Suchergebnisse

Einstellung ausgewählter Personen zu innen- und
außenpolitischen Fragen.

Themen: Beziehungen BRD und USA; Einstellungen zur EWG, zur
NATO, zu einer europäischen Atomstreitmacht und zur Lagerung
von Atomwaffen auf deutschem Boden; Vorbehalte gegenüber den
Notstandsgesetzen; Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands und
Entspannungspolitik; Einstellung zur Verringerung der Streitkräfte;
Einstellung zu diplomatischen Beziehungen mit arabischen und
osteuropäischen Staaten; wichtigste Gründe für den Sturz der
Regierung Erhard; präferierte Wahlrechtsreform; Beurteilung der
Wahlerfolge der NPD; eigene Parteipräferenz; Dauer der
Mitgliedschaft im Deutschen Bundestag.

Demographie: Konfession; Beruf; Bundesland.

In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of a fringe of managerial firms affects the stability of a cartel of strict profit-maximizing firms. There always exists a critical dimension of the fringe that makes the cartel unstable, and this dimension is non-monotone in the total number of Örms. By appropriately selecting the dimension of the fringe, a policy maker can affect the equilibrium outcome. As an example, I consider the case of a domestic authority that is contemplating whether to allow entry of a fringe of managerial foreign firms in the domestic market to increase the competitive pressure, thereby enhancing domestic welfare.

Domestic opposition to violent, escalatory national policies during international crises has long been considered an important factor influencing the foreign policy behavior of nations. Yet the explicit theoretical linkages between domestic opposition and crisis choices have not been investigated. To provide these linkages, we set out an extensive form game of sequential decisions leading to the various consequences of crises together with their attendant costs and benefits. Our findings indicate that an antagonist's beliefs about domestic opposition are not particularly effective levers to manipulate in crises when a peaceful resolution is the goal.

This paper investigates whether and how the distance in institutional quality between investing and target country affects the pattern of foreign land acquisitions. We estimate a panel gravity-like equation to assess the impact of the institutional distance on the amount of land acquired and the number of contracts signed. Our results show that the institutional distance significantly affects both the number of contracts and the amount of land, but that the direction of these effects varies according to the geographical region and the relative strength of institutions in the target countries, with Africa following a pattern of its own.