Suchergebnisse

Under United States law, the Department of Commerce (Department) and the International Trade Commission (ITC) are authorized to impose countervailing duties on imported merchandise that has been provided with foreign government export subsidies which result in, or threaten, material harm to United States industry. The United States is, however, a party to international agreements that contain elaborate "guidelines," and "illustrative" examples, dealing with both prohibited and permitted governmental export subsidies. These international export subsidy rules have been incorporated into the definition of "subsidy" set forth in United States countervailing duty law. Nevertheless, the Department evidently takes the positions that it has statutory authority to invoke countervailing duties directed against foreign governmental export subisidies that are expressly permitted to our trading partners by those international rules. In the Department's view, this result is required by domestic law even though the conduct in question - as the Department concedes- described as not prohibited by international obligations of the United Stats that the Congress purported to implement in 1979.

In what follows, I develop an account of when individuals can unilaterally impose moral obligations on others. I then use it to argue that people have the ability to unilaterally appropriate property. The lynchpin of this argument is a certain kind of natural right-what I will call the natural right to own property. The precise nature of this right, I will argue, renders original appropriation consistent with the moral equality of all. Adapted from the source document.

This paper explores the role of information in the formulation of trade policy for home and foreign country, in a setting in which the home government chooses its subsidy level first after which the foreign firm retaliates by imposing tariffs on its imports. We consider an environment in which home firm costs are private information but it can signal these costs to both policymakers and the foreign firm by choosing the appropriate output level. We show that a low-cost home firm has an incentive to misrepresent itself as high-cost. This is understood by the foreign firm and both policymakers and results in the home government setting a higher subsidy in the signalling case compared to the case when the home firm's output was not a signal of its costs; the foreign government sets the same tariff in both cases.

In this paper we claim that, in the WTO Appellate Body (AB)'s ruling in US — Countervailing Measures (China), the AB decision has not put in question the practice of imposing countervailing duties (CVDs). While the US has formally "lost" the case, a change in the procedures and tests used to motivate the CVD will allow the US to continue using this policy tool on the specified products. From an economic point of view, this is not welcome news since CVDs have the standard distortionary effects of tariffs and could go against environmental goals. From a political-economy point of view, the CVDs in this case appear driven by pressure of domestic manufacturers of clean energy technology and products.

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "Since fiscal year 2001, the federal government has been unable to collect over $1 billion in antidumping (AD) and countervailing (CV) duties imposed to remedy injurious, unfair foreign trade practices. These include AD duties imposed on products exported to the United States at unfairly low prices (i.e., dumped) and CV duties on products exported to the United States that were subsidized by foreign governments. These uncollected duties show that the U.S. government has not fully remedied the unfair trade practices for U.S. industry and has lost out on a substantial amount of duty revenue to the U.S. Treasury. This statement summarizes key findings from prior GAO reports on (1) past initiatives to improve AD/CV duty collection and (2) additional options for improving AD/CV duty collection."

Policing, environmental protection, and tax administration have much more in common than practitioners in these areas often recognize. Their cultures and traditions have, for the past few decades, incorporated a classic enforcement mentality, based on the underlying assumption that a ruthless and efficient investigative and enforcement capability would produce compliance through the mechanisms of deterrence. In these fields, and perhaps in many other enforcement or compliance oriented professions, Sparrow believes the traditional enforcement approach is under stress. There are too many violato