This report reviews vehicle emissions standards in Europe, Japan and the United States, providing the reader with valuable comparisons. It also examines incentives for sulphur free fuels - which can contribute to reducing both conventional air emissions and carbon dioxide. It describes emissions control technologies and the impact of emissions on health and the environment and assesses the adequacy of emissions limits for new passenger cars and heavy duty diesel engines.
In: Fowler, Rob (2007) 'Emissions Reduction Targets Legislation', in Bonyhady T, and Christoff P, Climate Law in Australia, Federation Press, pp. 103-123.
In: Tol , R S J , Heintz , R J & Lammers , P E M 2003 , ' Methane emission reduction: an application of FUND ' , Climatic Change , vol. 57 , no. 1 , pp. 71-98 . https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022196517982
Methane is, after carbon dioxide, the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas. Governments plan to abate methane emissions. A crude set of estimates of reduction costs is included in FUND, an integrated assessment model of climate change. In a cost-benefit analysis, methane emission reduction is found to be instrumental in controlling the optimal rate of climate change. In a cost-effectiveness analysis, methane emission reduction largely replaces carbon dioxide emission reduction. Methane emission reduction reinforces the case for international cooperation in climate policy, but complicates the efficient allocation of emission reduction efforts. Methane emission reduction at the short run does not help to achieve the ultimate objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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Despite climate agreements like Kyoto and Paris, CO2 emissions keep rising. If this continues, we could run out of time to stop global warming from reaching dangerous levels by 2040. ...
ABSTRACTThis paper models joint implementation (JI) for emission reduction between a developed and a developing country. When the per unit price of JI abatement is negotiated, the relative pay-offs deviate from the ratio of bargaining powers. When firms bargain, country-wise gains can increase with a greater abatement target. But if the governments bargain, the developing country's gains increase at the expense of the developed country as the target increases. However, the Pareto optimal JI can be achieved only when the governments negotiate over both abatement and transfer.