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This paper proposes an original formal framework to analyze institutional evolution. Institutions have formal (F) and informal (N) aspects that may evolve at different paces, although eventually converging towards each other through an dynamic interactive process. N evolves with capital accumulation, as in learning by doing, and F is optimally chosen by the government who maximizes output given the social and political costs of changing F. As transaction-cost-reducing mechanisms, F and N together define the production technology and affect the income level. As consistent with the evidence, calibrations of the model reveal that optimum F exhibits a punctuated equilibra.

Résumé Les concepts de rationalité limitée et les modes de comportements adaptatifs qui y sont associés aident à expliquer pourquoi des mécanismes de marché et des institutions spécifiques sont nécessaires pour « médiatiser » les échanges ; pourquoi l'économie peut évoluer hors de l'équilibre ; pourquoi le capitalisme démocratique change aussi vite ; pourquoi les systèmes socialistes tendent à s'atrophier et pourquoi des institutions autres que les marchés sont requises pour convertir les changements et atténuer le coût social d'un développement économique rapide. Ces notes établissent les arguments qui sont derrière ces asser­tions.

The author considers Post-Soviet institutionalism as a special social institution of scientific knowledge production. Quantitative parameters and institutional logic of evolution of this scientific current in Russia since 1992 and up to the present are analyzed. It is shown that the "boom" of institutional research has led to the crisis of overproduction of scientific papers and is now gradually turning into stabilization. The necessity of modernization of theoretical and methodological base of institutional economic theory is proved, perspective directions of its development in our country are determined.

Part and parcel of the transition to a capitalist, free-market economy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) was the development of independent currencies and, by extension, the monetary arrangements needed to govern these currencies. Coming off a system where money was merely a unit of accounting and inconvertible, the countries of CEE and FSU for the most part had to implement new central banks from scratch, with little historical memory on the role of such a bank. However, at the same time the monetary system was being built, the rest of the institutional system was in flux. This chapter examines the interlinkages between the creation of central banks and other economic and political institutions in transition, concluding that both central banks – modeled on the Western world – and monetary policies exerted a far stronger influence on institutional development than previously realized. In particular, the push by central banks for financialization had deleterious consequences for many transition economies and their political institutions, even as the early results of inflation abatement helped these economies to grow.

Klappentext: China's recent evolution is not only a story of extraordinary economic growth but also a story of great institutional change. Fan Zhang challenges traditional theory to explain the real origins of China's reform, the political and economic forces driving it, and the reasoning behind its stagnation. The institutional re-arrangement of government and market has been crucial in this marketization process. Using a wealth of documents and cases, Zhang provides a detailed analysis of China's institutional changes over the past 40 years, focusing on the government-market relationship. A theoretical framework is presented to explain the targets and incentives of government and business firms in a bureaucratic-market system, which promoted economic growth, but also fostered corruption and resulted in a re-centralisation of the system. Using an index of marketization in China since 1978, Zhang shows that overall, market expansion has continued but with diminishing marginal gains. The government control of financial resources that had previously been relaxed in the early years of reform has been enhanced to some extent as a result of the changing institutional environment. Policy makers dealing with China-related policies, researchers and postgraduate students in political science, economics and Chinese studies will find this book a compelling exploration of the current and constant cooperation and conflict between government and market.

Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- Preface -- 1 Political Representation and Parliamentary Power -- 2 Gorbachev's Constitutional Reforms -- 3 Organizing the New USSR Parliament -- 4 The Power Game in Russia, 1990-1993 -- 5 Deputies and Lawmaking in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet -- 6 Framing a New Constitution -- 7 Organizing the Federal Assembly -- 8 Does Parliament Matter? -- Notes -- Index.