Suchergebnisse

Der Digital Markets Act (DMA) bringt eine Vielzahl neuer Regeln für grosse Plattformbetreiber in der Europäischen Union. Die Verpflichtungen gehen über das Wettbewerbsrecht und Kartellrecht hinaus. Davon betroffen sind auch alle Unternehmen, die die zentralen Plattformdienste der "Gatekeeper" nutzen sowie die privaten Endnutzerinnen und -nutzer der Plattformen. Sie können sich bei Behörden und vor Gericht auf neue Rechte berufen.Systematisch präzise verliert der Kommentar nie den Blick für die Anwendungsfragen der Praxis. Das Werk erläutert - wer als "digitaler Gatekeeper" direkter Adressat der verbotenen Verhaltensweisen ist- wie die Verpflichtungen umgesetzt werden müssen- welche Rechte den gewerblichen Nutzer/innen der Plattformen - zum Beispiel Händler/innen, Werbetreibende, App-Entwickler/innen - zustehen- wie im Falle eines Verstosses gegen die Gatekeeper vorgegangen werden kann

Vertical restraints applied by major operators of digital markets have become a serious challenge for international regulators and governments of leading world powers in recent years. Having new specific features in comparison with the restraints in force in traditional sales channels, they can lead to a rapid strengthening of the market power of dominant online platforms and to the subsequent monopolization of markets. The article is devoted to the study of business practices of applying various types of vertical restraints in global digital markets. Using the example of global leading companies (Apple Inc., Amazon, Booking.com., Microsoft, etc.), the market consequences of the introduction of exclusive and related contracts, cross-platform parity agreements, as well as a wide range of transaction bans are demonstrated. In particular, suppliers and dealers are significantly limited in their ability to sell competing products and brands and list them on major online marketplaces. Bans are introduced on the use of Internet sites for price aggregation and comparison, as well as certain e-commerce platforms and certain types of payment means. At the same time, there are significant penalties for non-compliance with the terms of vertical contracts. Buyers and users are limited by the possibilities of using software products of independent developers, connecting to competing online services. Technological solutions are being introduced that increase the costs of sharing hardware and software of competing operators. And such solutions are greatly simplified in the conditions of existing "closed" global digital ecosystems. It is shown that the norms of vertical contracts of major market players are able to effectively eliminate the cost advantages of both existing operators and new firms, significantly increasing the entry costs and reducing potential of entering firms to attract the target audience at the start of activity. The most vulnerable here are, first of all, small highly specialized companies using low-budget business models. The author proposes a theoretical model that reveals the mechanism that prevents new firms from achieving the minimum effective sales volume. Using the example of the distributor's retail price control strategy, it is proved that the use of vertical contracts allows both increasing the profits of existing operators and successfully preventing potential competitors from entering the market. At the same time, it is noted that the use of vertical restraints contributes to solving a number of current business problems of large digital companies: effective protection of investments in the development of e-commerce channels, limiting the turnover of counterfeit products, deepening the differentiation of market supply, reducing the risks of price wars and leveling the actual "stowaway problem". Therefore, the qualification of vertical restraints as good practices, or as abuses of market power, should be based on an analysis of the objectives of such restraints and a comprehensive assessment of their potential consequences. An important step towards solving this complex and very sensitive problem may be the adoption of the Digital Markets Act by the European Parliament in 2023.

Compared with the size of China's digital market, competition enforcement in China in this area is relatively underexplored. It had been almost an entirely blank space until the end of 2020. This article summarizes the enforcement actions that have been taken to date, from few distant cases in which former authorities tentatively approached competition issues in this area, to more recent landmark cases in which more sophisticated analysis is provided and hefty fines are imposed. This article traces the enforcement history, thereby explaining the reasons of some China-featured situations, for example, a large amount of existing gun-jumping cases. It also studies some comparable enforcement decisions with a common issue, for example, dominance abuse in the digital market and a controversial topic in China—"choose one from two." Enforcement trends are also discussed to predict future development in this regard.

This innovative book provides state-of-the-art analyses of the current condition of the economics of digital markets. The most recent developments in web technology are evolving, creating an increasingly deregulated environment. Much of the impetus for liberalisation is in response to multimedia convergence and the globalisation of markets, leading to uncertainties in the sector. Gary Madden and Russel Cooper examine the microeconomics of platform structure and firm competition within and between digital markets, modern theoretical treatments of regulatory intervention in digital markets and the consideration of forward-looking experimental analysis of demand for yet-to-be provided services. Bringing together a highly focused group of eminent scholars, this book will appeal to academics, postgraduate students, and both international treaty and national government agencies as well as market analysts

In September 2022, the European Union (EU) legislature adopted the Digital Markets Act (DMA)—a landmark piece of regulation with the potential to transform the digital economy in Europe and beyond. Even after adoption, however, questions remain about its stated goals, underlying assumptions, scope, obligations, and eventual effectiveness. This article examines these questions using EU competition law not as a touchstone but as a reference point. First, the DMA's goals of "fairness" and "contestability" can be more accurately restated as the protection of intra-platform and the promotion of inter-platform competition. Second, the DMA is based on the idea that the enforcement of the abuse of dominance provision, Article 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), is ineffective both procedurally (due to lengthy investigations and remedial issues) and substantively (due to the difficulty of establishing dominance and abuse)—two assumptions that must be tested by examining competition law's track record. Third, the scope of the DMA is built around the concept of "gatekeepers," which are in turn defined based on turnover, market capitalization, and active users. Is this an application of the resurgent "big is bad" ideology or a proxy for market power? Fourth, the DMA imposes a list of dos and don'ts on gatekeepers, many of which are inspired by past or ongoing antitrust investigations. Does this experience justify the far-reaching obligations and if so, are they sufficiently flexible to allow for procompetitive gatekeeper conduct? Finally, the DMA is based on the idea that large online platforms have not continued to deliver the desired innovation outcomes and have reaped more than their fair share of the rewards from the innovation they brought. This assumption is tested by a historical look at Apple's App Store—the most important innovation platform to arise in the digital economy.