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This paper examines the impact of union membership rates on inflation in OECD countries. A positive effect of union density is estimated, even after controlling for fixed effects and time dummies. Additional institutional characteristics, for example union coordination, employment protection laws and central bank independence, do not affect inflation directly in a panel setting, but do influence the size of the unionization coefficient via interaction terms. The results are robust to controlling for potential common causes such as oil price shocks and the political stance of the government, and to using GMM/IV techniques to handle possible endogeneity biases.

This paper examines the impact of union membership rates on inflation in OECD countries. A positive effect of union density is estimated, even after controlling for fixed effects and time dummies. Additional institutional characteristics, for example union coordination, employment protection laws and central bank independence, do not affect inflation directly in a panel setting, but do influence the size of the unionization coefficient via interaction terms. The results are robust to controlling for potential common causes such as oil price shocks and the political stance of the government, and to using GMM/IV techniques to handle possible endogeneity biases.

With few exceptions the last decades have seen reductions in inflation around the world. This experience is the result of many factors. In this paper, we seek to isolate one of the factors, namely, improvements in the quality of monetary policy. We estimate a gravity—like model and propose an exhaustive analysis of the potential role for a large number of institutional factors. Briefly, we find that institutional factors help explain inflation relative to the US experience, which is used as the benchmark. Nevertheless, a role for greater central bank autonomy is a feature of the 1980s and early 1990s only.

The inflation targeting (IT) regime is 17 years old. With practice of IT now in more than 21 countries, there is enough evidence gathered to take stock of the IT experience. In this paper, we analyze the inflation record of IT central banks. We extend the work of Albagli and Schmidt-Hebbel (2004) by looking at a broad range of factors that can influence inflation target deviations and by identifying the empirical determinants of successful monetary policy under IT. We find that part of the cross-country and time variation in inflation deviations from targets can be explained by exchange rate movements, fiscal deficits, and differences in financial sector development. With respect to the components of the IT framework, we find that a higher inflation target and a larger inflation control range are associated with more variable inflation (and output) outcomes. Although the literature tends to suggest that greater central bank transparency is desirable, our findings imply that transparency might be associated with less satisfactory inflation performance. Interestingly, central banks using economic models do a better job of stabilizing inflation around the target and output around trend.