Suchergebnisse

There are broadly five interconnected meanings of the noun 'discipline'. Disciplinawere instructions to disciples, and hence a branch of instruction or department of knowledge. This religious context provided the modern educational notion of a 'body of knowledge', or a discipline such as sociology or economics. We can define discipline as a body of knowledge and knowledge for the body, because the training of the mind has inevitably involved a training of the body. Second, it signified a method of training or instruction in a body of knowledge. Discipline had an important military connection involving drill, practice in the use of weapons. Third, there is an ecclesiastical meaning referring to a system of rules by which order is maintained in a church. It included the use of penal methods to achieve obedience. To discipline is to chastise. Fourth, to discipline is to bring about obedience through various forms of punishment; it is a means of correction. Finally there is a rare use of the term to describe a medical regimen in which 'doctor's orders' brings about a discipline of the patient. In contemporary society, there is, following the work of Michel Foucault, the notion of increasing personal regulation resulting in a 'disciplinary society' or a society based upon carceral institutions.

In this paper I would like to reflect on discipline as a category (as opposed to other possibilities, such as notion, structure, norm, protocol, etc.), and explain the quotation marks in the title, as they can always follow and amend the word discipline. my intention is to reconstruct a decades-long resistance to discipline (as punishment, control, violent pedagogy, militarism, fanaticism, masculinity, unfreedom), and to uncover the origin of praise for self-discipline, un-discipline or interdisciplinarity. Further, I would like to offer a few arguments in favor of discipline as one of the most important protocols of social ontology, and the unconditioned condition of cooperation, life and group work. Discipline is joint learning, as well as production and a nurturing of knowledge that constitutes and sustains an institution. the question is whether individuals' discipline indeed makes an institution necessarily better or more just. © 2019 CSIC.

With Discipline, we focus on techniques and mechanisms that advance corporeal, attitudinal, and behavioural docility and thereby contribute to contemporary processes of social differentiation and exclusion. Exploring the intersection of migration policy and welfare governance, we discuss disciplinary measures deployed at the intersection of welfare and migration regimes with the aim of understanding how internal border and welfare controls discipline poor non-citizens by criminalising certain kinds of behaviour. Drawing on concepts including micro-violence and micro-aggression, this keyword looks at bureaucratic practices, their justifications and their consequences for non-citizens, before moving on to theorise how such practices have come to permeate the wider society. Disciplinary systems of welfare governance depend on the threat of punishment: individuals are prompted to discipline themselves because they could become the object of disciplinary power at any moment. Such disciplinary techniques are efficient, productive, and subtle, and can result in the increasingly 'automatic' internalisation by non-citizens of certain kinds of behaviour.

Intro -- Title Page -- Chapter 1 -- Chapter 2 -- Chapter 3 -- Chapter 4 -- Chapter 5 -- Chapter 6 -- Chapter 7 -- Chapter 8 -- Chapter 9 -- Chapter 10 -- Chapter 11 -- Chapter 12 -- Chapter 13 -- Chapter 14 -- Chapter 15 -- Chapter 16 -- Chapter 17 -- Chapter 18 -- Chapter 19 -- Chapter 20 -- Chapter 21 -- Chapter 22 -- Acknowledgments -- About the Author.

As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected. This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that has important policy ramifications yet remains largely unexamined – a dramatic rise in interbank discipline. The Article demonstrates that today's large, complex banks have financial incentives to monitor risk taking at other banks, They also have the infrastructure, competence, and information required to be fairly effective monitors and mechanisms through which they can respond when a bank changes its risk profile. Interbank discipline thus affects bank risk taking, discouraging banks from taking some types of risk while potentially encouraging the assumption of others. Given its influence, ignoring the phenomenon can lead to inefficiencies and gaps in bank regulation. The rise of interbank discipline has positive and negative ramifications from a social welfare perspective. 'The good news is that self-interested banks may be expected to penalize a bank when it takes excessive risks, thereby deterring such risk taking. he bad news is that the interests of banks and society are not always so well aligned. Other banks, for example, may be expected to reward a bank when it changes its risk profile in a way that increases the probability that the government would bail the bank out rather than allowing it to fail. This is because a bailout protects a bank's counterparties and other creditors, even though socially costly. Interbank discipline ma thus encourage barks to alter their activities in ways that increase systemic fragility. In drawing attention to the powerful yet mixed effects of interbank discipline on bank activity, this Article contributes to a new generation of scholarship on market discipline. Its aim is not to question whether we need regulation, but to address the pressing issue of how we should allocate inherently finite regulatory resources. By reducing the regulatory resources devoted to activities that other banks are performing relatively well, increasing the resources devoted to activities that regulators are uniquely situated or incented to address and seeking to counteract the adverse effects of interbank discipline, bank oversight could be redesigned to more effectively promote the stability of the financial system.

As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly interconnected. This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that has important policy ramifications yet remains largely unexamined – a dramatic rise in interbank discipline. The Article demonstrates that today's large, complex banks have financial incentives to monitor risk taking at other banks, the infrastructure, competence, and information to be fairly effective monitors, and mechanisms through which they can respond when a bank changes its risk profile. This suggests that interbank discipline affects bank risk taking and merits more consideration than it has received thus far. The rise of interbank discipline has both positive and negative ramifications from a social welfare perspective. The good news is that self-interested banks may be expected to penalize a bank when it takes excessive risks, thereby deterring such risk taking. The bad news is that the interests of banks and society are not always so well aligned. Other banks, for example, may be expected to reward a bank when it changes its risk profile in a way that increases the probability that the government would bail the bank out rather than allowing it to fail. This is because a bailout protects a bank's creditors, even though it is socially costly. Interbank discipline may thus encourage banks to alter their activities in ways that increase systemic fragility. In drawing attention to the powerful yet mixed effects of interbank discipline on bank activity, this Article contributes to a new generation of scholarship on market discipline. Its aim is not to question whether we need regulation, but to address the pressing issue of how we should allocate inherently finite regulatory resources. By reducing the regulatory resources devoted to activities that other banks are performing relatively well, increasing the resources devoted to activities that regulators are uniquely situated or incentivized to address, and seeking to counteract the adverse effects of interbank discipline, bank oversight could be redesigned to more effectively promote the stability of the financial system.