Suchergebnisse

'Die jüngsten Entwicklungen auf der internationalen Ebene haben das akademische Interesse an der 'Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik' (GASP) der Europäischen Union verstärkt, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Politik der EU gegenüber der arabischen Welt. In diesem Zusammenhang wird häufig auf die Rolle der EU als normativer Akteur hingewiesen und ihre Bedeutung bei der Verbreitung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten betont. Die Politik der EU gegenüber bestimmten Regionen wird also vor dem Hintergrund des Liberalen Idealismus betrachtet. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt diese Sichtweise in Frage. Er argumentiert stattdessen, dass eine am strukturellen Realismus orientierte Interpretation der GASP einen wichtigen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der EU-Außenbeziehung leisten kann. Anhand der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft, und insbesondere am Beispiel der EU-Politik gegenüber Marokko, zeigen die Autoren, dass die EU - entgegen den liberal-idealistischen Werten der GASP - autoritäre Regime in den Partnerländern unterstützt und fördert, um auf diese Weise den Mittelmeerraum zu sichern.' (Autorenreferat)

The relations between Morocco and the European Union rotate, especially from the Moroccan side, around one single desire: The creation of a Free Trade Zone (FTZ). From the first EU-Morocco Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (1996) until the new Agreement on Agriculture (2010), through the granting of Advanced Status to Morocco (2008), most agricultural and industrial products enjoyed certain privileges, financial advantages and finally their practical liberalisation on the EU market. This research will focus on the analytical study of the Institutional Framework to develop relations between the EU and Morocco on agriculture. In this sense, we will analyze: Firstly, the legal framework that legally and politically regulates these relations, i.e. the Treaty on European Union (1992) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004); secondly, the agreements that have had the greatest impact on agricultural development in Morocco.

Human rights — Self-determination — Non-self-governing territories — Western Sahara — Moroccan claim to sovereignty — International non-recognition — National liberation movements — Front Polisario — Extent of recognition by United Nations — Principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources — Agreement between European Union and Morocco — Decision of the Council of the European Union — Whether Council obliged to consult Front Polisario before adopting decision — Whether Council obliged to ensure the implementation of agreement not infringing fundamental rights of population of Western Sahara — Human rights under European Union law — Whether applicable to Western Sahara — Whether Front Polisario possessing legal personalityInternational organizations — European Union — Rights and obligations under international law — Agreement between European Union and Morocco — Whether European Union obliges to respect general international law regarding Western Sahara — Scope of European Union human rights law — Whether agreement between European Union and Morocco extending to Western Sahara — Standing of Front Polisario to challenge decision of Council of the European Union regarding AgreementStates — Sovereignty — Extent of sovereignty — Morocco — Western Sahara — International recognition of Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory — Whether agreement between Morocco and European Union applicable to Western SaharaTerritory — Non-self-governing territory — Western Sahara — Claims by Morocco — International recognition — Status of Western Sahara before United NationsTreaties — Application — Scope — Principle that treaty not applicable to third parties — Agreement between European Union and Morocco — Whether applicable to Western Sahara — Whether Western Sahara a third party — The law of the European Union

This paper examines the recent, current and potential future role of the European Union in Morocco, especially with regard to public sector governance reforms under the 'Hakama' programme, and 'advanced regionalization'. Based on several interviews with key EU officials in Rabat and Brussels as well as other key informants in donor organizations and academia and a thorough review of primary and secondary written materials, this paper first takes stock of the implementation of regulatory convergence under the 'Advanced Status' agreement. It then analyzes the 'Hakama' program and past twinning projects as a potential tool to further the EU's influence, arguing that the EU's approach of 'more for more', where financing disbursements are made conditional on concrete policy reform measures means that it can only push reforms slowly and with limited influence. However, this may be exactly what it wants to do at the current juncture: given its primary concern with stability, particularly post-Arab uprisings, the EU does not want to rock the boat while seeking to still pursue its interests – migration control, anti-terrorism cooperation, economic benefits, all through the effort of 'exporting the EU order beyond the border', though with mixed results. Morocco for its part is much less dependent on the EU than it used to be as it has more leverage on the migration and security fronts, and also because many other donors are available who are happy to fund under less stringent conditions. It can thus afford to pick and choose. In this context, the cautious approach regarding the advanced regionalization issue can be explained, as all of these factors mean that the EU does not seem to have a clear plan or vision on what to do or whether it is worth doing anything. ; Funded by the European Research Council (ERC) within the 7th Framework Programme, the BORDERLANDS project is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, and directed by Professor Raffaella A. Del Sarto.

The intention of this master-thesis is a critical assessment of the European Union´s (EU) approach to external democracy promotion in Morocco. The study follows a comparative approach and compares the approach pursued by the EU within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), incepted in 2004, with the approach that it had developed up until then under the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The comparison is done with the intention to analyse, to what degree it is justified to speak of a new impetus for democratisation through the ENP in partner countries. The analysis takes into consideration the range of possible instruments for external democracy promotion in the categories "diplomacy", "conditionality" and "positive instruments". For the comparison of democracy promotion under the EMP and the ENP it is suggested to compare the implemented measures in respect to three distinct dimensions: As a first dimension, instruments of democracy promotion are analysed with respect to the focus on indirect vs. direct instruments, e.g. those which aim at establishing socio-economic preconditions favourable to successful democratisation, vs. those which immediately intervene in the processes of political reform. As a second dimension, it is asked whether there has been a shift in the democracy promotion approach on a continuum between consensual cooptation and coercive intervention. As a third dimension, finally, it is analysed whether the approach has undergone a general intensification of efforts, e.g. whether the approach to democracy promotion has become a more active one. The analysis in this master-thesis comes to the conclusion that since the inception of the ENP the EU is indeed pursuing a slightly more direct and certainly a more active approach to democracy promotion in Morocco, while no significant change can be observed in comparison to the strictly partnership-oriented and consensual approach of the EMP. It can be argued that, under the ENP, relations to Morocco have indeed become somewhat more "political", although at the same time they are still not pro-actively oriented at a political liberalisation of the political regime. Reforms promoted by the EU in Morocco are modest and largely in line with the reform agenda of the Morrocan government itself – e.g. a still largely authoritarian monarchy. Concrete reform steps directed at an opening of the political space, which is largely reserved to the king and its administration, are neither demanded nor supported by democracy promotion instruments, also under the ENP. ; Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit untersucht den Ansatz der Europäischen Union (EU) zur Demokratieförderung in Marokko. Die Arbeit folgt einem vergleichenden Ansatz und vergleicht die Strategie der EU, die unter der 2004 ins Leben gerufenen "Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik" (ENP) verfolgt wird, mit der, die sich bis dahin unter der "Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft" (EMP) herauskristallisiert hatte. Der Vergleich wird mit dem Ziel durchgeführt herauszuarbeiten, inwiefern es berechtigt ist, neue Triebkraft und neue Anstöße für Demokratisierung durch die ENP zu erwarten. In der Arbeit werden alle Instrumente der Demokratieförderung berücksichtigt, die in die Kategorien Diplomatie, Konditionalität und positive Unterstützungsleistungen fallen. Die durchgeführten Maßnahmen werden auf drei Ebenen verglichen: Auf der ersten Ebene wird untersucht, ob sich der Schwerpunkt verschoben hat zwischen indirekten Maßnahmen, die insbesondere darauf zielen, die sozioökonomischen Voraussetzungen für erfolgreiche Demokratisierung zu schaffen, und direkten Maßnahmen, die unmittelbar in politische Reformprozesse eingreifen. Auf einer zweiten Ebene wird gefragt, ob sich der Ansatz der Demokratieförderung auf einem Kontinuum zwischen Konsens und Zwang verschoben hat. Auf einer dritten Ebene schließlich wird untersucht, ob sich das Engagement generell intensiviert hat und der Ansatz der Demokratieförderung aktiver geworden ist. Die Analyse in dieser Arbeit führt zu dem Ergebnis, dass seit der Initiierung der ENP tatsächlich ein leicht direkterer und aktiverer Ansatz verfolgt wird, während sich an dem streng partnerschaftlichen und auf Konsens ausgerichteten Ansatz der EMP nicht signifikant etwas verändert hat. Es wird jedoch auch deutlich, dass politische Reformen von Instrumenten der Demokratieförderung zwar häufiger anvisiert werden. Die Reformen, die von der EU gefördert werden, sind jedoch ausschließlich Teil des von der marokkanischen Regierung eingeleiteten und begrenzten Reformprozesses. Reformen die eine signifikante Öffnung des politischen Raumes bewirken könnten, der für die autoritäre Monarchie reserviert ist, werden auch im Rahmen der ENP von der EU weder gefördert noch gefordert.