Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- A European Crisis: Perspectives on Refugees, Europe, and Solidarity -- A Common Commitment: Civil Society and European Solidarity in the 'Refugee Crisis' -- Resisting Euroscepticism and Anti-refugee Populism in Europe: The Portuguese Case -- Bringing Solidarity and Hostility to EU borders: The Calais Camps at the Heart of French-UK Securitization of Immigration Process -- Not Securitizing Migration? Lessons From Spain -- The Refugee Crisis and the Re-imagined Politics of Belonging: Political Discourses on the Western Balkan Route -- The Vanishing European Dream: The Double Crisis of Migration and European (Dis)Integration -- Turkey as a 'Strategic Partner' of the European Union during the Refugee Crisis: The Challenges and Prospects -- The European Union Crisis as a Crisis of Equality -- From Identity to Morality Politics: Croatia's Nation-State-Building During the Crisis -- EU Responses to Refugee Migration: the End of (Security) Community? -- Note on contributors.

The European crisis came to an end when first political leaders and then the European Central Bank promised to do whatever it takes to safeguard the euro. Specifically they committed to create a European banking union and to buy unlimited amounts of sovereign debt in distressed markets for governments that made a binding commitment to reform. Markets were initially sceptical and yet ultimately persuaded by the commitment of European elites. Events in Italy and Cyprus threatened to return Europe to crisis and yet were ultimately managed without major turmoil. Somehow along the way, however, the desire of European elites to do whatever is necessary began to waver and their commitment to banking union diminished. The European crisis has ended but Europe is not yet resilient enough to ensure that it will not recur.

The European crisis came to an end when first political leaders and then the European Central Bank promised to do whatever it takes to safeguard the euro. Specifically they committed to create a European banking union and to buy unlimited amounts of sovereign debt in distressed markets for governments that made a binding commitment to reform. Markets were initially sceptical and yet ultimately persuaded by the commitment of European elites. Events in Italy and Cyprus threatened to return Europe to crisis and yet were ultimately managed without major turmoil. Somehow along the way, however, the desire of European elites to do whatever is necessary began to waver and their commitment to banking union diminished. The European crisis has ended but Europe is not yet resilient enough to ensure that it will not recur