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AbstractInflation expectations are typically considered a pivotal and causal driver of inflation dynamics over which central banks have a strong influence. Given this influence, it is important for central banks to understand how expectations are formed and how their operations influence these expectations. We describe the various ways inflation expectations are measured and used by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), and then review the evidence on how Australians form their expectations. In contrast to what is assumed in standard macroeconomic models, expectations are generally not formed rationally or with full information. We close by highlighting what these findings imply for the conduct of monetary policy.

Forecast errors from end of last year are essentially zero. Figure 1: CPI inflation year-on-year (black), median expected from Survey of Professional Forecasters (blue +), median expected from Michigan Survey of Consumers (red), median from NY Fed Survey of Consumer Expectations (light green), forecast from Cleveland Fed (pink), all in %. NBER defined peak-to-trough recession […]

We examine partisan bias in inflation expectations. Our dataset includes inflation expectations of the New York Fed's Survey of Consumer Expectations over the period June 2013 to June 2018. The results show that inflation expectations were 0.46% points higher in Republican-dominated than in Democratic-dominated US states when Barack Obama was US president. Compared to inflation expectations in Democratic-dominated states, inflation expectations in Republican-dominated states declined by 0.73% points when Donald Trump became president. We employ the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition method to disentangle the extent to which political ideology and other individual characteristics predict inflation expectations: around 25% of the total difference between inflation expectations in Democratic-dominated versus Republican-dominated states is based on how partisans respond to changes in the White House's occupant (partisan bias). The results also corroborate the belief that voters' misperceptions of economic conditions decline when the president belongs to the party that voters support.

Inflation expectations are extracted from the Consumer Survey, which is conducted by the European Commission for the European Union. Using the probability method to quantify the qualitative answers different distribution functions and scaling parameters are assumed to cope with the properties of the data properly. The forecasting ability of respective series is assessed also compared to the balance statistic. Furthermore the time horizon of the survey participants while answering the questionnaire is analyzed, because the empirical results show that it might not coincide with the time horizon implied by the formulation of the question.

We examine partisan bias in inflation expectations. Our dataset includes inflation expectations of the New York Fed's Survey of Consumer Expectations over the period June 2013 to June 2018. The results show that inflation expectations were 0.46 percentage points higher in Republican-dominated than in Democratic-dominated US states when Barack Obama was US president. Compared to inflation expectations in Democratic-dominated states, inflation expectations in Republican-dominated states declined by 0.73 percentage points when Donald Trump became president. We employ the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method to disentangle the extent to which political ideology and other individual characteristics predict inflation expectations: around 25% of the total difference between inflation expectations in Democratic-dominated versus Republican-dominated states is based on how partisans respond to changes in the White House's occupant (partisan bias). The results also corroborate the belief that voters' misperceptions of economic conditions decline when the president belongs to the party that voters support.

We examine partisan bias in inflation expectations. Our dataset includes inflation expectations of the New York Fed's Survey of Consumer Expectations over the period June 2013 to June 2018. The results show that inflation expectations were 0.46 percentage points higher in Republican-dominated than in Democratic-dominated US states when Barack Obama was US president. Compared to inflation expectations in Democratic-dominated states, inflation expectations in Republican-dominated states declined by 0.73 percentage points when Donald Trump became president. We employ the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method to disentangle the extent to which political ideology and other individual characteristics predict inflation expectations: around 25% of the total difference between inflation expectations in Democratic-dominated versus Republican-dominated states is based on how partisans respond to changes in the White House's occupant (partisan bias). The results also corroborate the belief that voters' misperceptions of economic conditions decline when the president belongs to the party that voters support.

Abstract This paper investigates what are the main components of consumer's inflation expectations. We combine the FGV's Consumer Survey with the indices of inflation (IPCA and government regulated prices), professional forecasts disclosed in the Focus report, and media data which we crawl from one of the biggest and most important Brazilian newspapers, Folha de São Paulo, to determine what factors are responsible for and improve consumer's forecast accuracy. We found gender, age and city of residence as major elements when analyzing micro-data. Aggregate data shows the past inflation as an important trigger in the formation of consumers' expectations and professional forecasts as negligible. Moreover, the media plays a significant role, accounting not only for the expectations' formation but for a better understanding of actual inflation as well.