Political Economics: Redistributive Policies
POLITICAL ECONOMICS -- Table of Contents -- Prologue -- 1.Introduction to Political Economics -- 1.1 The Political Economic approach -- 1.2 Political Institutions -- 1.2.1 Simple Majority Voting -- 1.2.2 Agenda Setting -- 1.2.3 Borda Voting -- 1.3 A simple Example: Indirect Utility Function, Single-Peaked Preferences and the Bliss Point -- 2. Electoral Models -- 2.1 The Median Voter Model -- 2.2 Probabilistic Voting Model -- 2.2.1 The candidates -- 2.2.2 The voters -- 2.2.3 The timing of the game -- 2.2.4 The "Swing" voter -- 2.2.5 The candidates' decisions -- 2.3 An Example of Simple Majority Voting and Probabilistic Voting -- 3. Lobbying -- 3.1 Public Policy: A Local Public Good -- 3.1.1 The Social Optimum -- 3.1.2 Complete Fiscal Federalism -- 3.1.3 Partial Fiscal Federalism -- 3.2 Lobbying -- 4. Facts, Data and Relevant Issues of the Welfare State -- 4.1 Economic Policies and the Role of Government -- 4.2 Size and Composition of the Welfare State -- 4.3 Labor Market Issues -- 4.4 The Economic Approach to Government Intervention -- 4.5 The Political-Economics Approach to Government Intervention -- 4.6 Citizens' Opinions on the Welfare State -- 5. Redistributive Transfers in the Welfare State -- 5.1 The Economic Model -- 5.2 The Redistributive System: Winners and Losers -- 5.3 The Political Decision -- 5.4 Discussion -- 6. Pensions -- 6.1 The Economic Environment of the Voting Models -- 6.2 Individual Preferences over Pension Systems -- 6.2.1 Dynamic inefficiency -- 6.2.2 Reduced time horizon -- 6.2.3 Within cohort redistribution -- 6.2.4 Crowding out -- 6.2.5 Altruism -- 6.3 Voting on Pension Systems -- 6.4 Population Aging and Pension Systems -- 7. Labor Market Policies -- 7.1 A Simple Political Economy Model -- 7.2 Labor Market Institutions -- 7.3 The Political Game -- 7.4 Discussion -- 8. Structural Reforms
