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A major underlying assumption in burnout research is that burnout is a phenomenon to be found primarily in the human services professions. The focus of this study is the effect this assumption has had on conventional definitions of burnout. The generalizability of the concept of depersonalization, frequently cited as a part of burnout, is tested in a nonhuman services occupation. In addition, the study controls for the effect of Jungian psychological type, since one particular Jungian type is overrepresented in the human services. It was found that depersonalization was not a salient construct in this occupational setting. Further, the construct was not the unidimensional one said to exist in the human services. It was also found to be type-specific. Negative reactions to other people were associated with the burnout measure only for that Jungian type which predominates in the human services. Another Jungian type, which is underrepresented in that occupational arena, reacted with a greater degree of personalization. The concept of depersonalization may, therefore, not only not be applicable across all situations but not applicable across all individuals.

This is the final version. Available on open access from Frontiers Media via the DOI in this record ; Disruptions in the ordinary sense of selfhood underpin both pathological and "enlightened" states of consciousness. People suffering from depersonalization can experience the loss of a sense of self as devastating, often accompanied by intense feelings of alienation, fear, and hopelessness. However, for meditative contemplatives from various traditions, "selfless" experiences are highly sought after, being associated with enduring peace and joy. Little is understood about how these contrasting dysphoric and euphoric experiences should be conceptualized. In this paper, we propose a unified account of these selfless experiences within the active inference framework. Building on our recent active inference research, we propose an account of the experiences of selfhood as emerging from a temporally deep generative model. We go on to develop a view of the self as playing a central role in structuring ordinary experience by "tuning" agents to the counterfactually rich possibilities for action. Finally, we explore how depersonalization may result from an inferred loss of allostatic control and contrast this phenomenology with selfless experiences reported by meditation practitioners. We will show how, by beginning with a conception of self-modeling within an active inference framework, we have available to us a new way of conceptualizing the striking experiential similarities and important differences between these selfless experiences within a unifying theoretical framework. We will explore the implications for understanding and treating dissociative disorders, as well as elucidate both the therapeutic potential, and possible dangers, of meditation. ; European Union Horizon 2020

We propose that personal status affects the extent to which individuals have a depersonalized perception of the self, that is, perceive themselves in terms of their group membership rather than individuating characteristics. In two experiments, we tested the prediction that individuals with low personal status tend more to depersonalization than individuals with high personal status, especially when individual distinctiveness is threatened. Results were generally in line with predictions. In Experiment 1, in which relative group size was manipulated, individuals with low personal status displayed more depersonalization than individuals with high personal status, although independent of relative group size. In Experiment 2, in which group immersion was manipulated, individuals with low personal status reported more depersonalized judgments than individuals with high personal status when group immersion was high.

AbstractDepersonalization/Derealization Disorder (DPD) is a psychopathological condition in which subjects suffer from a massive alienation from themselves and the world around them. In recent years, several philosophers have proposed accounts that explain DPD in terms of an alteration in global features of normal consciousness, such as 'mineness'. This article criticizes such accounts and develops an alternative approach, based on the observation that many mental states relate to the subject because of the kind of state they belong to. I argue that most symptoms of DPD can be understood as impairments in such forms of self-relation.