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AbstractWhy do middle-income country governments use costlier sovereign debt markets when cheaper finance is available from official creditors? This research note argues that left-leaning governments with labor and the poor as core constituencies are likely to prioritize markets in their annual foreign borrowings. This is because markets provide an exit option from official creditor conditions that have disproportionately negative effects on working classes. This finding puts limits on disciplinary assumptions that left-leaning governments should have relatively less access to sovereign debt markets and thus use them less. Instead, left-leaning middle-income countries are likely to use proportionally more market finance as they fulfill annual foreign borrowing needs. This, in turn, shapes which middle-income countries are likely to become relatively more exposed to global debt market costs and pressures as they accumulate external debt over time.

Why do middle-income country governments use costlier sovereign debt markets when cheaper finance is available from official creditors? This research note argues that left-leaning governments with labor and the poor as core constituencies are likely to prioritize markets in their annual foreign borrowings. This is because markets provide an exit option from official creditor conditions that have disproportionately negative effects on working classes. This finding puts limits on disciplinary assumptions that left-leaning governments should have relatively less access to sovereign debt markets and thus use them less. Instead, left-leaning middle-income countries are likely to use proportionally more market finance as they fulfill annual foreign borrowing needs. This, in turn, shapes which middle-income countries are likely to become relatively more exposed to global debt market costs and pressures as they accumulate external debt over time.

The government decisions to call, in recent years, more and more reimbursable financing gave birth to fierce reactions among politicians and economy specialists. The present article aims to analyze how the external borrowing may be a solution to overcome the difficult situation where we are.

THE PAPER INVESTIGATES THE OPTIMAL TIME PATH OF CONSUMPTION AND EXTERNAL BORROWING IN THE DEPENDENT ECONOMY MODEL. THE SMALL COUNTRY FACES GIVEN WORLD PRICES AND A GIVEN WORLD REAL INTEREST RATE. THE PRESENCE OF A HOME GOODS SECTOR IMPLIES THAT THE RELEVANT REAL INTEREST RATE APPROPRIATE TO CONSUMPTION DECISIONS DEPENDS ON THE RATE OF CHANGE OF THE REAL PRICE OF HOME GOODS. THE PAPER SHOWS HOW TRANSITORY DISTURBANCES IN OUTPUT OR IN THE WORLD REAL INTEREST RATE AFFECT THE TIME PROFILE OF CONSUMPTION AND THE TRADE BALANCE. IN PARTICULAR IT IS SHOWN THAT THE PRESENCE OF A HOME GOODS SECTOR DAMPENS THE CONSUMPTION EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE WORLD INTEREST RATE.

Domestic public debt issued by emerging markets has risen significantly relative to international debt in recent years. Some recent empirical evidence also suggests that sovereigns have defaulted differentially on debt held by domestic and external creditors. Standard models of sovereign debt, however, mainly focus on how the actions of foreign creditors influence default decisions of sovereigns. Contrasting this one-sided focus, this paper adds to a new theoretical literature that points at the possibility of default on domestic debt and the consequences of doing so. It presents a model of an emerging market economy in which the government can selectively default on its domestic or external debt obligations. The model shows that the differential ability of domestic and foreign creditors to punish the government creates a gap in the expected default costs to the sovereign, and hence a differential in its propensity to default on its domestic versus foreign debt. The extent to which the possibility of differential treatment of creditors affects the composition of debt is explored. It shows that a country characterized by volatile output, sovereign risk, and costly tax collection will want to borrow in domestic markets as well as in international capital markets. The optimal allocation of debt between domestic and foreign creditors can thus be viewed as the government's purchase of insurance against macroeconomic shocks that affect its budget.

During the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, Congo (or Zaire, as Mobutu renamed the country) accumulated a public external debt of roughly $14 billion. At the same time, Mobutu and his associates extracted wealth from the country. By 1990, real capital flight from Zaire amounted to $12 billion. With imputed interest earnings, the accumulated stock of Zairian flight capital was nearly $18 billion. Congo's successor governments may be able to repudiate liability for the Mobutu regime's debts on the basis of the doctrine of odious debt. Creditors could then seek to recover their losses by identifying and impounding flight capital which was extracted from the country.

Fiscal policy is procyclical in developing countries. An ample literature has explained this fact and explored its consequences for aggregate cyclical fluctuations. Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) are an important source of finance for governments and therefore play a role in the execution of fiscal policy. In this paper, we assess whether MDB disbursements to the sovereign commove with government expenditure and with private sovereign lending, during different stances of fiscal policy and during fiscal crises. We find that multilateral lending to the sovereign is correlated with government expenditure and this correlation does not change if the government is running a surplus or a deficit. However, when the sovereign is having a fiscal crisis associated with unsustainable fiscal policy, this relationship disappears for Regional Development Banks (RDBs) and the World Bank (WB). Finally, we find evidence of synchronization between MDBs and IMF during fiscal crises.

Ghana is one of the earliest and most serious examples of the build up of foreign debt by a developing country to support its policies for economic growth. This study, first published in 1974 in conjunction with the Overseas Development Institute, analyses Ghana's economy over twenty years and highlights the problems of the debtor/creditor relationship between developed and developing countries.The study concludes with an assessment of the creditors' contribution to Ghana's critical debt position through their readiness to supply funds without adequately analysing the viability of the programm