Suchergebnisse

Contents: Foreword by Richard Bird xiii 1 Introduction to the volume 1 Serdar Yilmaz and Farah Zahir PART I CONCEPTUAL ISSUES 2 The architecture of intergovernmental transfers: principles and practice in low- and middle-income countries 7 Roy W. Bahl Jr 3 Issues in intergovernmental fiscal transfers: public finance and political economy considerations 21 Serdar Yilmaz and Farah Zahir 4 The practice of fiscal equalization: a political economy clarification 41 Bernard Dafflon and François Vaillancourt PART II INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS IN MATURE FEDERATIONS 5 The German model of addressing vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances 64 Paul B. Spahn 6 The United States grant system 86 Howard A. Chernick 7 Federal finance arrangements in Canada: the challenges of fiscal imbalance and natural resource rents 109 Marcelin Joanis and Fran.ois Vaillancourt 8 Revenue and expenditure needs equalization: the Swiss answer 134 Bernard Dafflon 9 Intergovernmental fiscal relations in Australia 163 Bob Searle 10 The economic impacts of horizontal fiscal equalization as practised in Australia 185 Jonathan Coppel PART III INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS IN EVOLVING FEDERATIONS 11 Intergovernmental fiscal transfers and performance grants in Brazil 204 Deborah L. Wetzel and Lorena Viñuela 12 Intergovernmental fiscal transfer system in Argentina: historical evolution, current performance and reform options to promote efficiency, equity and transparency 224 Marco Larizza and Julian Folgar 13 Evolving role of the Finance Commissions in India in the last 25 years 248 Farah Zahir 14 Emerging trends in fiscal transfer systems in selected federations: implications for India 275 Jorge Martinez-Vazquez PART IV INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS IN UNITARY FEDERATIONS 15 Intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Kenya: the evolution of revenue sharing under new devolution in a quasi-federal system 296 Jamie Boex and Paul Smoke 16 Reforming vertical programmes: the case of South African local government 323 David Savage Index 345.

In this paper the design of intergovernmental transfer schemes in a federation is analysed, focusing on schemes that can have a significant impact on improving interpersonal distribution in the sense of alleviating poverty. It is argued that states with a lower income have larger concentrations of poor persons and that their ability to combat poverty is lower and their opportunity cost higher. Federal transfers are not only a cost-effective means of enabling such states to undertake nationally optimal levels of poverty alleviation but also a way of ensuring that they actually do so. The distribution of intergovernmental transfers in India during the seventh five-year plan is examined, and it is argued that general-purpose and specific-purpose transfers were inadequate and imperfectly designed from the perspective of poverty alleviation.

This paper will examine a variety of models in which the affected governments modify their behavior in response to spillover benefits. Initiallly, governments will adjust to the 'income effects' of benefit spill-ins, but it will be shown that intergovernmental compensation will generally be required in order to achieve Pareto optimality.

A rigorous understanding of the developmental effect of fiscal transfers to subnational governments remains an important policy research issue globally. This paper exploits a novel dataset of 20 years of municipal poverty maps and local public finances to study the effects on local welfare of a large fiscal transfer fund earmarked for social investment in more than 2,000 Mexican municipalities. Results show a positive but modest effect on the average household income, and positive effects on seven nonmonetary welfare measures. In contrast, these funds have no significant impact on extreme and moderate monetary poverty. These results provide important lessons for policy on the effects of earmarked funds to reduce territorial poverty and inequality in terms of incentives to design formulas to distribute earmarked fiscal resources to subnational governments.

We develop a model with optimal shares of intergovernmental transfers, and we apply a simulation analysis of our model for the case of Mexico. The main outcomes of this paper are as follows: First, we provide optimal shares of intergovernmental funds to be allocated in each state considering the regional distribution of the benefits of local public spending in Mexico. Second, our analysis shows that the regional heterogeneity of preferences across regions should be an important determinant of federal funds allocated to state governments. Third, the current system of finance relies on a tax revenue sharing accord that emphasizes nationwide tax collection issues as the main determinants of intergovernmental transfers and local spending. Our analysis provides a contrast between how fiscal policy is conducted, and feasible choices of policy reform. Fourth, our analysis of simulation identifies winners and losers from policy reform, and so our analysis contributes to a better understanding of the advantages and shortcomings of the current policy of intergovernmental transfers, providing feasible ways to improve the outcomes of subnational government spending.