Suchergebnisse

The dynamics of escalation and negotiation / I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure -- Deadlocks in negotiation dynamics / Guy Olivier Faure -- Deterrence, escalation, and negotiation / Patrick M. Morgan -- Quantitative models for armament escalation and negotiations / Rudolf Avenhaus, Juergen Beetz and D. Marc Kilgour -- Entrapment in international negotiations / Paul W. Meerts -- The role of vengence in conflict escalation / Sung Hee Kim -- Structures of escalation and negotiation / I. William Zartman -- Conflict escalation and negotiation : a turning-points analysis / Daniel Druckman -- Escalation, negotiation and crisis type / Lisa J. Carlson -- Escalation in negotiation : analysis of some simple game models / D. Marc Kilgour -- Escalation, readiness for negotiation, and third-party functions / Dean G. Pruitt -- Enhancing ripeness : transition from conflict to negotiation / Karin Aggestam -- Lessons for research / I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure -- Strategies for action / Guy Olivier Faure and I. William Zartman

How can an escalation of conflict lead to negotiation? In this systematic study, Zartman and Faure bring together European and American scholars to examine this important topic and to define the point where the concepts and practices of escalation and negotiation meet. Political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, and war-making and peace-making strategists, among others, examine the various forms escalation can take and relate them to conceptual advances in the analysis of negotiation. They argue that structures, crises, turning points, demands, readiness and ripeness can often define the conditions where the two concepts can meet and the authors take this opportunity to offer lessons for theory and practice. By relating negotiation to conflict escalation, two processes that have traditionally been studied separately, this book fills a significant gap in the existing knowledge and is directly relevant to the many ongoing conflicts and conflict patterns in the world today

Formulae are presented, based on L. F. Richardson's formulae for establishing the probable outcome of arms races designed to estimate the probable degree of escalation of internat'l conflicts. The variables in the formulae include the perceptions by the parties of the magnitude of their respective nat'l interests involved in the conflict, the forces immediately available to each, the costs of the hostilities in money & men, the world pressures for peace, the military forces of the parties & their actual & potential allies likely to be available to each in the long run, & the vulnerability of each to destruction if escalation continues. Estimates of the magnitude of these variables are made in 45 conflict situations since WWI, in 9 of which there were no military hostilities, in 20 of which military hostilities occurred but did not escalate, & in 16 of which military hostilities escalated, in 2 cases to global war. Application of these magnitudes indicated that the formulae had considerable predictive value for those conflicts which had come to an end, & predictions were offered for those in progress, on the assumption, made by Richardson, that statesmen act on the basis of traditional images & 'do not stop to think.' A brief legal analysis of these 45 situations as found by the League of Nations, the UN, & other internat'l bodies & jurists indicated that the legal obligations of the parties had less influence on their actions than the factors included in the formulae. Perceptions of might seemed to be more influential in internat'l relations, during this period, than rights under internat'l law. It is suggested that world opinion should increasingly demand clarification & observance of the obligations which nations have accepted in the UN Charter & other sources of internat'l law, & that gov's should recognize that such observance is in their nat'l interest. Modified AA.

"Conflict Escalation" published on by Oxford University Press.

Why do escalations in protracted international conflicts sometimes hasten the pace of negotiations ? And why is it sometimes the case that the resulting terms of agreement were deemed unacceptable to one or both sides before the escalation ? We analyze these issues in a game-theoretic setting with asymmetric information, in which the delay a party exercises before it makes an acceptable offer is served to signal credibly its true stand, of which the other side is initially uncertain. Escalation makes both sides more eager to settle than before, as an agreement would end the increased level of hostilities. We analyze how this effect may loosen the incentives to exercise long delays in the course of bargaining, and hence shorten the time to agreement. However, it turns out that the larger is the overall increase in violence implied by escalation, the higher are also the chances that its initiator will eventually regret its own decision to escalate. These insights emerge both with one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information.