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AbstractBalancing the trade-off between economic efficiency and social objectives has been a challenge for natural resource managers under rights-based management. While the actual prioritization should be guided by social preferences, the mechanisms and consequences of the quota transfer system need to be well understood. We investigate the effects of the quota transfer scheme implemented in the Norwegian coastal cod fishery in 2004. This is a small-scale fishery that has traditionally been important for employment in the northern part of Norway. Using vessel-level quota registry data, we estimate the effect of quota trading on vessel exit using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits variation in implementation timing between regulatory groups. In addition, we describe the outcome of quota consolidation with descriptive statistics. Our results confirm that the quota transfer scheme accelerates the exit of vessels from the fishery by at least 5% points in the short run. The descriptive analysis reveals great heterogeneity in both the size and geographic location of exiting vessels, suggesting that the scheme has distributional impacts. While the policy change has the expected effects in the short run, our results suggest that the implications of consolidation last longer. This has implications for policymakers trying to balance economic efficiency and social objectives of rational fishery management.

Many European countries are exploiting common fish resources in the EU community waters and hence the management of their fisheries is highly governed by the European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The main objective of the CFP is that it 'shall ensure exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions ' (Council Regulation 2371/2002, p61). Since the establishment of the CFP in 1983, the application of Total Allowable Catches (TACs) has been a key element in achieving the CFP's objectives. Each year in December, the TACs for the coming year are negotiated between the European Commission and the Council of Ministers for Fisheries, and all Member States receive a fixed share or quota from the agreed TACs. Setting TACs is the final step of an annual process, which starts with the collection of fishery- and stock-related data at the national level. Data gathering is subjected to the provisions of the Data Collection Regulation (DCR; Council Regulation 1543/2000 and Commission Regulations 1639/2001 and 1581/2004) and ILVO-Fisheries is one of the partners who carries out the DCR for Belgium. Fishery independent data (derived from surveys at sea with research vessels) and fishery dependent data (e.g. landings and discard statistics, length and age compositions of fish caught by fleet segments, etc.) are used to assess the status of the stocks. The assessment of stocks in the North East Atlantic occurs under the umbrella of ICES, the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. It is also ICES who advises the European Commission on the fishing opportunities for the coming year(s). The Commission makes use of the advice to formulate the TAC proposals for the Council of Ministers in December.

While the global environment faces increasing pressure on its living resources, total bans on exploitation may not always provide a practical or preferable solution for their protection. This is especially true for international fisheries and wildlife such as leopards and elephants. In this context, quotas have arisen as a compromise between protection and unbridled exploitation. They seek to ensure the sustainable utilization of threatened resources. Wildlife quotas, adopted largely through the CITES regime, restrict the rights of countries to trade internationally threatened national resources. Internationalfisheries quotas limit the right to exploit national and open access resources. Quotas have, however, led to mixed results. Yet the distinction must be made between thefailure of a quota per se and the failure of an environmental protection regime through which quotas are implemented. If the correct conditions exist, including accurate determination, enforcement, and international cooperation, quotas can still provide a valu able tool for environmental management.

The profile of small-scale fisheries has been raised through a dedicated target within the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG14b) that calls for the provision of 'access of small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets'. By focusing on access to fisheries resources in the context of European Union, in this article we demonstrate that the potential for small-scale fishing sectors to benefit from fishing opportunities remains low due to different mechanisms at play including legislative gaps in the Common Fisheries Policy, and long-existing local structures somewhat favouring the status quo of distributive injustice. Consequently, those without access to capital and authority are faced by marginalizing allocation systems, impacting the overall resilience of fishing communities. Achieving SDG14b requires an overhaul in the promulgation of policies emanating from the present nested governance systems.