Destruction of weapons systems under multilateral arms control agreements
In: Disarmament: a periodic review by the United Nations, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 115-131
ISSN: 0251-9518
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In: Disarmament: a periodic review by the United Nations, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 115-131
ISSN: 0251-9518
World Affairs Online
In: Arms control today, Band 44, Heft 10, S. 8-17
ISSN: 0196-125X
World Affairs Online
In: Arms control today, Band 45, Heft 6, S. 23-26
ISSN: 0196-125X
World Affairs Online
In: Working Paper, 18
World Affairs Online
In: Arms control today, Band 45, Heft 6, S. 23
ISSN: 0196-125X
In: Arms control today, Band 28, S. 3-8
ISSN: 0196-125X
Examines differences between biological, chemical, and atomic weapons in terms of lethality and destructive power; argues that combining them under a single term obscures the overriding priority of reducing the nuclear danger. Some focus on US relations with Russia and Iraq.
In: SWP Comment, Band 30/2014
Russia's annexation of Crimea will make it harder for Germany to achieve its disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Joint action by Russia and the United States to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals appears unlikely in the medium term. And that reduces the chances of tactical nuclear weapons being included - as Germany would prefer - in a future arms control accord. While existing nuclear arms control agreements have not thus far been openly called into question, they may yet become consumed by the ongoing Ukraine crisis. Berlin should argue against NATO re-directing missile defences at a Russian threat. In order to prevent a further weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Germany can emphasise the value of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states. (author's abstract)
In: Contemporary strategic issues in the Arab Gulf
In: Gulf report special issue
World Affairs Online
In: World affairs: a journal of ideas and debate, Band 162, Heft 4, S. 158-173
ISSN: 0043-8200
World Affairs Online
In: Public administration and public policy, 114
Nonproliferation Issues for Weapons of Mass Destruction provides an understanding of WMD proliferation risks by bridging complex technical and political issues. The text begins by defining the world conditions that foster proliferation, followed by an analysis of characteristics of various classes of WMDs, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. It then explores the effectiveness of arms control, discussing current nonproliferation problems, nonproliferation prior to the fall of the USSR, and weapons safeguards. The book analyzes the future of these weapons, discussing delivery systems and potential use by states, terrorist groups, and individuals. The text concludes with a discussion of what can be done to limit the impact of WMDs. This volume enables a realistic understanding of the relative risks that WMDs present to our way of life.
In: Arms control today, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 3-8
ISSN: 0196-125X
World Affairs Online
Russia's annexation of Crimea will make it harder for Germany to achieve its disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. Joint action by Russia and the United States to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals appears unlikely in the medium term. And that reduces the chances of tactical nuclear weapons being included - as Germany would prefer - in a future arms control accord. While existing nuclear arms control agreements have not thus far been openly called into question, they may yet become consumed by the ongoing Ukraine crisis. Berlin should argue against NATO re-directing missile defences at a Russian threat. In order to prevent a further weakening of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Germany can emphasise the value of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon states. (SWP Comments)
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In: SWP-Aktuell, Band 42/2014
Die russische Annexion der Krim wird die Erreichung der Ziele erschweren, die Deutschland bei der Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen verfolgt. Gemeinsame Schritte Russlands und der USA zur Reduzierung strategischer Atomwaffen dürften mittelfristig unwahrscheinlich sein. Damit sinken die Chancen, dass taktische Atomwaffen wie von Deutschland gewünscht in die Rüstungskontrolle einbezogen werden. Auch wenn geltende nukleare Rüstungskontrollabkommen bislang nicht offen in Frage gestellt wurden, können sie immer noch Opfer der aktuellen Ukraine-Krise werden. Berlin sollte dafür eintreten, dass die Nato ihr Raketenabwehrsystem nicht auf Bedrohungen ausrichtet, die von Russland ausgehen. Um einer weiteren Schwächung des nuklearen Nichtverbreitungsvertrags entgegenzuwirken, kann Deutschland den Wert von Sicherheitsgarantien für Nichtatomwaffenstaaten hervorheben. (Autorenreferat)