Suchergebnisse

June 27, 1990, is a significant date in the recent history of Mali. It marks the beginning of what Malians call "The Second Tuareg Rebellion." The first had been staged against the post-colonial Malian government in 1963. The national government had suppressed that rebellion with harsh coercive measures, and the Tuaregs continued to nurture grievances. The second Tuareg rebellion coincided in the early 1990s with turbulent political developments in Malian society as a whole. It soon was clear that Mali's stability and progress were contingent on ending the insurgency. This, in turn, required a solution to Tuareg grievances. By the mid-1990s, Mali apparently had found a solution. Though by no means easy, or assured, that solution may provide useful insights into conflict resolution in the region as a whole. This study describes the nature of the Malian solution and indicates the reasons for its success to date. More specifically, this study considers the Tuareg rebellion from the perspective of a senior Malian military officer who lived the events. It describes a conflict little known and poorly reported outside of West Africa. It emphasizes the trauma of conflict in developing societies and the excruciatingly difficult political and economic choices faced by their leaders. It highlights the appropriate role of the international community in resolving such conflicts. Finally, it illustrates that resolution of intra-state conflict in Africa requires intensive efforts to secure the willing cooperation of local communities with military and civil government agencies. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1857/thumbnail.jpg

Introduction: In March 2012 a secessionist-Islamist insurgency gained momentum in Mali and quickly took control of two-thirds of the state territory. Within weeks radical Islamists, drug smugglers and rebels suddenly ruled over a territory bigger than Germany. News of the abuse of the population and the introduction of harsh Sharia law spread soon, and word got out that the Malian Army had simply abandoned the land. The general echo of the IC was surprise, a reaction that was, as this research will show, as unfunded as it was unconstructive*. When Malian state structures collapsed, the world watched in shock, even though the developments couldhave been anticipated –and prevented. Ultimately, the situation had to be resolved by international forces (most notably French troops), who are still in Mali at the time of writing (Arieff 2013a: 5; Lohmann 2012: 3; Walther and Christopoulos 2015: 514f.; Shaw 2013: 204; Qantara, Interview, 2012;L'Express, Mali, 2015; Deutscher Bundestag, MINUSMA und EUTM Mali, 2016; UN, MUNISMA, 2016; Boeke and Schuurmann 2015: 801; Chivvis 2016: 93f.). This research will show that the developments in Mali in 2012 have been developing for a long time and could have been avoided. In doing so, it will also show why state security can never be analyzed or consolidated in an isolated manner. Instead, it is necessary to take into account regional dynamics and developments in order to find a comprehensive approach to security in individual states. Once state failure occurs, not only does the state itself fail, but the surrounding region equally failed to prevent the failure. Weak states are a growing concern in many world regions, particularly in Africa. As international intervention often proves unsustainable for various reasons*, the author believes that states which cannot stabilize themselves need a regional agent to support them. This regional agent should be a Regional Security Complex (RSC) asdefined by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (Buzan and Waever 2003). As the following analysis will show, Mali is a case in point. The hope is that this study will help avoid similar failures in the future by making a strong case for the establishment of RSC's. …

In 2012, North Mali was riven by an armed insurrection. The rebellion was led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a mostly Tuareg armed organization, allied with Islamist elements. Its aim was the secession of the Northern territories of the country and to claim the independence of Azawad. Throughout the different phases of the crisis, the MNLA always remained a key actor, being able to reshape its political and military strategy in order to adapt to the evolution of the situation. In this context, France played a capital role. French authorities contributed to giving a new political legitimacy to the Tuareg insurgents, despite strong opposition of political élites in Bamako; the Tuareg insurgents de facto exploited France, leveraging its security interests in pursuit of their own political goals. Examining the agency of insurgent actors in Kidal allows outlining the power relationship with the state institutions and the attempt of consolidating a system of informal rebel governance.

Evolution of the Iraqi insurgency: from conventional to Partisan warfare during Operation Iraqi freedom -- Origins and motives of the insurgency -- The insurgents' way of warfare -- Contending national identities: the Kurds and Shi'a Arabs -- Ideology, politics and failure to execute: the US counter-insurgency campaign -- Whither Iraq?