Suchergebnisse

We consider a vertically differentiated model with two identical countries each having initially one firm. We compare two options: a unique international ecolabel set up by an international authority and two national ecolabels set up non-cooperatively by two national non-governmental authorities. The governments decide then to open or not their economies, then firms choose their environmental qualities and prices. We prove that relative to the case of national ecolabels, the international label lets the global welfare as it is or improves it. However, the improvement is always at the expense of one of the two countries, in which case the international label is not feasible unless the beneficiary country offers a compensation to the aggrieved one.

We consider a vertically differentiated model with two identical countries each having initially one firm. We compare two options: a unique international ecolabel set up by an international authority and two national ecolabels set up non-cooperatively by two national non-governmental authorities. The governments decide then to open or not their economies, then firms choose their environmental qualities and prices. We prove that relative to the case of national ecolabels, the international label lets the global welfare as it is or improves it. However, the improvement is always at the expense of one of the two countries, in which case the international label is not feasible unless the beneficiary country offers a compensation to the aggrieved one.

We consider a vertically differentiated model with two identical countries each having initially one firm. We compare two options: a unique international ecolabel set up by an international authority and two national ecolabels set up non-cooperatively by two national non-governmental authorities. The governments decide then to open or not their economies, then firms choose their environmental qualities and prices. We prove that relative to the case of national ecolabels, the international label lets the global welfare as it is or improves it. However, the improvement is always at the expense of one of the two countries, in which case the international label is not feasible unless the beneficiary country offers a compensation to the aggrieved one.

Das EU-Ecolabel.

International audience ; Since the early 1990s, national ecolabelling programmes have proliferated worldwide. The European Union (EU) implemented such a regional program in 1991. This decision was part of a broader orientation towards Integrated Product Policy approach in the EU. Since 1991, the development of European ecolabels has been slow and difficult. This paper examines industrial strategies vis-à-vis the EU ecolabel in order to understand the problems faced by the regulator in the development of this ecolabel. The first part of the paper defines and uses the concept of credence good in order to argue that the consumer cannot assess the ecolabel. Based on the examination of the development of the European ecolabel, the second part points out three variables that seem to influence the development of product eco-labels : i) the type of industry (i.e. the degree of heterogeneity between the sets of products sold by the different firms); ii) the threat of direct governmental regulation on the environmental quality of the product; and, iii) the magnitude of the final demand for a green variant of the product. The paper concludes with a discussion of on policy implications for policy makers interested in considering or promoting the use of ecolabels.

International audience ; Since the early 1990s, national ecolabelling programmes have proliferated worldwide. The European Union (EU) implemented such a regional program in 1991. This decision was part of a broader orientation towards Integrated Product Policy approach in the EU. Since 1991, the development of European ecolabels has been slow and difficult. This paper examines industrial strategies vis-à-vis the EU ecolabel in order to understand the problems faced by the regulator in the development of this ecolabel. The first part of the paper defines and uses the concept of credence good in order to argue that the consumer cannot assess the ecolabel. Based on the examination of the development of the European ecolabel, the second part points out three variables that seem to influence the development of product eco-labels : i) the type of industry (i.e. the degree of heterogeneity between the sets of products sold by the different firms); ii) the threat of direct governmental regulation on the environmental quality of the product; and, iii) the magnitude of the final demand for a green variant of the product. The paper concludes with a discussion of on policy implications for policy makers interested in considering or promoting the use of ecolabels.

International audience ; Since the early 1990s, national ecolabelling programmes have proliferated worldwide. The European Union (EU) implemented such a regional program in 1991. This decision was part of a broader orientation towards Integrated Product Policy approach in the EU. Since 1991, the development of European ecolabels has been slow and difficult. This paper examines industrial strategies vis-à-vis the EU ecolabel in order to understand the problems faced by the regulator in the development of this ecolabel. The first part of the paper defines and uses the concept of credence good in order to argue that the consumer cannot assess the ecolabel. Based on the examination of the development of the European ecolabel, the second part points out three variables that seem to influence the development of product eco-labels : i) the type of industry (i.e. the degree of heterogeneity between the sets of products sold by the different firms); ii) the threat of direct governmental regulation on the environmental quality of the product; and, iii) the magnitude of the final demand for a green variant of the product. The paper concludes with a discussion of on policy implications for policy makers interested in considering or promoting the use of ecolabels.

International audience ; Since the early 1990s, national ecolabelling programmes have proliferated worldwide. The European Union (EU) implemented such a regional program in 1991. This decision was part of a broader orientation towards Integrated Product Policy approach in the EU. Since 1991, the development of European ecolabels has been slow and difficult. This paper examines industrial strategies vis-à-vis the EU ecolabel in order to understand the problems faced by the regulator in the development of this ecolabel. The first part of the paper defines and uses the concept of credence good in order to argue that the consumer cannot assess the ecolabel. Based on the examination of the development of the European ecolabel, the second part points out three variables that seem to influence the development of product eco-labels : i) the type of industry (i.e. the degree of heterogeneity between the sets of products sold by the different firms); ii) the threat of direct governmental regulation on the environmental quality of the product; and, iii) the magnitude of the final demand for a green variant of the product. The paper concludes with a discussion of on policy implications for policy makers interested in considering or promoting the use of ecolabels.

IUU fishing has been a major nuisance in Nordic fisheries for many years, and it has proved difficult to get rid of the problem by governmental controls alone. Engaging consumers and the market however, could be a supplement to public actions, and make the loopholes smaller for this kind of black market economy. Ecolabeling is a tool which could contribute to responsible behaviour throughout the industry, and give the consumer the option of making informed choices. For the industry however, choosing the most relevant ecolabel can be difficult as there are several labels available on the market, and they emphasize different aspects of the sustainability concept. In this book prepared for the Nordic Council of Ministers by Det Norske Veritas a review of the most relevant ecolabels is presented, as well as an assessment of each label against a defined set of criteria. The intention of this publication is thus that it could be of assistance for businesses which are considering which ecolabels to choose for their products, and also to stimulate further discussions and professional development in the Nordic seafood sector in the realms of documentation, labelling and tracing.

AbstractEcolabels are designed to help consumers identify environmentally superior products and services; however, they are not all created equal. Some ecolabels have strong rules that promote environmental improvements, while others have weaker rules that permit free‐riding. Because information about ecolabel design and rule strength is typically not readily available at the point of purchase, consumers struggle to differentiate stronger ecolabels from weaker ones. We investigate whether ecolabel sponsorship is a signal that can help consumers distinguish between ecolabels according to the quality of their institutional design. Using data of 189 prominent ecolabels, we find that while most ecolabels have basic rules for environmental performance, monitoring, and conformance, the strength of these rules varies across labels according to sponsoring organization. Independent sponsors have the strongest ecolabel rules, followed by governments. Industry sponsored ecolabels have the weakest rule structures. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that sponsorship may provide important information about whether an ecolabel is designed with rules that effectively condition firms to promote meaningful environmental improvements.