Suchergebnisse

The effects of financial system on economic growth rate are identified. To do this in an endogenous stochastic growth model with two types of financial systems, efficient and inefficient ones, the effects on growth are studied. This investigation shows that financial inefficiency has a negative impact on growth. A financial regulation through a capital yield tax corrects negative impacts on growth; furthermore, the necessary conditions for growing under this scenario are characterized. An empirical study is carried out in order to verify the relationship between economic growth and financial regulations. © 2017 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Economía. ; Versión del editor ; Producción Científica de la Universidad de Panamericana

This volume deals primarily with the administration of Government finances in relation to the consolidated fund including the supply services. It sets out the principles involved and gives some indications of their detailed application in so far as they are common to Government ministries and departments. The volume has incorporated and as appropriate revised the contents of the Revised Financial Orders (1968 edition) and other general instructions which had been issued in form of Treasury circulars at the time of printing. (DÜI-Hff)

This study assesses how effective governance institutions and de jure financial openness influence the attitude of policy makers in pursuing further financial development by allowing the use of cryptocurrency. In other words, we examine the relationships between a) de jure openness to cryptocurrency and institutional strength and b) de jure openness to cryptocurrency and de jure capital openness. Our main method of estimation is a cross-sectional ordered probit model using institutional and macroeconomic data drawn from several sources, including the Chinn-Ito index, the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the World Bank's World Development Indicators, among others, over the period 2010-2018. To measure the de jure openness to cryptocurrency, we compose an index of 218 economies by using the current legal and regulatory status of cryptocurrency compiled in 2018. Our results show that effective governance institutions are associated with a less restrictive regulatory stance on cryptocurrency, whereas financial openness is not found to be significant. The results imply that a certain level of institutional quality may be necessary before opening up to new forms of financial technology. As cryptocurrency is recognized as a risky speculative financial instrument, its current state of many unknowns can prevent policy makers from conducting a thorough surveillance to avoid system-wide vulnerabilities.

There is heightened interest in reforming government regulation of financial institutions to make better use of market discipline and data. We strongly support such reforms, which are being implemented to some degree by the Federal Reserve System. However, market oriented reforms will not work unless government policies are credible in putting market participants, especially those at the largest financial institutions, at risk of loss. Establishing credible policies requires that governments address the time-consistency problem head-on. As a result, we recommend policies that establish credibility by directly reducing the incentive that policy-makers have to protect the creditors of financial institutions. Other policies, which do not address the fundamental reasons why policy-makers bail out creditors, are therefore likely to be circumvented when large banks get into trouble.

During the 1980s, deregulation became adopted as a slogan and set of practices which by setting market forces free could increase the efficiency of market systems. This was particularly the case in the financial services where national systems which had been closed through government and industry collaboration were now opened up to more internal and international competition. This book examines the consequences of deregulation in retail financial services. It shows that organisation and actors sought to adapt to this process, often with unexpected results.

published_or_final_version ; Public Administration ; Master ; Master of Social Sciences

The current banking regulatory framework assigns EU government bonds a risk weight of zero. Since the European debt crisis, there has been increasing controversy over eliminating this equity capital privilege, which is viewed as contributing to the close relationship between state and bank risks. This report analyses the development of home bias—the tendency of major European banks to invest disproportionately high in domestic government bonds—for Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain. In addition, it examines how much additional equity capital the banks of the euro area's major nations would require if equity capital privilege were eliminated. This report shows that home bias has increased over the last four years for many major European banks. Home bias only affects the additional capital requirements of Italian and Spanish banks, as their home countries have comparatively weak ratings. The estimated additional capital required if equity capital privilege were to be abolished indicates that Italian banks have the highest capital requirement at 11.5 billion euros, followed by the Spanish banks at 9.5 billion euros. Eliminating equity capital privilege would thus make it much more difficult to finance sovereign debt in Italy and Spain. Therefore, it would be advisable to introduce risk weighting for government bonds only after the EU sovereign debt levels have stabilized. At the same time, measures should be taken to make it easier for banks to reduce their home bias and better diversify their government bond portfolios.

Das aktuelle Regelwerk zur Bankenregulierung erlaubt ein Risikogewicht von null für EU-Staatsanleihen. Seit der europäischen Verschuldungskrise wird verstärkt über die Aufhebung des Eigenkapitalprivilegs gestritten, weil die Nullgewichtung als ein Grund für die engen Verbindungen zwischen den Risiken von Staaten und Banken gesehen wird. Dieser Bericht analysiert die Entwicklung des Home Bias – also der Neigung der europäischen Großbanken, überproportional in Staatsanleihen des Heimatlandes zu investieren – für Deutschland, Frankreich, das Vereinigte Königreich, Italien und Spanien. Außerdem wird der potentielle Eigenkapitalbedarf für den Fall der Abschaffung der Nullgewichtung von Staatsanleihen bestimmt. Es zeigt sich, dass der Home Bias in den letzten vier Jahren bei vielen europäischen Großbanken zugenommen hat. Auf den zusätzlichen Eigenkapitalbedarf wirkt sich der Home Bias nur bei spanischen und italienischen Banken aus, da deren Heimatstaaten eine vergleichsweise schwache Ratingnote haben. Die Abschätzung des zusätzlichen Eigenkapitalbedarfs im Falle der Aufhebung des Eigenkapitalprivilegs zeigt für die italienischen Banken mit 11,5 Milliarden Euro den höchsten Kapitalbedarf an, gefolgt von den spanischen Banken mit 9,5 Milliarden Euro. Damit würde die Abschaffung des Eigenkapitalprivilegs die Finanzierung der Staatsschulden in Italien und Spanien deutlich erschweren. Es wäre daher empfehlenswert, die Risikogewichtung für Staatsanleihen erst nach der Stabilisierung der Staatsverschuldung einzuführen. Gleichzeitig sollten Maßnahmen ergriffen werden, die es den Banken erleichtern, ihren Home Bias abzubauen und ihr Staatsanleihenportfolio besser zu diversifizieren