Suchergebnisse

Trade policy is generally considered to be a key leverage in the pursuit of labor norms, environmental standards, and human rights. This is even more so for the European Union (EU), which exerts an extensive market power and exclusive competences in trade while lacking a full-fledged foreign policy. In recent years, there has been a growing demand for making sustainable development provisions "enforceable" and for more frequently applying trade sanctions. Taking a post-development perspective, we interrogate the EU's enforceability discourse around the trade–sustainability nexus. We focus specifically on the conditionality behind the Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP). The EU GSP regime bears the "carrot" (reduced tariffs), the "stick" (preferential tariff withdrawals), and increasingly intrusive "monitoring" mechanisms. Drawing on the post-development literature, we problematize the discourses that fundamentally enframe the EU GSP conditionality regime: development through trade, performance of power, and epistemic violence. Empirically, we analyze these frames by looking at public-facing texts produced by policy elites in the EU as well as in Cambodia and the Philippines during the two most recent GSP reform cycles since 2014. We argue that the dominant discursive acts of policy elites in the EU and the two target countries congeal into a global presupposition that there is no alternative to the EU GSP regime, thereby effacing counterhegemonic perspectives and stripping emancipatory notions such as "dialogue" and "partnership" of their radical potential. This formulation demands a genuine commitment to researching with the very people the EU is intent on regulating, reforming, and rescuing to unsettle taken-for-granted views about EU trade sanctions.

(1): 2 March 1988. - 35 S., zahlr. Tab. - (TD/B/GSP/AUSTRIA/19) ; (GE.88-50575/9242e); (2): 3 March 1988. - II,30 S., zahlr. Tab. - (TD/B/GSP/AUSTRIA/20) ; (GE.88-50635/3404G)

AbstractTrade policy is among the EU's major capabilities to promote fundamental rights in developing countries. Conditionality clauses thus accompany EU trade agreements and tariff preferences under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP). Yet while conditionality in trade agreements have come under the spotlight and the EP has stepped up its engagement in this area of decision‐making, the GSP has largely not been addressed in scholarly debate. This article fills this void in the literature by exploring the conditions under which the EP asks for trade sanctions on beneficiaries of the GSP. I argue that the EP invests political resources in a beneficiary when this country is salient under EU development cooperation. Hence, I observe a horizontal spill‐over effect whereby EP trade activities are driven by a country's salience in the area of development cooperation. However, this effect occurs only in the absence of security interests and the lack of development performance.

The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from designated developing countries. Agricultural imports under the GSP totaled $2.1 billion in 2007, about 7% of all U.S. GSP imports. Some in Congress have called for changes to the program that could limit GSP benefits to certain countries, among other changes. Opinion within the U.S. agriculture industry is mixed, reflecting both support for and opposition to the current program. Congress made changes to the program in 2006, tightening its requirements on imports under certain circumstances. The 110th Congress extended GSP through 2009, likely making the GSP a legislative issue in the 111th Congress.

Free access for Georgian goods to the EU markets is one of the important factors for Georgia's economic development, attraction of investments and raising the standard of living. The European Union is the most important trade partner for Georgia. Great experience has been accumulated with respect to removing trade barriers between Georgia and the European Union. Despite it, certain problems still persist. In the present article, we have reviewed the systems of preferences with the European Union, the EU's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the essence of ongoing reform; we have assessed weak and strong sides of relations established between the European Union and Georgia in this regard; analyzed Georgia's export and import over the past years; also reviewed the prospect of a unified database; established existing and anticipated positive and negative factors. Based on the analysis, we have provided the relevant recommendations.

Free access for Georgian goods to the EU markets is one of the important factors for Georgia's economic development, attraction of investments and raising the standard of living. The European Union is the most important trade partner for Georgia. Great experience has been accumulated with respect to removing trade barriers between Georgia and the European Union. Despite it, certain problems still persist. In the present article, we have reviewed the systems of preferences with the European Union, the EU's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the essence of ongoing reform; we have assessed weak and strong sides of relations established between the European Union and Georgia in this regard; analyzed Georgia's export and import over the past years; also reviewed the prospect of a unified database; established existing and anticipated positive and negative factors. Based on the analysis, we have provided the relevant recommendations.