Suchergebnisse

Derivatives, and derivatives used to hedge financial and operating functions, are designed to allow managers of firms to manage effectively the downside risk of their financial and operating strategies. They also can be very useful tools that allow managers and executives to accurately predict financial and operational performance and manage the investment communities expectations regarding overall firm performance. Derivatives and hedges, however, if not properly designed in conjunction with the firm's risk management strategy, can be potentially disastrous for the firm. The ongoing financial turmoil in markets can be partially explained by company managers and executives not understanding the potential financial statement impact when derivative markets move in a particular direction for longer periods of time than anticipated by firms.

This study examines the extent of information about hedging activities disclosures within the annual reports of Main Market companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. The extent of hedging activities disclosures is captured through a 32-item-template, which consists of a mandatory and voluntary disclosure scores. The results of this study indicate that the extent of information on hedging activities disclosure is still insufficient among the sampled companies even though the disclosure scored is quite high. This study also examines the relationship between the existence of risk management committee (RMC), its characteristics and the extent of information on hedging activities disclosure in two separate statistical models. The regression results imply that the existence of RMC is positive but does not significantly influence the extent of information on hedging activities disclosure. However its characteristics (i.e. RMC independence and RMC meeting) have a significant influence. The findings may provide some meaningful insights to regulators, policymakers and researchers, towards the establishment of RMC as a part of the internal corporate governance mechanisms. In addition to its existence, the effectiveness of RMC also needs to be emphasized.

This paper provides a critical assessment of the line of research that measures speculative and hedging activities in futures markets from volume and open interest data. It makes several contributions. First, a detailed theoretical analysis of the measures proposed in the previous literature as proxies for speculative activity clarifies the circumstances in which they fail, as well as the assumptions that have to be made, when they are used as intended. Second, we propose a new way of combining the volume and the open interest figures, which provides additional information regarding the type of trading activity that takes place in the market on a given date. Finally, we analyse empirically the basic statistical properties of all the ratios when they are applied to real data for some of the stock index futures contracts most actively traded in the world. This empirical analysis shows the diverse behaviour of the ratios when they are applied to a common sample of real data, which confirms our previous theoretical findings. Our contributions should be taken into account when any of the measures is used as a proxy for the relative importance of speculative demand in empirical analyses.

Warfield Company is considering hedging the risk associated with (1) an available-for-sale (AFS) security portfolio and (2) an anticipated purchase of oil. Warfield's Board of Directors has limited experience in this area and has requested that you summarize the accounting and reporting implications if these items are hedged. The hedged risk in these two transactions can be either the risk associated with the cash flow or the risk associated with changes in the fair value. The two risks are discussed in separate parts of the case.

Macroeconomic volatility, in particular from exposure to volatile terms of trade in the form of volatile commodity prices, is an important source of risk for emerging market countries. As a consequence of this exposure, it has been argued, their probability of facing solvency problems on payments of their foreign currency debt is high, as are the country risk premia they must pay in order to borrow from international capital markets. While the availability of derivative contracts on many major commodity prices makes it possible to hedge commodity price exposure, many emerging market sovereigns either do not hedge a significant amount of their fiscal exposure to their major exports and import commodities or do not clearly report their hedging activities. In light of this phenomenon, and with the goal of crisis prevention in mind, we illustrate how a country exposed to shocks can execute its own insurance strategy against fluctuations in the prices of its major export commodities using futures and options markets. In the context of a model of sovereign default with endogeous sovereign spread and debt choice (Catao and Kapure (2004)), we demonstrate the resulting benefits of this insurance in terms of increased welfare for the country, a reduced soverign spread, and a higher debt ceiling. Additionally, we highlight some political economy problems leaders might face that hinder them from hedging in practice, and describe a hedging strategy to overcome these problems.

Macroeconomic volatility, in particular from exposure to volatile terms of trade in the form of volatile commodity prices, is an important source of risk for emerging market countries. As a consequence of this exposure, it has been argued, their probability of facing solvency problems on payments of their foreign currency debt is high, as are the country risk premia they must pay in order to borrow from international capital markets. While the availability of derivative contracts on many major commodity prices makes it possible to hedge commodity price exposure, many emerging market sovereigns either do not hedge a significant amount of their fiscal exposure to their major export and import commodities or do not clearly report their hedging activities. In this of light of this phenomenon, and with the goal of crisis prevention in mind, we illustrate how a country exposed to shocks can execute its own insurance strategy against fluctuations in the prices of its major export commodities using futures and options markets. In the context of a model of sovereign default with endogenous sovereign spread and debt choice (Catao and Kapur (2004)), we demonstrate the resulting benefits of this insurance in terms of increased welfare for the country, a reduced sovereign spread, and a higher debt ceiling. Additionally, we highlight some political economy problems leaders might face that hinder them from hedging in practice, and describe a hedging strategy to overcome these problems.

This article examines Iranian proliferation behaviour through the lens of nuclear hedging. Defined as 'nuclear latency with intent', hedging is an area of proliferation behaviour that has not been fully explored. The Iranian case presents an outstanding example of the questions and types of evidence required to judge whether a nuclear programme is engaged in a hedging strategy. By examining a nuclear programme from three distinct angles – technical, narrative and diplomatic – key elements of strategic hedging can be identified. Applied to Iran, evidence supports a diagnosis of hedging. But this assessment is further complicated by Iran's domestic political context, which has engendered an approach that is as much 'hedging by default' as it is 'hedging by design'. This approach allows Tehran to reconcile restraint with domestic consensus on nuclear advancement. In this regard, our analysis shows that international exposure of Iran's undeclared nuclear activities had an enormous impact on the direction of Iran's nuclear programme, placing important constraints on Iran's nuclear progress. The article argues that any solution to the Iranian nuclear challenge must be based on realistic goals. The international community should focus on containing Iranian advancements rather than rollback, with a view to restricting hedging to a low level of latency.

This paper provides survey evidence captured from a sample of 113 respondents to a 2008 questionnaire sent to 344 companies in Thailand. The study examines Thai hedging practices following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Thai companies, like their international counterparts, rely predominantly on matching and forward contracts to hedge transaction exposure. Thai companies, however, appear to be less rigorous when it comes to internal control and supervision of derivative activity. It is recommended that Thai companies improve their risk management practices by putting into place a documented hedging policy, which includes a requirement that senior staff be actively engaged in the risk management activities of the firm.

It is widely claimed that secondary states across East Asia are not purely balancing or bandwagoning, but rather hedging between the United States and China by combining policies of economic and political engagement with risk management. We argue that hedging behavior should not include costless activities that do not require states to face trade-offs in their security choices. We redefine hedging as signaling that generates ambiguity over the extent of a secondary state's shared security interests with great powers. This definition returns the focus to security relationships and better accounts for the trade-off between autonomy and alignment. Based on this definition, we argue that hedging occurs in far narrower (but arguably more interesting) circumstances than is widely believed. Many Asian states have existing treaty alliances with the United States or major territorial conflicts with China, creating path dependencies that reinforce balancing behavior rather than hedging. We therefore clarify cross-national variation in state behavior and contribute to the larger research project on regional responses to China's rise.