Suchergebnisse

Like a tightrope walker, the Court is engaging in a delicate balancing act in its Opinion 1/17, seeking a path of compatibility of the ICS with the treaties that will allow it not to compromise its requirement of compliance with the Constitutional Charter of the European Union.With a benevolent interpretation of the provisions of the CETA and the acts accompanying its development, it stipulates the obligations that the EU institutions will have to fulfil to ensure the implementation of Chapter 8 Section F of the CETA, and its long-term compatibility with EU law. In doing so, it validates the European model of the investor-State dispute settlement mechanism, enabling it to be applied in other bilateral agreements and, eventually, on a multilateral basis.

On 29 of October the leaders of the Belgian federal government and the regional and community governments reached a compromise deal over the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). One of the key outcomes is that the Belgian federal government will seek the Opinion of the European Court of Justice on the compatibility of the Investment Court System (ICS) in Chapter Eight of CETA with the EU Treaties. As soon as the Belgian federal government makes the request for an Opinion, the Court will be able to express itself on this contentious legal issue. This article provides some background on the origins of the Walloon request before explaining why ICS could potentially pose a legal problem for the EU.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently assessed the compatibility of the reformatory Investment Court System (ICS) of the EU's trade agreement with Canada (CETA). In the Opinion 1/17, the CJEU ruled the ICS mechanism to be compatible with EU law. This article provides a comprehensive critical assessment of the ICS mechanism and its potential adverse effects on uniform interpretation of EU law. It is proposed that, despite the favourable assessment of the CJEU, the ICS mechanism could result in indirect negative effects on the uniform interpretation of EU law and the autonomy of EU legal order. Involvement of the CJEU in the proceedings of the ICS mechanism is suggested as a possible option to resolve all the incompatibilities of the ICS with the autonomy of the EU legal order, and to ensure the CJEU's exclusive right to interpret EU law.

On 30 December 2020, the European Union (EU) and China agreed in principle to a revamped investment treaty: The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). Notably, the EU and China have not decided which investment dispute resolution system will be included under the new agreement. Instead, the EU and China are continuing negotiations on this contentious topic. This article discusses the key features of the proposed investment court system in the context of the CAI negotiations to assess whether China could agree on such a paradigmatic change that would have systemic consequences. The article explains the objective reasons behind China's partial support for the proposed reforms to the existing investor-state arbitration system. For example, China has supported adding an appellate body without accepting the EU's full-fledged investment court proposal. Finally, the article identifies the points of convergence and divergence which will shape the CAI negotiations and pave the way to global investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) reform.
comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI), investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), investment court system (ICS), United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Working Group III), Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), EUVietnam Free Trade Agreement (EVFTA), State-to-state dispute resolution, Achmea case, financial responsibility regulation, European Commission

In recent years, the foreign investment regime has been subject to an increasing volume of criticism from the public. The significant sums of money at stake and the potential impact of the awards on State's regulatory powers have placed the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (isds) under the spotlight. In response to this, the European Union has proposed a far-reaching reform which introduces an Investment Court System (ics). This model constitutes an innovative dispute settlement mechanism intended to address most of the core issues of the isds by combining elements of the traditional isds with judicial features. Overall, this paper aims at analysing whether the EU's new approach constitutes an effective improvement to the traditional isds and the future of the international investment regime. To achieve this, the study begins with an overview of the current isds; followed by a synopsis of the main criticisms to the traditional isds; proceeded by a review of the core features of the EU's proposed ics and its inclusion in the new generation of iias in negotiation by the EU; and finally, provides a commentary of the main criticisms and obstacles that the introduction of the ics is likely to encounter. ; En los últimos años, el régimen de inversión extranjera ha sido objeto de un creciente número de críticas del público. Las sumas significativas de dinero en juego y el posible impacto de los laudos en los poderes regulatorios del Estado han puesto al actual Sistema de Resolución de Controversias entre Inversores y el Estado bajo la lupa. En respuesta a ello, la Unión Europea ha propuesto una reforma de gran alcance mediante la introducción de un Sistema de Corte de Inversiones (sci). El nuevo sistema constituye un mecanismo innovador de resolución de controversias internacionales destinado a remediar los problemas centrales que acarrea el sistema actual, mediante la combinación de elementos tradicionales del arbitraje con rasgos judiciales. En este contexto, el presente escrito pretende analizar si el nuevo enfoque de la Unión Europea constituye una mejora efectiva del actual mecanismo de resolución de controversias de inversiones y del futuro del régimen de inversión internacional. Para dicho propósito, el artículo comienza con una descripción general del actual Sistema de Resolución de Controversias entre Inversores y el Estado; seguido de una sinopsis de sus principales críticas; continúa con un resumen de las principales características del Sistema de Corte de Inversiones, así como de su inclusión en la nueva generación de acuerdos internacionales de inversión en negociación por la Unión Europea; y, finalmente, hace una referencia a las principales críticas y posibles obstáculos que afrontará la introducción del nuevo Sistema de Corte de Inversiones.

Many would agree that reforms to the existing investor-State arbitration system are necessary, but opinions diverge on precisely what these should be. The European Commission's proposal is to include an Investment Court System (ICS) in the investment chapters of the European Union (EU) Free Trade Agreements. This article scrutinizes, first, difficulties in setting up an ICS: the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention's applicability, the rules regarding conflicts of interest, ethics and ancillary professional affiliations of adjudicators, and requirements in terms of nationality, expertise and diversity of the bench. Secondly, problems are examined which may emerge in running an ICS: ensuring transparency, allowing for third party participation, and avoiding major increases in length and costs of the proceedings. Thirdly, issues concerning the review and enforcement of ICS decisions are analysed. Although the Commission has made a meritorious attempt at countering the main criticisms of investor-State arbitration, several new challenges have emerged which need to be addressed in order for an ICS to be fit for purpose. Although the incorporation of investment rules into the World Trade Organization (WTO) would seem unlikely to become politically feasible in the foreseeable future, multiple bilateral ICS mechanisms could serve as stepping stones towards a multilateral adjudicatory system for international investment disputes.

Abstract
This article develops the concept of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the analysis of the case study of the Investment Court System (ICS). By providing a general framework over the criteria that have been developed by the Court, the work sheds light on the controversial principle of autonomy of the European Union (EU) and its implications to the EU's external action. The work intends to be both pragmatic and analytical. On the one hand, the criteria are extracted as operative tools from the jurisprudence of the CJEU and then used in the context of the validity of the ICS. This provides the reader with some definitive standards that can then be applied to future cases whenever a question concerning autonomy arises. On the other hand, the article questions the reasons behind the idea of the monopoly of jurisdiction of the CJEU, advancing a concept of autonomy of the EU as a claim for power and critiquing the legitimacy and coherence of its foundations. Both dimensions will hopefully help to provide some clarity over the meaning of autonomy and the monopoly of jurisdiction, while, at the same time, promoting a larger discussion on its impact on the external action of the EU.

AbstractIn April 2019, the Court of Justice of the EU ('CJEU') handed down its Opinion (C-1/17) on the compatibility of the Investment Court System ('ICS'), that is the Investor-State Dispute Settlement ('ISDS') mechanism under the EU-Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement ('CETA'), with EU law. This article puts Opinion 1/17 in its broader (policy and legal) context, focusing on the salient issue of compatibility with the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order. It argues that the Court's openness to this judicial competitor was an acknowledgment of the need to maintain the powers of the Union in international relations. However, Opinion 1/17 should not be perceived as an automatic green light for any future investment court (such as the Multilateral Investment Court) as the autonomy test it introduces is a rather difficult one to pass.

The Investment Chapter of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) can be seen as an unofficial blueprint of future EU Investment Agreements and Chapters. It was developed under immense public pressure and had to fulfil multiple conditions resulting from the EU constitutional framework. This contribution highlights the political and juridical background of EU investment policy, and then analyses the most significant new approaches in international investment law - both with regard to substantive standards and investor-State dispute settlement - as exemplified in the CETA. With regard to the substance, it can be witnessed that states are more proactive in defining investment protection standards, leaving less discretion for adjudicators. With regard to dispute settlement, the EU managed to introduce a completely new Investment Court System (ICS) with preselected adjudicators and an appellate mechanism. In light of all these developments, this article argues that we are currently facing a complete change of paradigms in EU investment law, heading towards the EU's long-term goal of establishing a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC).