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Arnaboldi highlights the importance of one of the three pillars of the Banking Union, the common mechanism for insuring deposits. She claims that integrated financial markets require a European solution with regard to deposit insurance and that the establishment of a pan-European scheme could address the problems for large cross-border banks.

Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) become more visible under the current conditions of the world financial markets. If those have played in the past a rather discreet role for social stability through the function of pay box following a bank failure, the recent crisis put them in a new light, once the guarantee ceiling for eligible deposits grew in order to make for the accumulation of wealth worldwide and the increased risk incurred by the leverage of banking operations. Consequently, the resources accumulated by the DGS from the member banks and their proper management make possible their involvement in pre-emptive actions aimed to avoid bankruptcies via special administration and purchase of assets and assumption of liabilities. These new attributes give DGS a role in the mechanism of financial safety-net, along the supervisors of the market. Hence, an increased preoccupation for applied corporate governance has developed and Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems have been adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision together with International Association of Deposit Insurers. Concurrently, the EU Commission has put forward a process for reviewing the Directives 94/39 and 09/14 EC, in order to make the European DGS more prepared to deal with above mentioned issues and bestow increased confidence upon depositors. Keywords: deposit guarantee scheme, deposits, banking system, surveillance, risks. (Romanian Journal of European Affairs / SWP)

In this note, a new concept for a European deposit guarantee scheme is proposed, which takes account of the strong political reservations against a mutualization of the liability for bank deposits. The three-stage model for deposit insurance outlined in the text builds on existing national deposit guarantee schemes, offering loss compensation on a European level and at the same time preventing excessive risk and moral hazard taking by individual banks. ; In dieser Notiz wird ein neues Konzept für eine europäische Einlagensicherung vorgeschlagen, welches den starken politischen Vorbehalten Rechnung trägt, die gegen eine Vergemeinschaftung der Haftung für Bankeinlagen bestehen. Das skizzierte drei-stufige Einlagensicherungsmodell führt existierende nationale Einlagensicherungseinrichtungen weiter, bietet einen europäischen Verlustausgleich und verhindert eine exzessive Risikoübernahme zu Lasten der internationalen Gemeinschaft.

In this note, a new concept for a European deposit guarantee scheme is proposed, which takes account of the strong political reservations against a mutualization of the liability for bank deposits. The three-stage model for deposit insurance outlined in the text builds on existing national deposit guarantee schemes, offering loss compensation on a European level and at the same time preventing excessive risk and moral hazard taking by individual banks. ; In dieser Notiz wird ein neues Konzept für eine europäische Einlagensicherung vorgeschlagen, welches den starken politischen Vorbehalten Rechnung trägt, die gegen eine Vergemeinschaftung der Haftung für Bankeinlagen bestehen. Das skizzierte drei-stufige Einlagensicherungsmodell führt existierende nationale Einlagensicherungseinrichtungen weiter, bietet einen europäischen Verlustausgleich und verhindert eine exzessive Risikoübernahme zu Lasten der internationalen Gemeinschaft.