Suchergebnisse

Zum Ausgleich des Interessenkonfliktes zwischen Urheberrechtsinhaber und Werknutzer haben sich im internationalen Vergleich zwei grundlegend unterschiedliche Regelungstechniken entwickelt. Das eine Modell – dessen prominentester und wirtschaftlich bedeutendster Vertreter die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika sind – versucht den Interessenausgleich dadurch zu erreichen, dass einem umfassend gewährten Urheberrecht eine ebenso offene Schrankengeneralklausel gegenübergestellt wird. Der zweite, traditionell in den kontinentaleuropäischen Rechtsordnungen vorzufindende und auch in das deutsche Urheberrechtsgesetz übernommene Typus sieht dagegen einen abschließenden Katalog von Einzelausnahmen vor. Achim Förster widmet sich den Rechtssetzungsmöglichkeiten bei der Ausgestaltung urheberrechtlicher Schranken und stellt hierzu die Fair Use-Doktrin des US-amerikanischen Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 107) dem Schrankenkatalog des deutschen Urheberrechtsgesetzes (§§ 44a ff. UrhG) gegenüber. Er vergleicht Herkunft, Funktion und Handhabung der Schrankensysteme und untersucht deren Verwurzelung im Verfassungsrecht und in der Urheberrechtstheorie. Aus inter- und supranationaler Sicht stellt er die Frage, welche konkreten Vorgaben sich aus dem Völker- und Europarecht für die Ausgestaltung der nationalen Urheberrechtsschranken ableiten lassen. Der Autor wendet die so gewonnenen Erkenntnisse auf die aktuelle Diskussion zur Flexibilisierung des Schrankenkataloges an und bewertet die rechtspolitischen Optionen des deutschen Gesetzgebers. ; Addressing the different legislative approaches to copyright limitations, Achim Förster compares the wide scope of the U.S. fair use doctrine (17 U.S.C. § 107) with the German set of explicitly enumerated statutory exceptions. He assesses the major criteria for deciding whether or not certain uses are permitted under U.S. or German copyright law and addresses the question of why these criteria have emerged as a characteristic feature of each system. In addition, the author deals with the influence of international and European law on national copyright legislation and in conclusion makes a contribution to the German discussion on copyright reform.

During election season, politicians and political campaigns often use pop culture or iconic works, such as viral memes or popular songs, to help convey their political messages—often without authorization from the copyright owners of these works. As politics and politicians become ever more divisive, these unauthorized political uses of copyrighted works can be particularly objectionable to copyright owners. In addition to offending their political or moral inclinations, artists and copyright owners frequently claim that these political uses infringe their copyrights. Politicians and campaigns argue that their right to use copyrighted works for political purposes is protected by the First Amendment and that such political uses are presumptively fair use. This Article examines unauthorized political uses of copyrighted works under copyright law's fair use doctrine to demonstrate that, in fact, both sides are correct. Through a series of case studies, this Article identifies a pattern in political fair use decisions: in disputes arising from the unauthorized political uses of copyrighted works, courts appear to implicitly modify their analyses and balancing of the fair use factors under section 107 of the Copyright Act in order to both accommodate the import of political speech and to respect copyright owners' dignity and rights to control use of their expressive works. Under the courts' political fair use analysis, one determination—the nature of the original copyrighted work—seems to exert an outsized influence on the determination of all four fair use factors, permitting certain unauthorized political uses of copyrighted works to appear presumptively fair. This contradicts the Supreme Court's guidance to courts not to subject copyright to independent First Amendment review nor to expand copyright's fair use doctrine in infringement cases involving political or public figures. It also disregards certain copyright owners' right to control use of their work but permits other copyright owners the right to curtail infringing behavior that causes no market harm. This Article highlights these concerns and explores the normative implications of political fair use on litigation certainty and predictability, incentives to create political expressive works, and the balance between respecting creators' dignity and rights to control use of their expressive works with guaranteeing free and open discussion of politicians and political candidates.

The Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. solidified the treatment of fair use as an affirmative defense. However, treating fair use as an affirmative defense shifts the burden to the defendant while in most fair use cases plaintiffs are able to easily prove a prima facie case of infringement. This Article identifies that, despite its decision in Campbell, the Supreme Court has not yet undertaken a thorough analysis of whether Congress intended fair use, as codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, to be treated as an affirmative defense. In fact, as explored in this Article, the legislative history cuts against viewing fair use as an affirmative defense, and the legislative history explicitly confirms what the statute clearly states: Congress did not intend fair use to be an affirmative defense; a defense, yes, but not an affirmative defense. The negative consequences of labeling fair use an affirmative defense support shifting back to what Congress intended. Fair use should not be seen as an affirmative defense, but should instead be treated as a defense that shapes the scope of a copyright owner's rights.