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This paper addresses the choice of banks between alternative channels for interbank payments. The conventional view assumes a tradeoff between the safety of real‐time gross settlement (RTGS) and the liquidity savings of multilateral netting. Moreover, correspondent banking is believed to be inefficient, both in terms of liquidity and of administrative costs. In the last decade, however, the impulse of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, technological changes and the management of RTGS systems by central banks have reduced the difference between the various systems. This is especially true for risk, whereas liquidity cost crucially depends on the refinancing policy adopted by the central bank and the co‐ordination among the participants. On the basis of the recent evolution of payment systems in Europe, we verify the importance of liquidity, as well as other variables like transaction costs, for the choice of banks among different settlement systems. Cost factors imply that the nature of payments flows (value, commercial versus financial) and some structural features of the banking systems (dimension of the intermediaries, concentration of the banking sector) become important. The analysis is carried out both through a theoretical model and a cross‐country comparison based on three data sources: ECB (European Central Bank, EBA (Euro Banking Association) and SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication).

The international SWIFT system is an essential link in the global payment infrastructure. Its significance for conducting numerous financial transactions is hard to overestimate. Therefore, this article deals with the most detailed consideration of the issues of integration of the Russian banking system with the SWIFT system and its analogues as a means of providing an opportunity for global integration and accelerated growth.

PurposeThe knowledge of the link between interbank financing and business cycle fluctuations is important in assessing the stability and soundness of the banking sector. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the simultaneous relationship between interbank financing and the business cycle with respect to the financial structure of the bank-based and market-based systems in European countries by using bank-level data from 2007 to 2011.Design/methodology/approachThe study employs an innovative instrumenting technique with an instrument of the financial structure to address the simultaneous determination of interbank financing and the business cycle.FindingsThe results suggest that banks establish pro-cyclical interbank borrowing by increasing their interbank position during booms and reducing it during downturns. Bank-based system performs better in redistributing the liquidity in the economy than the market-based system when there are imperfectly correlated liquidity shocks across regions during the 2007–2009 financial crisis.Practical implicationsThe improvement of banks' liquidity risk management should be aligned with a specific financial system. The macro-prudential supervisor should require banks in the market-based system to disclose their interbank position on the extent of risk exposure during the liquidity shock period to stabilize the EU banking industry.Originality/valueThis study is the first to provide policy makers with some novel empirical results concerning the linkage among bank liquidity, the macroeconomic condition and financial structure.

Using detailed loan transactions-level data we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market, and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no-arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada we show that while the market is fairly efficient, some degree of inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007- 2008 financial crisis, where more liquidity intervention implies more inefficiency. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply towards borrowers as the financial crisis progressed, and towards riskier borrowers. This supports a nuanced version of the Too- Big-To-Fail story, whereby participants continued to lend to riskier banks at favorable rates, not because of explicit support to the riskier banks provided by governmental authorities, but rather due to the collective self-interest of these banks.

The unprecedented collapse of international interbank borrowing was a prominent feature of the global financial crisis that started in August 2007. This paper focuses on the drivers of the retrenchment from 32 advanced and emerging banking systems. Using novel risk-weighted indexes the paper examines whether the banking systems' access to credit was related to their domestic financial soundness and exposure to distressed international counterparties. The empirical findings suggest that both domestic and international risk factors contributed to the decline in international interbank borrowing during the crisis.

We identify interbank (i.e. non-collateralized) loans from the Colombian large-value payment system by implementing Furfine's method. After identifying interbank loans from transactional data we obtain the interbank rates and claims without relying on fin