Suchergebnisse

Abstract.  International outsourcing to lower cost countries such as China and India can best be understood through the enrichment of trade models to include concepts from industrial organization and contract theory that explain the vertical organization of production. The combination of trade with the choice of organizational form represents an important new area for both theoretical and empirical research. This survey paper provides a perspective on this new literature so as to gain insights into the forces driving international outsourcing. The paper focuses on relationship‐specific investment, incomplete contracts, and also search and matching, as fundamental concepts that explain outsourcing decisions. JEL classification: F1, L14

"Im Papier werden die Anreize untersucht, aufgrund derer Unternehmen mit gewerkschaftlich
organisierten Beschäftigten die Produktion von Zwischengütern
in Niedriglohnländer auslagern. Dieses Outsourcing führt zu höheren Löhnen
für die im Inland verbleibende Produktion. Es wird gezeigt, dass starke
Gewerkschaften, die für höhere Löhne am inländischen Standort sorgen, die
Anreize für die Auslagerung verringern. Dieses theoretische Ergebnis bringt –
überraschenderweise – die empirischen Beobachtungen in Übereinstimmung,
dass einerseits im Trend die gewerkschaftliche Organisation schwächer wird
und andererseits gleichzeitig internationales Outsourcing in vielen Ländern
zunimmt. Globalisierung – definiert als Integration von Märkten oder verstärkter
Wettbewerb im Produktmarkt – wird die Anreize für internationales Outsourcing
weiter verstärken, wie hier gezeigt werden kann." (Autorenreferat)

In this paper, we provide first empirical evidence on the effect of outsourcing on union wages using linked employer-employee data for Germany. We find that low skilled workers experience a decline in the union wage premium when working in industries with high outsourcing intensities. The finding applies to both firm- and sector-level agreements. Hence, outsourcing appears to deteriorate the bargaining position of unions. Outsourcing is not found to have a negative effect on the wages of low skilled employees not covered by collective bargaining agreements. While wages of medium skilled workers are largely unaffected by outsourcing, high skilled workers see their wages rise in industries with a high level of outsourcing. There is no interaction between coverage and outsourcing for these skill groups.

This paper explores the welfare consequences of international outsourcing in the presence of resulting environmental damage in a three-stage model of North-South trade. In stage 1, outsourcing firms in the North (e.g., United States [US] and Europe) cause environmental damage to the vendor country in the South, as exemplified by the People's Republic of China (PRC). But, as its primary goal, the South pursuing economic development is willing to bear the costs of environmental degradation. Moving into Stage II, the environmental deterioration becomes so severe in the South that the vendor country begins to tackle the environmental problem by enacting government regulations. As a result, the costs and, hence, the prices of outsourced goods and services tend to increase for the firms in the North. However, the environmental protection measures undertaken generally fall short of the levels needed to restore the environmental quality acceptable by WHO standards. We present a framework for analyzing the effects of international outsourcing on environment and, ultimately, social welfare in terms of gains and losses under three alternative scenarios regarding no, partial or full accountability for outsourcing induced environmental damages. The policy implication is clear: to fully resolve the environmental problem in Stage III, the implementation of strong regulations or the fostering international cooperation is desirable; that is, until the environmental costs of outsourcing are fully accounted for by the outsourcing firms in the North. Such firms, however, may react by resorting to insourcing, diversified outsourcing and other strategies.

This study examines the results of a field survey on international outsourcing conducted in 2009 in the Netherlands. The research sample is composed of 156 Dutch enterprises from various industries. Empirical evidence shows that reduction of labor costs, improved competitiveness, strategic decisions taken by the group head and reduction in other costs are the main motivations for Dutch firms to engage in international outsourcing. Tax and regulatory advantages seem to play a lesser role. The motivations can be grouped into three distinct factors: access to cheaper resources and increasing competition, access to scarce and distinctive resources and reduction of other production costs. The most important impediments turn out to be problems with distance to producers, the need for proximity to existing clients, concerns about the outsourcing operation exceeding expected benefits and linguistic/cultural barriers. Violation of patents/intellectual property rights and uncertainty of international standards are not viewed as important issues. The impediments are captured by three different dimensions as indicated by the data: legal and governmental obstacles, human concerns and logistical difficulties. Article in English. Tarptautinės užsakomosios paslaugos: empirinis tyrimas Nyderlandų pavyzdžiu Santrauka.Šiame straipsnyje pristatomi tarptautiniu užsakomuju paslaugu tyrimo rezultatai. Tyrimas vyko Nyderlanduose 2009 m., jame dalyvavo 156 kompanijos, atstovaujanèios ivairiems pramones sektoriams. Empirinio tyrimo rezultatai rodo, kad darbo užmokesèio sumažinimas, konkurencinio pranašumo didinimas, strateginiu sprendimu formavimas bei kitu išlaidu mažinimas yra vieni pagrindiniu motyvu, skatinantys Olandijos firmas teikti tarptautines užsakomsias paslaugas. Mokesèiai ir teisinis reglamentavimas nera tokie svarbus. Motyvacij galima suskirstyti i tris pagrindines grupes, t. y. pigesniu ištekliu šaltiniu radimo ir naudojimo galimybe bei konkurencinio pranašumo kurimas, ribotu ištekliu naudojimo galimybes bei kitu gamybos išlaidu dalies mažinimas. Svarbiausios nurodytos kliutys—tai atstumas iki gamintojo, klientu poreikiai ir abejones del užsakomuju paslaugu laukiamos naudos, taip pat kalbos bei kulturiniai skirtumai. Pastebeta, kad patentu/intelektines nuosavybes teisiu pažeidimas, tarptautiniu standartu neapibrežtumas šiuo atveju nera svarbus dalykai. Taèiau, kaip rodo gauti tyrimo rezultatai, paèios didžiausios kliutys yra šios: teisiniai ir valdžios barjerai, žmogiškieji veiksniai bei logistikos nesuderinamumai. Reikšminiai žodžiai: užsakomosios paslaugos,tarptautines užsakomosios paslaugos,produktu užsakomosios paslaugos,neaiškios sutartys,inovacijos,išorines žinios,vidines žinios,empirinis tyrimas,Nyderlandai.

We analyze the impact of international outsourcing on income, if the domestic labor market is imperfect. We distinguish in our analysis between the case where the parties negotiate over the wage only and where they negotiate over both wage and profit share. We find that in the first case outsourcing will reduce (increase) workers' income, if the labor union's bargaining power is sufficiently high (low) and outsourcing will increase workers' income in the second case. For the amount of optimal international outsourcing, we find that it is in a pure wage bargaining system positively (negatively) affected by a sufficiently high (low) labor union's bargaining power, while in a wage and profit share bargaining system, a higher union's bargaining power decreases the optimal amount of outsourcing.

Abstract.  We consider the implications of international outsourcing in a simple general equilibrium model where the wage rate is the outcome of negotiations between a firm and a trade union. The effects of potential, but non‐realized, international outsourcing, is a reduction in the wage rate and an increase in employment. Aggregate welfare increases, but the trade union becomes worse off while owners of capital become better off. Realized international outsourcing gives rise to an increase in the wage rate and a reduction in employment. Aggregate welfare decreases, but the trade union becomes better off, while owners of capital become worse off.