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This Article identifies the causes and consequences of a puzzling asymmetry in constitutional law. Of the three facets of adjudicative factfinding-evidence, procedure, and rules of decision- only two are constitutionalized. Constitutional law regulates procedural and decisional rules, but not whether the evidence that factfinders use is adequate. Constitutional law regulates procedure through a set of rules that determine a person's power to control the trial by adducing evidence in support of her case and by examining the evidence of her adversary. Constitutional law regulates decisionmaking by setting probability requirements for findings of fact-standards of proof-and by allocating the burdens of proof among the prosecution, plaintiffs, and defendants. Constitutional law, however, does not control adequacy of the evidence upon which factfinders determine the probability of contested allegations and apply the burdens of proof. This is so because the Supreme Court interprets the Due Process Clause, as related to evidence, very narrowly. Under this interpretation, any evidence is constitutionally adequate when its use is not "fundamentally unfair." Moreover, "fundamental unfairness" occurs only in extreme cases such as those which exhibit a serious prosecutorial misuse of the trial process. Examples include when the government knowingly procures the defendant's conviction by false evidence or by evidence from which factfinders can draw no rational inferences. Anything less is not "fundamentally unfair." As a result, virtually any rule that controls evidential admissibility and identifies evidence that does or does not require corroboration is constitutional. The "fundamental unfairness" criterion practically exempts evidential adequacy from constitutional scrutiny.

Introduction : the crossroads of psychology and evidence law -- Part I. Minding the jury -- Judges versus juries : trying the facts -- Balancing acts -- Instructions to disregard and to limit use -- Part II. Judging the witness -- Witness the witness -- Character evidence : propensity and impeachment -- Part III. Other types of evidence -- Hearsay and exceptions -- Scientific and other expert evidence -- Conclusion: The lessons of psychology for evidence law -- Appendix A: Table of concepts -- Appendix B: Federal Rules of Evidence (abridged)

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of contributors -- Acknowledgements -- Foreword -- Introduction: Taking evidence teaching seriously -- PART 1: New tools -- 1. Learning Evidence with an uncasebook -- 2. Teaching Evidence Law in a flipped classroom -- 3. Using true crime to teach Evidence -- 4. Using mock voir dires to assess the Law of Evidence -- 5. Using deductive reasoning to teach the application of a heightened relevance standard to sexual history evidence -- 6. Using international criminal law to teach Evidence -- PART 2: New audiences -- 7. The influences of decolonisation on an Evidence curriculum -- 8. Undergraduate learning in Evidence: Complexities, challenges and opportunities -- 9. Bridging the law and forensic science divide -- 10. Teaching Evidence Law in Hong Kong after 1997 -- PART 3: New fields -- 11. A blended learning approach to teaching Electronic Evidence -- 12. Introducing Science and Technology Studies into the Expert Evidence course -- 13. Teaching legal ethics in a course on Evidence -- Conclusion: The horizon of Evidence Law teaching -- Index.