Suchergebnisse

Acknowledgements This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council/Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council BioSocial initiative (Grant Number ES/N00048X/1; PH, ADM, LHP, RS, AF-S, MR). PH, GWH, and GH acknowledge the support of the Scottish Government's Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services Division (RESAS). The sequencing was carried out at the Aberdeen Centre for Genome-Enabled Biology and Medicine. The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the Maxwell Compute Cluster funded by the University of Aberdeen. The authors would also like to thank the participants of the Aberdeen 1936 Birth Cohort, without whom this research would not have been possible. ; Peer reviewed ; Publisher PDF

The impartiality of judges often expressed in the Latin maxim nemo iudex in propria causa interpreted to mean that no man should be a judge in his own cause together with the right of fair hearing make up the right to natural justice. This principle is recognized by a number of provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 165 (4) provides that the organs of state shall through legislative and other measures assist and protect the courts to ensure their independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness. Furthermore, section 34 of the same Constitution provides that everyone has the right to have any dispute resolved by the application of law by a court or, where appropriate another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 as incorporated in the Human Rights Act 1988, applicable in England since 2000 provides that: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations … everyone is entitled to a fair hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law." The independence of courts and impartiality of judges are closely related in that they operate to sustain public confidence in the administration of justice. This article advocates a return to the use of the manifest justice principle enshrined as the proper contextfor the application of the tests of "reasonable apprehension of bias" adopted by South African courtsand "real possibility of bias" adopted by English courtsin the consideration of allegation of apparent bias. This paper argues that the tests are differentand that while the English test is a move of English courts from the real danger/likelihood test in consonance with an overwhelming global jurisprudence the South African test is a move away from this global jurisprudence and arguably back to the real danger/likelihood test. This paper also argues that the reasonable apprehension test as applied by the minority in SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson Ltd (Seafoods Division Fish Processing)is a more acceptable interpretation of the reasonable apprehension test than the test laid down in President of the Republic of South Africa v South Africa Rugby Football Union (2) and its interpretation by the majority in SACCAWU v Irvin & Johnson Ltd (Seafoods Division Fish Processing). More importantly there is an examination of cases where the tests have been applied which hopefully shows that there are considerable problems and inconsistency in their application and argue that the manifest justice principle provides the proper context for the tests to be properly applied.

AbstractTo analyze moral notions in conflict dynamics, several conceptions of negotiation, moral notions in conflict perspectives, and elements of moral compromise are examined. Together, these indicators provide a framework for analyzing the moral dimensions of the mediator's role in complex negotiations. These ideas are illustrated through a discussion of the actions of two mediators in the Bosnia conflict during the 1990s. The analysis considers why these mediators were so different in their effectiveness and capacity to reach compromise. It also becomes clear when moral compromise is feasible.