Sir Anthony and the Implied Freedom of Political Communication
In: in Dynamic and Principled: The Influence of Sir Anthony Mason (Federation Press, 2022) 196
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In: in Dynamic and Principled: The Influence of Sir Anthony Mason (Federation Press, 2022) 196
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In: 'Crafting a Concept of Deference for the Implied Freedom of Political Communication' (2016) 27(2) Public Law Review 101
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In: University of Queensland Law Journal, Forthcoming
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Working paper
In: University of New South Wales Law Journal, Band 35, Heft 3
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In: ANU College of Law Research Paper No. 14-49
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In: Australian journal of political science: journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Band 48, Heft 4, S. 456-469
ISSN: 1036-1146
In: Australian journal of political science: journal of the Australasian Political Studies Association, Band 48, Heft 4, S. 456-469
ISSN: 1363-030X
In: (2019) 23(1) Media and Arts Law Review
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In: (2022) 44(3) Sydney Law Review 469
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In: Agenda: a journal of policy analysis & reform, Band 1, Heft 1
ISSN: 1447-4735
In: The international & comparative law quarterly: ICLQ, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 392-401
ISSN: 1471-6895
In three important decisions,1 handed down on the same day in October 1994, the Australian High Court continued its exploration of the implied constitutional guarantee of freedom of political communication. Two years previously, in the judgments in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v. Wills2 and Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v. The Commonwealth,3 a majority of the High Court had distilled an implication of freedom of political communication from the provisions and structure of the Australian Constitution.4 This was not an implication of freedom of expression generally, since it was derived from the concept of representative government which the majority considered to be enshrined in the Constitution: "not all speech can claim the protection of the constitutional implication of freedom … identified in order to ensure the efficacious working of representative democracy and government".5 The extent of this implied constitutional guarantee was left rather unclear, since a number of different views were expressed. As Justice Toohey has now explained,6 there were two possibilities. The first was a more limited "implied freedom on the part of the people of the Commonwealth to communicate information, opinions and ideas relating to the system of representative government". The second was a rather more expansive "freedom to communicate in relation to public affairs and political matters generally". In the recent trilogy of cases a majority of the High Court was prepared to endorse the second of these alternatives.7 In Cunliffe v. The Commonwealth Chief Justice Mason concluded that it would be too restrictive to limit the implied freedom to "communications for the purposes of the political processes in a representative democracy".8
In: International & comparative law quarterly: ICLQ, Band 45, Heft 2, S. 392
ISSN: 0020-5893
In: 49 Federal Law Review 554 (2021)
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There are very few freedom of information cases that have been heard by the High Court of Australia and this article discusses freedom of information rights in the context of the Court's recent important decision in McKinnon. After reviewing the judgments in the case, the author advocates that freedom of information rights must not be seen in isolation, but in the context of broader constitutional rights, including the implied right to political freedom of communication, as well as the doctrine of representative government. It is suggested that the effect of the decision is to unduly narrow the rights citizens would otherwise have under freedom of information laws, and is contrary to the spirit of such laws. It compromises the ability of the sovereign people to exercise that sovereignty over their elected representatives. Placing freedom of information rights into this broader constitutional perspective, the decision can be seen as out of step with the Constitution and its prescribed system of government. More broadly, it is considered that freedom of information principles must be interpreted within the existing constitutional rights framework.
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