Suchergebnisse

AbstractRegulation plays a vital role in reducing harms and promoting public order. However, regulatory reform has been likened to painting the Sydney Harbour Bridge, it never ends. Coupling this reality with the increasing array of areas requiring regulation, there is an acute need for regulators to become more effective in how they work. We discuss the leadership skills needed to ensure regulators consistently contribute to the creation of public value.Points for practitionersRegulators can be more effective when they appreciate their authorising environment and the factors which make that environment dynamic.Careful calibration of enforcement practices to the capabilities of those being regulated can reduce conflicts and improve outcomes.Regulators with good communication skills can do much to resolve apparently intractable disputes.

Bitcoin stands like no other cryptocurrency for the profound transformation of financial markets in the digital economy. While the last few months saw the free trade in goods struggle against trends towards protectionism, cryptocurrencies seemed to tear down one border after the other – physical, geographic, and legal ones alike. A libertarian's wet dream. Blockchain presents itself as a fortress against state intervention, for whatever purpose. Finally, a technological, market-based solution would put an end to the problem of monetary policy, payment transactions, and make whole chunks of government regulation superfluous. .

By thinking loudly about putting the regulation of cryptocurrencies on the agenda of the G20, governments seem to have managed to keep the Bitcoin bubble from inflating into a systemic risk, so far. In a tongue-in-cheek sense, this behavior of supervisory and regulatory authorities can be described as the distributed ledger technology of financial supervision. It is distributed because it does not have a clear center. The G20 seems to be the common reference point for many actors, but it does not speak itself. It is like a shared code.

This cloud audit toolkit is designed to support the work of financial regulators in developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank. It aims to assist and accelerate the uptake of cloud computing technologies and digital tools to improve the efficiency and efficacy of financial regulators' work processes. Drawing on existing practices observed by leading regulators from across the globe, the toolkit provides a comprehensive framework for improving supervisory work processes. It also includes a checklist to help regulators conduct an initial review of their existing oversight mechanisms.

AbstractThe emergence of behavioral public administration has led to increasing calls for public managers and policy makers to consider predictable cognitive biases when regulating individual behaviors or market transactions. Recognizing that cognitive biases can also affect the regulators themselves, this article attempts to understand how the institutional environment in which regulators operate interacts with their cognitive biases. In other words, to what extent does the "choice architecture" that regulators face reinforce or counteract predictable cognitive biases? Just as knowledge of behavioral insights can help regulators design a choice architecture that frames individual decisions to encourage welfare‐enhancing choices, it may help governments understand and design institutions to counter cognitive biases in regulators that contribute to deviations from public interest policies. From these observations, the article offers some modest suggestions for improving the regulatory choice architecture.

We analyze the regulation of firms that undertake socially risky activities but can reduce the probability of an accident inflicted on third parties by carrying out non verifiable effort. Congress delegates regulation to an agency, although these two bodies may have different preferences toward the industry. The optimal level of discretion left to the agency results from the following trade‐off: the agency can tailor discretionary policies to its expert knowledge about potential harm, but it implements policies that are too "pro‐industry." The agency should be given full discretion when the firm is solvent; partial discretion is preferred otherwise. We then investigate how this trade‐off changes as the political and economic landscapes are modified.

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Risk Principles -- Appendix 1. Beta Coefficients for Selected Regulated, Formerly Regulated, and Related Market Sectors (2015) -- Appendix 2. Key Court Decisions Regarding Risk -- Glossary -- Notes -- References.

The Journal of Employment Counseling invites articles of interest to readers. To contribute to the journal, follow these guidelines and send your manuscript to the Editor: Norman Amundson, Department of Educational and Counselling Psychology, and Special Education, Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia, 2125 Main Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z4.

The Journal of Employment Counseling invites articles of interest to readers. To contribute to the journal, follow these guidelines and send your manuscript to the Editor: Norm Amundson, Dept. of Educational and Counselling Psychology, and Special Education, Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia, 2125 Main Mall, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Z4.