Suchergebnisse

This paper aims to review the impact of the various tariff legislations passed from 1998 to 2003 on the structure of protection in the Philippines. The paper finds that while the overall level of effective protection has declined, it has remained uneven as some selected sectors have continued to receive relatively high effective rates of protection. As such, the economic distortions that characterize our tariff structure have continued to prevail and have led to the inefficient use of resources. The tariff structure continues to favor the manufacture of highly protected import substitutes at the expense of exportables. Oftentimes, the favored sectors are intermediate goods like sugar, petrochemicals, float glass, and steel which are inputs to a lot of products. Since the tariffs on the inputs are higher than the outputs, the cost of production has remained high affecting the competitiveness of the user sectors. The large disparities in tariff protection has provided incentives for lobbying. Thus, sustaining the trade reforms and encouraging competition to promote efficiency and consumer welfare has been very difficult.

AbstractDo relative concerns on visible consumption give rise to economic distortions? We re-examine the question posited by Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) building upon their general framework but recognizing that relative concerns can only apply to visible goods (e.g., cars, clothing, jewelry) and that households consume both visible and non-visible goods. Contrary to Arrow and Dasgupta (2009), the answer to this question turns to be always affirmative: the competitive equilibrium will always be different than the socially optimal one, since individuals do not take into account the negative externality they exert on others through the consumption of the visible good, while the social planner does. If one invokes separability assumptions, then the steady state competitive equilibrium consumption of non-visible goods will be strictly lower than the socially optimal one.

Germany is not facing a debt crisis, but rather a serious budget crisis triggered by the 'debt brake' ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC). This crisis is deeper than the 60 billion in unused "Corona debts" being shifted to a climate fund, as reported in the media. More fundamentally, the court has mandated that the federal budget strictly adhere to the "principle of annuality" (Jährlichkeit). This is the most significant impact of the court's ruling, and from an economic perspective, it is quite perplexing.

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has become an influential player in the field of direct taxation in the European Union in the past twenty years. However, it is unclear whether the ECJ's decisions actually increase tax neutrality and therefore contribute to the achievement of an internal market as stipulated by the European treaties or not. In 2006, the ECJ limited the applicability of specific tax rules in Europe that are intended to prohibit the excessive use of low-tax countries. Our counterfactual scenarios show that this restriction of so-called controlled foreign company (CFC) rules and the related emergence of IP boxes cast doubt on the positive effects the ECJ is assumed to have. Additionally, we show that the abolishment of IP boxes would strengthen tax neutrality in Europe. Overall, further research is needed to relate and harmonise economic and legal concepts of tax neutrality.

In this paper, we investigate how government transparency depends on economic distortions. We first consider an abstract class of economies in which a benevolent policy maker is privately informed about the exogenous state of the economy and contemplates whether to release this information. Our key result is that distortions limit communication: even if transparency is ex ante Pareto superior to opaqueness, it cannot constitute an equilibrium when distortions are sufficiently high. We next confirm this broad insight in two applied contexts, in which monopoly power and income taxes are the specific sources of distortions. (JEL: D82, E61)