, entre octobre et décembre 2018. La dernière vague a eu lieu un an après la première, entre février et mai 2019. Les tests portent à chaque fois sur quatre candidats dans trois professions différentes, serveur, chargé de clientèle et comptable. Au total, nous avons répondu à 2436 offres d'emploi, correspondants à 9744 candidatures envoyées entre février 2018 et mai 2019. L'étude met en évidence une discrimination significative et robuste selon le critère de l'origine, à l'encontre du candidat français présumé maghrébin, dans tous les territoires de test et pour les trois professions testées. Nous trouvons également une discrimination plus faiblement significative selon le lieu de résidence, pour une partie des tests. Globalement, nous montrons que le déploiement des emplois francs depuis avril 2018 n'a pas coïncidé avec un changement des discriminations dans l'accès à l'emploi, selon l'origine et selon le lieu de résidence, ni dans leur nature, ni même dans leur ampleur. L'étude indique en outre que l'origine de la faible efficacité du dispositif ne réside pas dans un manque d'information des recruteurs sur les emplois francs.