Suchergebnisse

Capital is required in farm to buy input such as fertilizer, pesticide, seed, land rent, labor wage, and to adopt the latest technology. To ease the burden of loan interest and to increase the access of farm to formal credit, the government provides interest subsidy for Food Security and Energy Credit (Kredit Ketahanan Pangan dan Energi, KKP-E). This study was aimed to analyze the impact of accessing KKP-E on paddy farms' performance. The methods used in this study are descriptive analysis and propensity score matching model. Accessibility of KKP-E in research location was able to increase fertilizer use of 16.98 percent, pesticide use of 40.23 percent, labor outside farm household use of 43.08 percent, production of 58 percent, productivity of 23.64 percent, and farm profit of 84.5 percent. This quite high increase in percentage was due to the reason that farm business scale in this study was categorized as small-scale business.

Green loans are a way of financing green innovation. Two important factors, the lending interest rate and the loaning scale, should be focused on. In this paper, we explore the impact of lending interest rates and loaning scale on green innovation. We show that the incentive of green innovation strongly depends on the lending interest rate and the loaning scale through model analysis. Moreover, the dependence is summarized as a two-step strategy. In the first step, the lending interest rate should be lower than some rate thresholds given in the paper. Otherwise, green innovation fails to be stimulated. In the second step, if the lending interest rate is lower than the given rate threshold, then the practical loaning scale should lie between two thresholds of loaning scale derived in the paper, such that the green innovation will be stimulated. What is more, to guarantee the green effect of the innovation on the environment, we construct a threshold of loaning scale. If the loaning scale is larger than this threshold, then the innovation will show green effect on the environment. Otherwise, green innovation loses its environmental significance. The government stimulates green innovation through government subsidy. In this paper, we consider three kinds of government subsidy, including a subsidy for the bank, subsidy for the enterprise before and after implementing green innovation. Some appropriate government subsidy scales are presented.

Government intervention in the construction sector as a way to boost the economy has been a constant in Colombia for the past 90 years. This paper explicitly tests the impact of the most recent of such interventions: a subsidy to the mortgage interest rate. The results show that the subsidy boosted mortgage loans by around 38 percent. However, it is also found that real interest rates went up by 1. 09 percent, i. e. , there has been an incomplete pass-through of the subsidy to the consumer. The pass-through of this instance of intervention is estimated to be in the range of 65 percent to 74 percent.

Energy subsidy reform is not a goal in itself, but rather a means of achieving lasting economic and social progress. Communicating with the public and other key stakeholders about the benefits of reform and the drawbacks of existing subsidies helps build support and acceptance. It can also increase trust and understanding of the political decisions that underpin the reform. International experience shows that communicating before, during, and after subsidy reform is essential to ensuring the smooth rollout of a well-planned and executed energy subsidy reform program (GSIand IISD 2013). Some governments undertaking energy subsidy reform programs either ignore communication with stakeholders or take a top-down approach that fails to recognize stakeholder views and concerns. This happens for many reasons, including lack of understanding about the powerful role communication plays in a successful energy subsidy reform program and the absence of capacity within a government to undertake communication activities. This note is intended for use by governments and aims to (a) advocate for the importance of communicating with citizens proactively about energy subsidy reform and (b) guide practitioners through some of the important elements of an evidence-based and effective communication campaign, including timing, stakeholder consultation, opinion research, messages, messengers, media, and evaluation. This note should be used in combination with other tools, including capacity building workshops and tailored advice from experienced communication professionals.

Is tax relief on mortgage interest a subsidy to the home owner or do private house‐holders live in the shadow of Westminster (above)? Professor Parry Lewis challenges the Report of the Committee chaired by the Duke of Edinburgh, and argues for the retention of relief.

This study attempts to measure subsidies to agricultural credit in recent years and provides policy implications. It finds that credit policy has evolved, from provision of subsidized credit to one that is more market-oriented, focusing on providing access to credit to farmers while exposing them to market interest rates. Nevertheless, there remains a significant public outlay for credit largely through unintended default subsidy. It recommends that publicly supported credit be provided solely through competent government financial institutions under independent regulatory oversight, rather than through agencies (such as the Agricultural Credit Enhancement Fund) or through government-owned and controlled corporations (such as QUEDANCOR). Government may also need to invest in other support services that would attenuate agricultural risk and encourage greater private sector participation in agricultural lending.

AbstractSectoral interests play an important role in distributive politics, but their influence is difficult to measure. We compare the effect of international oil prices on subsidies for domestic gasoline and diesel consumption. Because diesel is used by a smaller number of organized agricultural and transportation interests, they are more capable of collective action than the dispersed beneficiaries of gasoline subsidies. The conventional wisdom holds that sectoral interests could mobilize to stop reform (e.g., price increases, deregulation). Challenging this view, we consider the possibility that sectoral interests promote reform by facilitating the targeted allocation of compensation and exemptions. An empirical analysis of gasoline and diesel prices, 1991–2012, strongly supports the second hypothesis: diesel prices respond to international oil prices more strongly than do gasoline prices. Quantitative tests and case studies allow us to explore causal mechanisms, verify that the gasoline‐diesel difference is related to actual policy reforms, and reject alternative explanations.

Regional integration affects location decisions of MNCs and therefore influences each member country's provision of investment incentives, which in turn may trigger relocation. As a consequence, subsidy competition increases as integration proceeds. We analyze the welfare consequences of this phenomenon, modelling subsidization as a game between a MNC facing different location alternatives and governments that may deter or induce relocation by means of subsidies. We show that the combination of integration and subsidy competition may lead to an excess of subsidization. We also discuss how the interest of harmonizing subsidies, the net gains from integration crucially depend on technological differences, ownership and the absorption capacity of MNC profits by countries. Lastly, we find that the gain from supranational subsidy coordination increases with integration. ; L'intégration régionale affecte les choix de localisation des Firmes Multinationales (FMN), ce qui modifie l'offre de subventions à l'investissement par les gouvernements, qui peuvent elles-mêmes provoquer des délocalisations. Ce mécanisme explique l'accroissement de la concurrence entre Etats au fur et à mesure de la libéralisation du commerce intra régional. Nous étudions les conséquences sur le bien-être régional de ce phénomène, en modélisant l'offre de subventions comme un jeu entre une FMN confrontée à différentes localisations possibles et des gouvernements choisissant des niveaux de subventions. Nous montrons d'abord que la conjonction de l'intégration régionale et de la concurrence entre Etats conduit à un excès de subventions. Nous montrons également que tant l'intérêt d'une harmonisation régionale des subventions que les gains nets à l'échange après subventionnement dépendent de manière cruciale des écarts technologiques entre pays, de l'origine du capital de la FMN, ainsi que de la part des profits de la FMN entrant dans le bien-être national. Enfin, nous trouvons que le gain à créer une institution supranationale coordonnant les ...

Regional integration affects location decisions of MNCs and therefore influences each member country's provision of investment incentives, which in turn may trigger relocation. As a consequence, subsidy competition increases as integration proceeds. We analyze the welfare consequences of this phenomenon, modelling subsidization as a game between a MNC facing different location alternatives and governments that may deter or induce relocation by means of subsidies. We show that the combination of integration and subsidy competition may lead to an excess of subsidization. We also discuss how the interest of harmonizing subsidies, the net gains from integration crucially depend on technological differences, ownership and the absorption capacity of MNC profits by countries. Lastly, we find that the gain from supranational subsidy coordination increases with integration. ; L'intégration régionale affecte les choix de localisation des Firmes Multinationales (FMN), ce qui modifie l'offre de subventions à l'investissement par les gouvernements, qui peuvent elles-mêmes provoquer des délocalisations. Ce mécanisme explique l'accroissement de la concurrence entre Etats au fur et à mesure de la libéralisation du commerce intra régional. Nous étudions les conséquences sur le bien-être régional de ce phénomène, en modélisant l'offre de subventions comme un jeu entre une FMN confrontée à différentes localisations possibles et des gouvernements choisissant des niveaux de subventions. Nous montrons d'abord que la conjonction de l'intégration régionale et de la concurrence entre Etats conduit à un excès de subventions. Nous montrons également que tant l'intérêt d'une harmonisation régionale des subventions que les gains nets à l'échange après subventionnement dépendent de manière cruciale des écarts technologiques entre pays, de l'origine du capital de la FMN, ainsi que de la part des profits de la FMN entrant dans le bien-être national. Enfin, nous trouvons que le gain à créer une institution supranationale coordonnant les politiques de subventions croît au fur et à mesure de l'intégration.

Regional integration affects location decisions of MNCs and therefore influences each member country's provision of investment incentives, which in turn may trigger relocation. As a consequence, subsidy competition increases as integration proceeds. We analyze the welfare consequences of this phenomenon, modelling subsidization as a game between a MNC facing different location alternatives and governments that may deter or induce relocation by means of subsidies. We show that the combination of integration and subsidy competition may lead to an excess of subsidization. We also discuss how the interest of harmonizing subsidies, the net gains from integration crucially depend on technological differences, ownership and the absorption capacity of MNC profits by countries. Lastly, we find that the gain from supranational subsidy coordination increases with integration. ; L'intégration régionale affecte les choix de localisation des Firmes Multinationales (FMN), ce qui modifie l'offre de subventions à l'investissement par les gouvernements, qui peuvent elles-mêmes provoquer des délocalisations. Ce mécanisme explique l'accroissement de la concurrence entre Etats au fur et à mesure de la libéralisation du commerce intra régional. Nous étudions les conséquences sur le bien-être régional de ce phénomène, en modélisant l'offre de subventions comme un jeu entre une FMN confrontée à différentes localisations possibles et des gouvernements choisissant des niveaux de subventions. Nous montrons d'abord que la conjonction de l'intégration régionale et de la concurrence entre Etats conduit à un excès de subventions. Nous montrons également que tant l'intérêt d'une harmonisation régionale des subventions que les gains nets à l'échange après subventionnement dépendent de manière cruciale des écarts technologiques entre pays, de l'origine du capital de la FMN, ainsi que de la part des profits de la FMN entrant dans le bien-être national. Enfin, nous trouvons que le gain à créer une institution supranationale coordonnant les ...