Suchergebnisse

We present an examination of informal network structure within the sales division of a global manufacturing organization. Sociometric Badges were used to collect data on face-to-face interactions over a total of 8 weeks, the latter half of which was spent in a redesigned workspace. These data were supplemented by employees' e-mail and instant messaging log activity. The allocation of an individual's communication among colleagues reflected the company's structure as a post-bureaucratic organization. The observed interteam communication patterns differed from those expected to arise based on the various functions performed by each team throughout the sales cycle, suggesting that the communication needs of each team were not wholly provided for by the available media. A subset of workers who were encouraged to utilize flexible seating arrangements in a remodeled space had a higher proportion of face-to-face interactions with colleagues outside of their team, while employees seated far away from each other were less likely to exchange e-mail. This research has implications for companies hoping to understand the structure of informal networks within their organization as well as those considering workplace redesign as a method of stimulating communication within these networks.

The relationship between third-party contract enforcement and informal networks raises important sociological, political, and economic questions. When economic activity is embedded in social structures, what are the implications of third-party contract enforcement for the scope and nature of economic relations? What determines whether individuals rely on formal legal institutions or informal networks to sustain trade relationships? Do legal institutions erode informal networks? We develop a model in which a trade-off exists between size and sustainability of networks. By adding the possibility of fee-based, enforceable contracts, we provide a theoretical explanation for the coexistence of legal contract enforcement and an informal economy. We find that legal enforcement has little effect on networks until law becomes sufficiently inexpensive, at which point small decreases in the cost of law have dramatic effects on network size and the frequency of use of the legal system. Figures, Appendixes, References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2006.]

The relationship between third-party contract enforcement and informal networks raises important sociological, political, and economic questions. When economic activity is embedded in social structures, what are the implications of third-party contract enforcement for the scope and nature of economic relations? What determines whether individuals rely on formal legal institutions or informal networks to sustain trade relationships? Do legal institutions erode informal networks? We develop a model in which a trade-off exists between size and sustainability of networks. By adding the possibility of fee-based, enforceable contracts, we provide a theoretical explanation for the coexistence of legal contract enforcement and an informal economy. We find that legal enforcement has little effect on networks until law becomes sufficiently inexpensive, at which point small decreases in the cost of law have dramatic effects on network size and the frequency of use of the legal system.

Examines the network structures and positions of managers and assesses two models of workplace rewards. Results partially support a rational-technical model since network positions do not differ greatly between men and women with similar credentials. Yet, discrimination theory receives some support in men's slightly higher formal positions and predominance in the networks. (Abstract amended)

"In recent years politicians and social scientists have become ever more concerned with citizens' participation in informal networks ('social participation'). From both fields, the state has theoretically been proposed as an important determinant of social participation. Differing state institutions would explain the large country level differences in the average level of social participation. This article studies the impact of a range of state institutions on participation in broad, informal networks. The editors distinguish two aspects of social participation: the quantity (the number of social meetings) and the quality (the character of the informal relationships in the form of help provision). Taking up a new institutionalist approach, they test three explanations that have been raised theoretically but have not - or not sufficiently - been tested empirically before. The crowding out thesis claims that a large welfare state undermines the role of informal networks as an economic safety net, and therefore has a detrimental effect on social participation. According to the economic safety thesis a large welfare state and economic prosperity at the national level will offer citizens the resources and financial security to look for self actualization through social participation. Finally, the safe refuge thesis claims that people who life in a hostile socio-political environment that gives them little civic autonomy in the public sphere will opt for participation outside of the public sphere - that is around secure ties in informal networks. They test these lines of reasoning in a multilevel research design on data of the European Social Survey 2002. They simultaneously test the impact of the social security, economic development, democracy, civil rights and state corruption on social participation. The crowding out thesis is refuted by the data: social security expenditure has no impact on social participation. Economic prosperity, on the other hand, stimulates social participation, which is in line with the economic safety thesis. The most important determinant of social participation, however, is the level of corruption in a society. In corrupt societies people have less social meetings and provide less help to others than in incorrupt societies." (author's abstract)

Using data from personal interviews conducted in 1982 with 101 senior managers in 2 NY government bureaucracies & survey data for 390 managers in the highest grade levels, the impact of gender on access to & participation in senior managerial networks in the public sector is explored. Two models of workplace rewards are assessed, including a rational-technical theory that provides an explanation for males' (Ms') advantage in top positions & networks, & a contrasting discrimination model in which gender & ethnicity operate to limit access to organizational positions & to maintain advantages of favored groups within organizations. The findings indicate that 90% of high-level managerial positions are occupied by Ms. The rare females (Fs) in high positions do not differ dramatically in formal positions & associated responsibilities from their M counterparts. Some evidence of M advantage is found in their slightly higher civil service ranks, but Ms have job titles similar to Fs & are more likely to occupy line positions or to report budget-making responsibility. Some gender differences in friendship networks are found, & it is suggested that Ms' relative isolation from F peers may have consequences in their perceptions of & behavior toward senior F managers. The findings partially support both rational-technical & discrimination theories of workplace rewards. 4 Tables, 38 References. Adapted from the source document.