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Throughout the advanced countries of the world self‐regulatory regimes are being introduced. This article suggests that, at least in some contexts, industry self‐regulation can be an effective and efficient means of social control that has been largely ignored by economics (which has a focus on individual rather than group behavior) and prematurely discounted by mainstream regulatory theory. The article examines the strengths and to a lesser extent the weaknesses of industry self‐regulation from five closely related yet distinct vantage points: mediating institutions; industrial morality; institutionalizing responsibility; institutions responding to external pressure; and the roles of the state and third parties.

OBJECTIVE: Industry actors (organizations, associations) can influence the way in which firms comply with regulations. This study examines how this influence process is affected by government intervention. METHODS: Using official, anonymized data from the entire industry of financial intermediation in the Netherlands (N = 8655 firms), we examine how firms' affiliations with industry actors relate to (1) voluntary actions aligned with improving regulatory compliance (e.g., requesting audits, attending workshops), and (2) law violations. Industry actors are distinguished between trade associations and the industry's self-regulatory organization (SRO), which is subject to more government intervention. The analysis employs Poisson regressions to explain count variables, and bootstrapping to assess indirect associations. A series of robustness tests focus on relevant sub-samples, employ exact matching to address possible self-selection, and incorporate lagged dependent variables. RESULTS: The association between affiliations with industry actors and law violations is negative and significant. This association is more indirect for trade associations than for the SRO (i.e., it is more strongly mediated by the voluntary actions firms take and which help to improve compliance). CONCLUSIONS: These findings go in line with the theory that government intervention makes industry-self regulation more mandated and less voluntary. Under less government intervention, industry actors may promote more voluntary efforts to comply.

The idea of self-regulation as an instrument capable of mitigating socially undesirable practices in industries - such as corruption, environmental degradation, or the violation of human rights - is receiving substantial consideration in theory and practice. By approaching this phenomenon with the theory of the New Institutional Economics, Jan Sammeck develops an analytical approach that points out the critical mechanisms which decide about the effectiveness of this instrument. By integrating theory with practical examples of self-regulation, this study highlights the necessity to look at the

An emerging body of institutional scholarship emphasizes the role played by private decentralized institutions in facilitating collective action among organizations. However, these institutions often suffer from free riding and opportunism. This may lead firms to exit the institution and eventually cause its collapse. In this paper, we explore how private decentralized institutions may be sustained despite these problems. We focus on one form of private decentralized institution—trade association–sponsored industry self-regulatory programs. We advance two alternative hypotheses to explain the sustained existence of industry self-regulatory institutions: (a) Firms participate to gain a participation-contingent benefit, and (b) firms participate to maintain a generally beneficial institution. Using a 10-year panel of data from the chemical industry, we find evidence consistent with the latter hypothesis for at least one prominent example of self-regulation. Our findings have implications for both specific models of industry self-regulation and general theories of collective action.

The scale of food waste across Europe is alarming, and its reduction has recently been identified as an important public policy issue. However, effective solutions require initiative and action both from the government and the food industry. What are the drivers of industry self‐regulation in this area? We provide an in‐depth analysis of the emergence and evolution of Norway's food waste reduction governance. In 2017, food sector companies signed a Voluntary Industry Agreement on food waste reduction, but as of 2021, a shift towards a binding law is increasingly likely. With outcome‐explaining process tracing, we test three hypotheses, identifying causal factors and mechanisms that explain the emergence of the Agreement, and apply a typology of (self‐)regulation to show how different actors and mechanisms played an important role in different phases of the process. We find that, initially, food waste reduction governance was clearly industry‐led. However, societal and political pressure was necessary for institutionalizing self‐regulation and its timing. We also note that despite Norway's tradition for co‐regulation, in the wake of the Agreement, lawmakers continued to pressure the government for a binding law, with a clear move from initial industry self‐regulation towards state‐steered regulation.

The scale of food waste across Europe is alarming, and its reduction has recently been identified as an important public policy issue. However, effective solutions require initiative and action both from the government and the food industry. What are the drivers of industry self-regulation in this area? We provide an in-depth analysis of the emergence and evolution of Norway's food waste reduction governance. In 2017, food sector companies signed a Voluntary Industry Agreement on food waste reduction, but as of 2021, a shift towards a binding law is increasingly likely. With outcome-explaining process tracing, we test three hypotheses, identifying causal factors and mechanisms that explain the emergence of the Agreement, and apply a typology of (self-)regulation to show how different actors and mechanisms played an important role in different phases of the process. We find that, initially, food waste reduction governance was clearly industry-led. However, societal and political pressure was necessary for institutionalizing self-regulation and its timing. We also note that despite Norway's tradition for co-regulation, in the wake of the Agreement, lawmakers continued to pressure the government for a binding law, with a clear move from initial industry self-regulation towards state-steered regulation.

The alleged efficacy of pharmaceutical industry self-regulation has been used to repudiate increased government oversight over promotional activity. European politicians and industry have cited Sweden as an excellent example of self-regulation based on an ethical code. This paper considers antidepressant advertising in Sweden to uncover the strengths and weaknesses of self-regulation.