Suchergebnisse

Sociologists of science who portray their work as a challenge to the epistemology of science, including H. M. Collins (Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, London: Sage Publications, 1985), are criticized. One reason is that they target hackneyed, positivist defenses of the unique position of scientific knowledge of the physical world, rather than tackling the more sophisticated formulations. The dispute cannot be resolved by empirical evidence drawn from studies of science or history. The aim of science is the acquisition of knowledge of the physical world, with experiment rather than mere observation as the source of significant scientific data. Sociologists' assertion that scientific debates are settled by social & political pressures rather than by experimental means is seen as an extreme position unsupported by case examples. Experimental outcomes are determined by the physical world itself. One branch of the sociology of science, constructivism, takes antirealism to the point that the physical world itself seems to be a social construction, & fails to distinguish between knowledge & the object of knowledge. The use of relativistic sociology of science to justify serious treatment of "creation science," for example, is raised as a possibility. A. Waters

Many Christian traditions affirm a doctrine of assurance. According to this doctrine, those who are saved have assurance of their own salvation; that is, the doctrine of assurance tells us that the elect can know their status as elect. In this paper, I explore two developments of the doctrine of assurance by theologians (i.e. John Calvin & Kenneth Keathley) and argue that they fail to accommodate the fallibilistic nature of human knowing. I then develop a fallibilistic doctrine of assurance, which makes such assurance available to most Christians, and respond to an objection from the camp of pragmatic encroachment.

A review essay on books by: Robert Nisbet, Conservatism: Dream and Reality (see IRPS No. 49/89c01175); John Gray, Liberalism; & David McLellan, Ideology (all published in Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1986 [see listings in IRPS No. 51]). While the individual is at liberty to accept his society's public self-conception, the social theorist is not, since his concern is explanation, which demands that he look behind the self-image, the ideology, to see what kinds of social relations do in fact prevail. McLellan addresses the problem of ideology, moving toward the conclusion that any successful account of ideology must recognize the inadequacy of the science/ideology dichotomy & the inadequacy of any view suggesting the omnipresence of ideology. While he is admirably clear in elucidating the views of Karl Marx, Karl Mannheim, & Jurgen Habermas, & identifying the difficulty in their respective accounts of ideology, he devotes little space to offering his own account, as opposed to indicating what such an account might do. Gray's Liberalism & Nisbet's Conservatism: Dream and Reality define the philosophies they defend by contrasting them with rival political outlooks; both share a common enemy, socialism. Gray defines liberalism as a single tradition with four shared elements: individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, & meliorism. While Gray is thorough in attempting to elucidate the conflicts & arguments within the liberal tradition, he is quite clear in formulating a particular conception of liberalism that he thinks worth defending. Nisbet's variant of conservatism is hard to categorize; while much of his commentary is based on the writings of Edmund Burke, he brings into the conservative canon such diverse thinkers as G. W. F. Hegel, Alexis de Tocqueville, Joseph de Maistre, H. L. Mencken, Michael Oakeshott, & F. A. Hayek. While the three books discussed have differences of focus, they share a common concern with solving the problems of understanding & dealing with the world of ideas, beliefs, & practices; all see the importance for political theory of certain epistemological questions. F. S. J. Ledgister

In dem Beitrag geht es um die Frage, ob Durkheim sein Versprechen hält, den Rationalismus seiner Tradition unter dem Druck des Pragmatismus zu rekonstruieren und nicht einfach nur zu verteidigen. Zugleich soll eine angemessene Würdigung von Durkheims Auseinandersetzung mit dem Pragmatismus erfolgen. Daher werden (nach einer Einführung in die Problematik) in den beiden ersten Abschnitten der Pragmatismus und Durkheims soziale Konstitutionstheorie jeweils für sich als parallele Projekte vorgestellt und erläutert. In den folgenden Abschnitten werden die immanenten Schwierigkeiten in Durkheims eigenem Programm und Durkheims Kritik am Pragmatismus gegeneinander abgewogen. Abschließend wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob sich aus der Berücksichtigung der Einwände gegen beide Programme nicht eine Perspektive gewinnen läßt, die die Schwierigkeiten beider Seiten zu überwinden erlaubt. Dabei wird festgehalten: Was von Durkheims Theorie einer sozialen Konstitution der Kategorien und seiner Kritik des Pragmatismus bleibt, ist der Druck, die Konstitution kollektiver Identitäten und deren Folgen handlungs- und ordnungstheoretisch ernstzunehmen. (KW)

A review of Theodor Adorno's 1963 lectures on Problems of Moral Philosophy highlights how he points out antinomies that invariably snare Kant's moral philosophy. Adorno believed moral action could only emerge from virtue but modern society has made virtue obsolete. The dilemma occurs because social conditions that make a type of moral reflection necessary also make moral action impossible. Both Adorno's moral-epistemological argument that applies to the formal characterization of moral knowledge that enables moral practice & his social-theoretical argument aimed at the formal characterization of moral knowledge are detailed. Special attention is given to common misunderstandings related to Adorno's conclusion about the social obsolescence of virtue. Other issues discussed include the reflective transformation of morality into the political brought about by the individual's loss of social power or freedom & Adorno's notion of an individualization of virtue & a radicalization of politics as the only two possible but incomplete solutions to the contradictions of moral philosophy. Adapted from the source document.

A conception of legitimacy is at the core of normative theories of democracy. Many different conceptions of legitimacy have been put forward, either explicitly or implicitly. In this article, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy. I then argue for a conception of democratic legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension of public deliberation seriously. In contrast to standard interpretations of epistemic democracy, however, the conception I put forward avoids procedure-independent standards of correctness. Instead, it relies on a procedural social epistemology and defines legitimacy entirely in terms of the fairness of procedures. I call this conception of democratic legitimacy `Pure Epistemic Proceduralism'. I shall argue that it should be preferred over `Rational Epistemic Proceduralism', the conception of legitimacy that underlies the standard interpretation of epistemic democracy.