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This paper provides an empirical appraisal of the influence of politics on the evolution of unemployment rates in 13 industrialized democracies (12 European Union countries and the U.S.) from 1960 to 1999. We conduct new tests of opportunistic and partisan business cycle models, using richer data and more general specifications than previous studies. In contrast to most previous studies, we pay particular attention to the importance of labor market structure in conditioning the influence of politics on unemployment. We also investigate the relationship between political stability and economic stability. The results suggest the existence of partisan effects, with higher unemployment rates prevailing under "right" parties than "left" parties. There is more support for "rational" partisan models that embody transient partisan impacts than for models with permanent effects. We find evidence that union power is associated with higher average unemployment rates, but that centralized bargaining institutions tend to lower unemployment rates. The evidence also suggests that more fragmented coalition governments are associated with higher unemployment rates than single party ...

This paper provides an empirical appraisal of the influence of politics on the evolution of unemployment rates in 13 industrialized democracies (12 European Union countries & the US) from 1960 to 1999. We conduct new tests of opportunistic & partisan business cycle models, using richer data & more general specifications than previous studies. In contrast to most previous studies, we pay particular attention to the importance of labor market structure in conditioning the influence of politics on unemployment. We also investigate the relationship between political stability & economic stability. The results suggest the existence of partisan effects, with higher unemployment rates prevailing under "Right" parties than "Left" parties. There is more support for "rational" partisan models that embody transient partisan impacts than for models with permanent effects. We find evidence that union power is associated with higher average unemployment rates, but that centralized bargaining institutions tend to lower unemployment rates. The evidence also suggests that more fragmented coalition governments are associated with higher unemployment rates than single-party governments. 8 Tables, 1 Appendix, 22 References. Adapted from the source document.

Featuring the work of an international interdisciplinary team of scholars, this volume explains patterns of fiscal performance (persistent patterns of budget deficits and government debt) from the 1970s to the present across seven countries - France, Italy, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States. Employing a comparative case study approach, seldom employed in studies of fiscal performance, contributions illuminate the complex causal factors often overlooked by quantitative studies and advances our theoretical understanding of fiscal performance.

ABSTRACTSince 1945, there has been substantial variation among the OECD countries and within them over time in central-government deficits. This paper surveys and assesses the literature on deficit spending in these industrialized democracies, emphasizing positive theories and the empirical support, or lack thereof, for each of them. We begin by considering the degree to which theories about the size of government and empirical tests of these theories about the level of overall government spending can explain deficits. We then survey theories pertaining to the political economy of fiscal deficits per se, including the 'tax smoothing' hypothesis, the neo-Keynesian countercyclical hypothesis, the public choice perspective, the 'left-right ideology' hypothesis, Roubini and Sachs' (1989) 'strength of government' hypothesis, and the importance of divided government in non-parliamentary systems.

Surveys theories pertaining to the political economy of fiscal deficits per se, including the tax smoothing hypothesis, the neo-Keynesian countercyclical hypothesis, the public choice perspective, the left-right ideology hypothesis, Roubini and Sachs' (1989) strength of government hypothesis and the importance of divided government in non-parliamentary systems. (Original abstract-amended)

October 1978. ; Speech before the Third U.S.-EC Economic Journalists' Conference in Airlie, Virginia on September 9. ; Mode of access: Internet.

New institutionalism has emerged as one of the most prominent research agendas in the field of comparative politics, political economy, and public policy. This article examines the role of institutional variation in political/economic regimes in shaping tax burdens in industrialized democracies. An institutionalist model for tax policy variation is tested across the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) democracies. Countries are conceptualized and statistically modeled in terms of majoritarian, shifting coalition, and dominant coalition governments. Regression analysis and cluster analysis are used to statistically model cross-national tax burdens relative to the strength of labor organization and party dominance in parliament. This study finds that political and economic institutions are important in explaining tax policy variation. Specifying the structure of political and economic institutions helps to explain the size of the state in modern capitalist democracies. This article specifies and demonstrates which institutions matter and how much they matter.

The determinants of the welfare state have received a great deal of attention in the comparative political economy literature. An analysis of the role that indirect taxation plays in the politics of advanced industrial societies is, however, missing. This article demonstrates that a full understanding of the links between redistribution, social democracy and corporatism is impossible without a closer look at indirect taxation. Conventional wisdom is questioned and it is shown that social democratic governments in corporatist environments find themselves in a paradoxical situation. They need to support the welfare state by relying upon a fundamentally regressive policy instrument: indirect taxation. It is also shown that social democratic governments can minimize the use of consumption taxes as part of their redistributive strategy only in non-corporatist settings. In exploring these issues, this article illuminates alternative routes for the pursuit of equality in a context of declining corporatist arrangements.