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AbstractDespite that independent agencies are typically justified in terms of technical efficiency, they inevitably have to make political judgments. How can political reasoning be legitimate in such institutions? This paper starts by investigating the merits of two prominent models. The "avoidance model" asks agency reasoning to stick to empirical facts and as far as possible stay clear of political values. By contrast, the "specification model" recognizes the need for constructive normative work, but confines it to the refinement of given statutes. This paper challenges both models and defends a third alternative. The "public reason model" requires agencies to ground their value judgments in a publicly accessible framework of reasoning, which is here interpreted as their overarching mandate. The paper argues that agency mandates should be conceived as distinct domains of reasoning, and it delineates three institutional virtues that enable agencies to track this domain.

Despite that independent agencies are typically justified in terms of technical efficiency, they inevitably have to make political judgments. How can political reasoning be legitimate in such institutions? This paper starts by investigating the merits of two prominent models. The "avoidance model" asks agency reasoning to stick to empirical facts and as far as possible stay clear of political values. By contrast, the "specification model" recognizes the need for constructive normative work, but confines it to the refinement of given statutes. This paper challenges both models and defends a third alternative. The "public reason model" requires agencies to ground their value judgments in a publicly accessible framework of reasoning, which is here interpreted as their overarching mandate. The paper argues that agency mandates should be conceived as distinct domains of reasoning, and it delineates three institutional virtues that enable agencies to track this domain.

Some agencies derive legitimacy from their political independence: for example, political meddling in monetary policy is problematic, as politicians favor short-term electoral goals over long-term economic stability. Nevertheless, the process of agency reform, even for agencies that are thought to be independent, is seldom onerous and often follows standard legislative procedures. Furthermore, citizens frequently lack expertise to hold policymakers accountable for new bureaucratic policies. Why then do politicians abstain from exercising influence through agency reform? This article delineates an informational cost to agency reform. In issue areas where politicians are frequently biased and citizens cannot perfectly observe the quality of agency reforms, citizens assume that reforms serve the politicians' self-interest and punish politicians for any reform at all. Agency independence then comes more from informational challenges than from institutional design. This article develops a formal model to explain when agencies are reformed and when they retain their independence.

This research studies theoretical construction of independent agencies in constitutional structure of Republic of Indonesia, and aims at researching and positioning its theoretical construction, characteristics, and also the forms of its checks and balances towards the original three branches.This normative legal research combines perspectives of conceptual approach, as well as statutory, comparative, and historical ones, in which the implementation conducted accordingly by need.By using the various theories created by some classical and contemporary theorists in term of independent agencies, and limitation of powers themes, as it has been implemented in constitutional law practice and revised in theoretical perspective, the result of this study shows independent agencies are a different branch of government, compare to the conception of Montesquieu's trias politica. Indonesian constitutional lawpractice attracts fact about an existence of a different branch of government, where it is referred to as the independent agencies. As a new type of separation of power, theoretical construction of independent agencies could be referred to as "The New Separation of Power."The result of this study also shows independent agencies existance in constitutional structure of Republic of Indonesia is still be placed under primary state agencies, and considered as auxiliary state agencies.

We present evidence pointing to the fact that international agencies' fiscal forecasts were affected to some extent by the same type of problems that the literature widely acknowledges for governmental ones. Informational shortages may lead independent agencies' staff to internalize 'political biases' in governmental forecasts when trying to grasp genuine 'private information'. Our study is based on a real-time database of EC, OECD and national governments' public deficit forecasts for 15 European countries over the period 1999-2007 and four vintages of projections per forecasted year. Against this background, independent national fiscal institutions might be a natural option, to the extent that they may have better access to inside national information than international organizations. Our results also provide some support to policy positions that claim a closer monitoring of official budgetary projections, in particular as regards transparency requisites, accountability and the threat of sanctions. [Copyright Elsevier B.V.]

This report provides appropriations of VA, HUV, and Independent Agencies for FY2003.